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PREFACE 
When I originally began to research on the Statute of Limitation 
in Tasmania, my main object was to examine the need for such a 
legislation in Tasmania, the reasons leading to the passing of 
the Limitation Act, 1974, and how the courts have interpreted 
various provisions of the Act, relating to extension of time. 
However, I found that such a study would be incomplete without 
looking at the development of the Statute of Limitation in the 
United Kingdom as Tasmania and indeed the other states of 
Australia all received the English law. As such, quite a fair 
proportion of my thesis is historical in that it traces the 
development of the Statutes of Limitation in the United Kingdom 
and in the various states of Australia. 
Since, equitable principles are preserved by the Limitation Act, 
1974, (Tas), I have also had to trace the historical development 
of equity, so that the whole topic could be viewed in its proper 
perspective. This again has made my thesis more historical than 
I originally intended. 
In the final chapter I have suggested reforms to the Tasmanian 
Act which should be either by passing a completely new Act using 
the foundation of modern limitation Acts like those of British 
Columbia and Alberta or alternatively to introduce immediate 
changes in the areas of discretion and the abolition of the 
"Custody of a Parent" rule. 
I would like to thank Professor DRC Chalmers who has given me 
invaluable help, advice and encouragement all along and my wife, 
Belinda, for her patience and understanding in typing this 
manuscript. 
JULY, 1995 	 Davidson A James 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Courts are always flooded with a multitude of civil actions. 
When a civil action is instituted by a party the law allows the 
defendant to raise the defence of limitation of action, where the 
party instituted proceedings outside the given time period. 
This thesis examines the defence of limitation of action. A 
person who has a good cause of action against another is given 
a certain period of time to institute legal proceedings. His 
claim should not be barred by statute. This time constraint for 
instituting proceedings is referred to as limitation of action. 
The need for a time constraint for instituting proceedings is 
justified on the grounds that there must be a limit on the level 
of litigation. More importantly, time constraints may be 
justified as otherwise there would be no end to stale claims 
being resurrected against unfortunate defendants, who would 
continue to remain under the constant threat of legal 
proceedings. Therefore, from a very early period in time in the 
development of the common law, statutes were enacted to stipulate 
time periods within which actions had to be instituted. The 
effect of these statutory time periods was to prevent any 
plaintiff, who did not institute' proceedings within the 
stipulated time period, from pursuing his right in a court of 
law. Originally, the early statutes of limitation were 
established with reference to real actions such as distress, 
entry and proceedings for recovery of realty. The periods of 
limitation were limited from the occurrence of some recent or 
fixed era as from the death of a particular king or the 
coronation of another. Some such event set the beginning of the 
general limitation period. As for example by the Statute of  
Merton, 1236 1 which was the earliest of such statutes, a claimant 
in a writ could not claim any seisin earlier than the reign of 
Henry the second and likewise by the Statute of Westminster, no 
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claim could be made earlier than that of Richard the First. These 
dates were unaltered and allowed to continue for such long 
periods that with the passage of time they became in effect no 
limitation at all. 
Later, the modern concept of a time period commencing on the 
accrual of a cause of action was established by the Act of  
Limitation with Proviso, 1540. This statute was the first English 
Statute to adopt general limitation period based on the 
commencement of a cause of action. In other words, real actions 
were limited not from any fixed date or event but according to 
a fixed interval of antecedent time. From this time, the basic 
policy of statutes of limitation have remained the same namely 
to preclude the right of an action after the lapse of the 
prescribed time. 
The reason underlying the introduction of limitation periods 
remains valid that it may often be harsher' to allow a dormant 
claim to be revived than to prevent it being enforced. So in A 
Court v Cross2 , Best C.J. said "....it has been supposed that the 
legislature only meant to protect persons who had paid their 
debts, but from length of time had lost or destroyed the proof 
of payment. From the title of the act to the last section, every 
word of it shows that it was not passed on this narrow ground. 
It is, as I have heard it often called by great judges, an act 
of peace. Long dormant claims have often more of cruelty than 
justice in them". 
The need and justification for limitation periods have been 
recognised on many occasions by judges, for instance in Board of  
Trade v Cayzer. Irving & Co 3 , Lord Atkinson stated "...the whole 
purpose of this Limitation Act, is to apply to persons who have 
good causes of action which they could, if so disposed, enforce 
and to deprive them of the power of enforcing them after they 
2 
have lain by for the number of years respectively and omitted to 
use". Lord Goddard C.J. in Jones v Bellgrove Properties Ltd4 
stressed the problem of evidence which arises if a dormant action 
is revived. The learned Chief Justice stated "...if a claim is 
made for payment of a debt many years after it has been incurred, 
there may be difficulty in proving that the debt ever was in fact 
incurred or that it was not already paid and so forth. That is 
why the law bars the right of action after a certain period has 
elapsed from the accrual of the cause of action....". Finally, 
in R.B. Polices at Lloyds v Butler s Streatfield J., highlighted 
the need for finality in litigation and stated that, "....it is 
a policy of the Limitation Act that those who go to sleep upon 
their claims should not be assisted by the courts in recovering 
their property, but another, and, I think, equal policy behind 
these Acts, is that there shall be an end of litigation, and that 
protection shall be afforded against stale demands". 
From the several reasons of practicality, justice and finality 
of litigation which are proposed from time to time to explain the 
existence of the statutes of limitation, it would be apparent 
that an attempt is made to protect the defendant as well as the 
plaintiff. A plaintiff is encouraged not to sleep on his right 
but to institute proceedings as soon as he possibly could, as 
delay in prosecuting a claim by him could affect the accurate 
recollection of facts by him and his witnesses which inevitably 
could prove fatal to the plaintiff. 
Defendants on the other hand, are protected from being vexed by 
stale claims, as after the lapse of time, they could with 
certainty treat the matter as closed once and for all, and 
destroy all documentary evidence, which they might have to 
preserve otherwise. 
The general law relating to limitation of actions is not 
exhaustively found in the Limitation Act, 1974 as besides this 
Act there are various other legislation which provide for time 
periods for instituting proceedings in various specific cases. 
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This undoubtedly would give rise to conflict between the time 
provisions provided in the Limitations Act and those provided in 
the other legislation. 
Limitation of Actions may not be viewed upon as something worthy 
of academic consideration, however it is very practical and of 
immense value to legal practitioners, who view it as a potential 
time bomb. Further there are a whole body of case law which has 
evolved around the various aspects of limitation and certainly 
these are worthy of consideration. Then there is the question 
of balancing the policies of the Statute of Limitations, namely 
that of resurrecting stale claims against the undue injustice to 
a litigant which may result if he is barred from pursuing his 
claim. For these reasons, a discussion on the Statute of 
Limitation is justified. 
In this thesis, I have outlined the historical developments of 
the Statute of Limitation both in England and in Australia and 
then examined in detail the scheme and provisions of the 
Tasmanian Limitation Act. 
In particular I have looked at the provisions relating to 
extension of time where in certain instances like in an action 
for damages for negligence, nuisance, breach of duty, including 
damages in respect of personal injuries, a judge is given a 
general discretion to extend the period of limitation for 
bringing an action. Although a general discretion is granted by 
the Limitation Act, 1974, to judges, decided cases show that this 
discretion would be exercised only on certain established 
criteria and these criteria are examined in this thesis. 
Besides the general discretion, the Act also contains provisions 
for specific extension of time in cases where there has been an 
acknowledgment or part-payment by the defendant. 
Finally, I have included a chapter on some proposals for reform 
to the Tasmanian Limitation Act. 
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CHAPTER 1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LIMITATIONS 
1.1 THE ENGLISH POSITION 
Although the focus of this thesis is on the Tasmanian Statutes 
of Limitation, a discussion of the history of the Law of 
Limitation in the United Kingdom is directly relevant to a study 
of limitation in Australia generally and Tasmania in particular. 
First, by the process of reception, English law was introduced 
into each of the new colonies in Australia, as and when it was 
established. When Captain Cook and the early British Settlers 
occupied Australia, the laws and practices of Britain were 
adopted as the foundation for the Australian legal system% In 
fact the British treated the whole continent of Australia as 
territorium nullius under International law and applied the 
principles of law on settled colonies. Secondly, the states of 
Australia, including Tasmania, later enacted their own laws 
relating to limitation, all of which were modelled on the English 
Limitation Acts. Accordingly, in this section, I propose to 
trace briefly the Law of Limitation in the United Kingdom and in 
the next section examine how the law of limitation developed in 
the various states of Australia. A discussion on the law of 
limitation of the various states of Australia is included merely 
for comparative purposes with the Tasmanian Act. 
Again for comparative purposes, a discussion of the modern law 
of limitation in England is included as it would enable us to see 
what problems were encountered in the administration of the 
earlier Limitation Acts in England and how the legislature sought 
to overcome such problems. Some of the states of Australia have 
already changed their legislation to reflect the progressive 
changes in England whilst others including Tasmania have yet to 
make any changes. 
Prior to the passing of the Limitation Act, 1939, which came into 
force on 1st July, 1940, the general law relating to limitation 
of civil actions was embodied in a series of statutes. The most 
important of those statutes were the Limitation Act, 1623 2 The 
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Civil Procedure Act, 1833 3 , and the Real Property Limitation 
Acts, 1833 4 and 1874 5 . 
1.1.1. 	Scope of the Early Acts 
The Limitation Act, 1623 provided a 6 year limitation period for 
actions on contract or tort, 4 years for actions of trespass to 
the person and 2 years for actions of slander, where the words 
were actionable per se6 . Subsequently, the operation of the Act 
was extended so as to apply to simple contract debts alleged by 
way of set-off. 7 
The Civil Procedure Act, 1833 prescribed inter alia a period of 
20 years within which actions of debt on a bond or other 
speciality, or on a recognisance had to be instituted. 8 
The operation of the Real Property Limitation Acts 1833, 1874 
were confined to proceedings relating to land. 
The 1833 Act abolished real actions with three exceptions 9 thus 
leaving ejectment as the only action for recovery of interests 
in land. This Act also reformed the law as to the period within 
which owners could bring their actions to recover their interests 
in land and did away with the limitations arising from the 
operation of the doctrines of descents cast and discontinuance". 
This Act further repealed the Limitation Act 1623 so far as it 
related to land and enacted a more complete body of rules in its 
place. 
The 1874 Act amended the 1833 Act and inter alia reduced the time 
period for instituting proceedings in actions relating to land 
from 20 to 12 years. Whilst the Real Property Limitation Acts 
were confined to proceedings relating to land, the Limitation 
Act, 1623 and the Civil Procedure Act 1833 dealt with common law 
actions. The term "common law actions" was intended" to cover 
all civil actions other than those dealt with by the Real 
Property Limitations Acts, 1833 and 1874 and matters of trusts 
7 
or those matters where equitable remedies were available. 
Actions for recovery of land or rent (not being reserved by a 
lease), the recovery of money charged on land, cases of advowson 
and mortgages were governed also by the Real Property Limitation 
Acts 1833 and 1874. 
	
1.1.2. 	Other Statutory Provisions 
These preceding acts were not a comprehensive statement of the
•law relating to limitation as besides these general statutes, 
there were other enactments dealing with limitation for special 
classes of people, such as a claim by the Crown u , an action 
against any person for an act done in pursuance of a public 
duty13 compensation claims by workmen, 14 claims where deaths 
occur15 carriers liability, 16 actions in respect of infringement 
of copyright, 17 recovery of money lent by money-lenders 111 civil 
proceedings for recovery of debt19 actions by the Crown or 
private informers for the recovery of penalties under statutes, 20 
actions challenging the right of a person to hold a local 
government office, challenging the validity of statutory 
orders22 actions to enforce maritime liens 23 , and claims against 
trustees24 . 
1.1.3. 	The 1939 Act 
(i) Major Law Provision 
The term "Statutes of Limitation" was a collective term referring 
not only to the general Acts dealing with the main classes of 
action, but also to a great number of enactments prescribing 
special periods of limitation to special classes of people or 
special classes of action25 . With such a great multitude of 
statutes, relating to limitation all of which were passed on an 
ad hoc basis to meet a specific need, as and when they arose, 
there was bound to be anomalies. 
To remove these anomalies and with a view to unification of the 
existing statutes and generally to secure greater simplicity and 
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uniformity, a Law Revision Committee was set up on 10th January, 
1934. 
Following a comprehensive review of the whole field of limitation 
by the Law Revision Committee, it presented its report in 
December, 1934 26 . 
The committee generally favoured having a single period for the 
various causes of action rather than a multiplicity of different 
periods for different causes of action. Besides this, they were 
of the opinion that the rule that limitation period should run 
from the accrual of the cause of the action should be maintained 
and that a system barring the remedy rather than extinguishing 
the right by lapse of time should be preferred. 
The recommendations of the committee were substantially, accepted 
and implemented by the Limitation Act, 1939 which came into force 
on 1st July, 1940 27 . 
(ii) 1939 Act 
Although the Limitation Act, 1939 replaced the earlier enactments 
like the Limitation Act, 1623, the Civil Procedure Act, 1833, the 
Real Property Limitations Acts, 1833 and 1874 and the Public 
Authorities Protection Act, 1893, some of the statutes dealing 
with limitations in special cases are still preserved by a saving 
provision in the Act 28 . 
The 1939 Act for the first time arguably introduced a general law 
relating to limitation. The general object of the 1939 Act was 
to introduce as much uniformity in the law of limitation as 
possible. However, since the law of limitation deals with so many 
different classes of actions, it was not practical for the same 
period of limitations to apply to all cases. Thus the effect of 
the Act was that no longer or different periods of limitation 
applied to different actions unless there were good reasons for 
making a distinction 26 . 
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The Limitation Act, was modified to a limited extent by the 
Limitation (Enemies and War Prisoners) Act, 1945, the operation 
of which was retrospective. 
(iii) 	Developments after the 1939 Act; Personal Injuries 
In 1946, the Monckton Committee on Alternative Remedies 
recommended that in personal injury cases, the length of 
limitation period should be reduced to three years and that the 
special protection given to public authorities under the 1939 Act 
be abolished. 30 This recommendation was accepted by Parliament 
and the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act, 1954 was passed 
which came into force on 4th January, 1954. Since that date, a 
claim for damages for personal injuries was barred, unless it was 
instituted within three years of the date on which the cause of 
action arose. There was no provision for extension of time by 
the court. 
Arising out of a decision of the Court of Appeal in Cartledge &  
others v E Jopling & Sons Ltd, 31 the Edmund Davies Committee was 
set up to consider whether the law of limitation should be 
changed for personal injury claims "where the injury or disease 
giving rise to the claim has not become apparent in sufficient 
time" to enable proceedings to be commenced within the three year 
limitation period. In Cartledge's case it was held that the 
plaintiff could not claim damages for lung injuries caused as a 
result of breaches of statutory duty by the defendants after the 
expiry of the statutory period although they had no reasonable 
opportunity to discover this fact until more than six years after 
the damage had been done, by which time it was statute-barred. 
It was the view of the Edmund Davies Committee32 that in cases of 
personal injuries the plaintiff should not be out of time if he 
started proceedings within twelve months from his "date of 
knowledge". In other words a plaintiff should be allowed to 
institute proceedings within twelve months from the time he could 
reasonably have been expected to discover the existence and cause 
of his injury. This recommendation was given statutory effect 
1 0 
with the passing of the Limitation Act, 1963.33  The 1963 Act 
provided for the plaintiff to obtain leave of the court and 
catered for claims brought after the death of the injured person, 
either on behalf of his estate under the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934 or on behalf of his 
dependents under the Fatal Accidents Acts. Thus, it was now 
possible for an action to be commenced with leave of the court 
within twelve months from the date of the death of the deceased, 
where the deceased had been in a state of "justifiable ignorance" 
until he died, or the "date of knowledge" of the deceased had 
been less than 12 months before his death and that proceedings 
had been commenced, with leave of the court within twelve months 
of that date. 
(iv) 	The Problem Unresolved; The Dicta in Lucy 
Unfortunately, this was not the end of the problem, as was 
manifested by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Lucy v W T 
Henley's Telegraph Works Co Ltd & others. In this case the 
Plaintiff, a widow was claiming damages under the Fatal Accidents 
Act in respect of death of her husband from cancer alleged to 
have contracted while in the employment of the defendant some 
years earlier, by exposure to a chemical manufactured by ICI Ltd. 
Her application for leave to add ICI Ltd as defendants to the 
action was rejected and in dismissing her appeal the court held 
that since more than 12 months had elapsed from the date of death 
of the deceased, to allow the writ to be amended to include ICI 
Ltd as defendants would deprive them of the defence under s.3(4) 
of the Limitation Act, 1963. 
Yet another problem posed by the 1963 Act was that the 12 month 
period from the plaintiff's date of knowledge did not allow 
sufficient time for the plaintiff to instruct solicitors and for 
the solicitors to obtain leave and institute proceedings 35 . 
11 
(v) Law Commission - Inadequate Time in Certain personal Injury 
Cases  
These problems were referred to the Law Commission, which in 
November, 197036 , recommended that the one year period be 
extended to three years. This recommendation was implemented by 
the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1971. The effect 
of the 1971 Act was to give a plaintiff in any personal injury 
claim a period of three years from the date of his own knowledge, 
or in the event where the Plaintiff dies, three years from the 
date of knowledge of his dependents to institute proceedings. 
1.1.4. Recommendation of the Law Reform Committee 1971 
The Law Commission dealt with certain difficulties over personal 
injuries. However there were general moves to reconsider the 
whole area of personal injuries. This was referred to a special 
Law Reform Committee. 
In April, 1971, the Law Reform Committee was asked to consider 
"what changes in the law relating to the limitation of actions 
are in the opinion of the committee, desirable". 
This wide reference was further extended by the Lord Chancellor 
in 1972. 
Whilst the Law Reform Committee was reviewing the law of 
limitation, the Lord Chancellor in December, asked the Law Reform 
Committee to consider as a matter of priority the question of 
limitation in personal injury claims 37 . 
The committee accordingly presented two reports, the first being 
a report on the limitation of actions in cases of personal 
injury38 . 	In this report, the Committee recommended, inter 
(1) that three years should be retained as the normal 
period of limitation in personal injury actions. 
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(2) the principle underlying the Limitation Act 1963, 
whereby the injured person is entitled to sue outside 
the normal three-year limitation period provided he 
starts proceedings within three years of "his date of 
knowledge" should be retained. 
(3) an injured person's date of knowledge should be the 
date on which he first knew (or could reasonably have 
ascertained) the nature of his injury and its 
attributability to an act or omission on the part of 
the defendant. 
(4) ignorance of matters of law should not postpone the 
running of time. 
(5) the court should have a discretion to override a 
defence of limitation notwithstanding that the 
plaintiff has not sued within three years of his date 
of knowledge. 
(6) a plaintiff should not be required to obtain the leave 
of court as a condition of suing outside the normal 
limitation period. 
(7) no effect should be given to supervening disability 
save to the extent that it should be a factor relevant 
to the exercise of the courts' discretion where the 
plaintiff sues more than three years after his date of 
knowledge. 
(8) the rule whereby time runs against a person under a 
disability who is in the custody of a parent should be 
abolished. 
In their final report, the committee made certain recommendations 
on the law of limitation, outside the field of personal injury". 
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The committee inter alia concluded that° : 
(1) there should be no change in the law relating to 
supervening disability. 
(2) the freedom of parties to abridge and to extend the 
limitation period by contract should be retained. 
(3) the 12 year limitation period for an instrument under 
seal should be retained. 
(4) it should be the law that an acknowledgment must be 
written and signed. 
(5) no acknowledgment or part payment made after 
expiration of the limitation period should be capable 
of reviving a remedy which has already been barred. 
(6) the rule that limitation has to be retained and, 
accordingly, limitation should continue to be 
procedural rather than a substantive rule. 
(7) the rights of an owner of goods in respect of them 
should not be barred by lapse of time as against a 
thief or receiver as against a bona fide purchaser of 
the stolen property, or a person claiming through him. 
The owner's title should be extinguished after six 
years from the purchase. 
(8) there should be no limitation period in favour of a 
gratuitous transferee of stolen goods even if he is 
himself honest unless he can claim through a bona fide 
purchaser. 
(9) where money is lent, and no date is specified for 
repayment, time should not begin to run in favour of 
the borrower until a written demand for repayment is 
14 
made. 
(10) there should be no change in the various limitation 
periods relating to actions to recover land. 
(11) there should be no change in the law relating to the 
running of time against persons entitled to future 
interests in land. 
(12) the law of limitation as it applies to mortgages 
should not be altered. 
(13) there should be no change in the law relating to 
acquiescence or laches. 
(14) a trustee who is a beneficiary and who has acted 
prudently and honestly in distributing trust property 
should be able to rely on a defence of limitation 
except in respect of the share which he would have had 
to pay to the late-comer had all the beneficiaries 
(including himself) been sued in time. 
This report was substantially accepted and implemented by the 
Limitation Act, 1975. 
1.1.5. The Limitation Act, 1975; The Discretionary Power 
The 1975 Act simplified the notion of knowledge and provided that 
an injured person who discovers that he has a cause of action 
only after the three year limitation period has run would not be 
out of time as the three year period would commence from the 
"date of knowledge" and that a subjective test would be adopted 
to determine the "date of knowledge". Importantly, the courts 
were given a significant discretion not to apply the three year 
limitation period if it appeared to them that it would be 
'equitable' to allow the action to proceed. 
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The committee was of the view that the purpose of the discretion 
should be to enable the court to take into account in suitable 
cases the plaintiff's lack of knowledge of the law as a 
justification for not suing in time 42 . However, there has been 
a tendency to interpret the discretion provision in the widest 
term. This important discretionary power was commented on by 
Lord Denning M.R. in Fireman v Ellis ° where he said it "... 
gives a wide discretion to the court which is not limited to a 
'residual class of case' at all. It is not limited to 
'exceptional cases'. It gives the court a discretion to extend 
the time to all cases where the three year limitation has expired 
before the issue of the writ. It retains three years as the 
normal period of limitation.., but it confers on the court an 
unfettered discretion to extend the three year period in any case 
in which it considers it equitable to do so". 
Again, Ormrod L,J, observed as follows": "The language of the 
section, in my judgment, is quite clear. Having laid down the 
norm, it then gives the court the widest discretion to adapt the 
norm to the circumstances of any case in which it would work 
equitably. This is, in fact, a statutory analogy of the old 
tradition by which equity was called in to mitigate the rigidity 
of the common law in the interests of individual justice". 
(i) Comment on Discretion. 
It is submitted that a period of three years from the plaintiff's 
'date of knowledge' would be wide enough to cover every 
foreseeable situation, as time only commences to run from the 
date of knowledge and not earlier. If a plaintiff fails to 
commence an action within three years of his 'date of knowledge' 
surely, he should not be given a second chance at the expense of 
the defendant. Ignorance of the law is certainly not an excuse 
in all other cases and it is difficult to see why there should 
be a departure for this well established principle in cases of 
limitation. That being so, it is submitted that there is no need 
for an additional discretion to be vested in the court to 
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override a defence of limitation should the plaintiff fail to 
institute proceedings within three years of his date of 
knowledge. This discretionary power would cause undue hardship 
to defendants, who would not be able to organise their affairs 
accordingly, once the three year period from the plaintiff's date 
of knowledge has expired. 
If it is at all necessary to grant discretionary powers to the 
court to extend time, then it is submitted that the commencement 
of the three year period should run from the date of injury as 
a plaintiff who discovers that he has a good cause of action 
after the three years has expired, could apply to the court to 
exercise its discretion in his favour. 
One notable recommendation of the committee, namely, that an 
acknowledgment or part payment made after the expiration of the 
limitation period should not revive the remedy, is consistent 
with the attitude of limitation in respect of real property. In 
the case of real property, it was recognised that where the 
expiration of the limitation period had extinguished title to 
real property, no subsequent acknowledgment or part-payment could 
revive that title. This approach taken by the committee is 
commendable, as not only would there be consistency between real 
property and all other cases, but more importantly it recognises 
the fact that at the expiration of the time period the defendant 
gets a right, which is recognised at law. 
(ii) Recommendation on Money Lent 
Another notable recommendation of the committee was that relating 
to money lent with no specified period of repayment. The 
committee recommended in such cases that time should run in 
favour of the borrower only from the time of a written demand for 
repayment. The tendency of the Courts was to treat the cause of 
action in such cases to accrue from the date of the loan, as that 
would be the time when he could have first taken steps to claim 
the money. However, it is submitted that this method of 
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calculating time could cause considerable injustice to lenders, 
as time starts to run against them from the date of the loan and 
through an omission or oversight on the lender's part, he could 
stand to loose the whole amount of the loan. Since, no time for 
repayment is stated, time should only be allowed to run from the 
moment the lender indicates to the borrower that he needs the 
money back. As such the committees' recommendation that time 
runs from the date of the demand is the only reasonable 
alternative. 
1.1.6. 	The Limitation Act, 1980  
The current Act on Limitation is the Limitation Act, 1980 which 
came into force on 1st May, 1981. This Act is a consolidating 
act which repealed the whole of the Limitation Act, 1939, the 
Limitation Act, 1975, and parts of the Limitation Act, 1963, and 
the Limitation *Amendment Act, 1980. 
The Act is divided into three parts. The first pare 5 sets out 
the ordinary periods of limitation which is three years for 
actions for libel and slander, negligence, nuisance or breach of 
duty where the damages claimed by the plaintiff include damages 
in respect of personal injuries; six Years for actions on simple 
tort or contract, actions to recover arrears of rent, actions to 
enforce a judgment or mortgage and twelve years for actions on 
specialties and in general for actions to recover land. Part 
11 46 of the Act provides for extension of time where the 
plaintiff is under disability at the time the cause of action 
accrues or in cases of acknowledgment in writing or part payment 
by the defendant or his predecessor or agent and in cases where 
action is based on fraud or mistake. Part 111 47 , deals with 
general provisions and inter alia makes the Act applicable to 
arbitrations except where a limitation period is prescribed by 
another statute. 
The recommendations of the United Kingdom Law Reform Committee, 
1974, chaired by Lord Justice Orr suggested the introduction of ' 
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a two-tiered scheme for the extension of personal injury actions, 
namely the retention of the discovery rule with a primary 
limitation period of three years to run either from the date of 
injury or date of knowledge, whichever is the later and the 
granting of a residual discretion to the court to extend the 
limitation period where the strict application of the discovery 
rule would cause injustice. The recommendations are retained in 
the consolidated 1980 Act. 
Section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980, which is the former 
Section 2D of the Limitation Act, 1975, gives the court a 
discretion to extend the period of limitation in a case where it 
was equitable to do so if there was no prejudice to any party. 
So in England, the Discovery rule extension formula operates to 
allow a plaintiff to commence an action as of right on 
satisfaction of the criteria. Furthermore the plaintiffs receive 
the benefit of the ordinary limitation period which then runs 
from the date of knowledge. Thus the position of victims of 
latent injury and diseases have been considerably improved and 
fully integrated with that of ordinary personal injury claimants. 
1.2. THE AUSTRALIAN POSITION 
As far as Australia is concerned, the States of Australia began 
originally as colonies of the British Empire. The British had 
by the beginning of the eighteenth century developed rules for 
determining the laws which should apply to their newly acquired 
territories. 
Basically, where the territory was obtained by conquest or 
cession, the general rule was that if there was already a system 
of law prevailing, that system would continue in operation until 
changed by the conquering power. However, where the acquired 
territory was settled by peaceful colonisation, and where at the 
time of settlement by the British, it was uninhabited or 
inhabited by a primitive people whose laws and customs were 
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considered by the British to be unacceptable to them, then the 
general rule was that the British settlers carried with them the 
common law and the Statutes of England, so far as they are 
applicable to conditions in the new colony. 48 The British 
adopted the latter rule for the States of Australia and treated 
them as 'settled colonies' despite the existence of complex 
Aboriginal customs and practices which were administered by the 
Aboriginal chiefs of the various tribes. 
Thus, part of the English law received into Australia related to 
limitation of actions before the courts. 
1.2.1. New South Wales 
In the case of New South Wales, although Captain Cook took 
possession of the eastern coast of Australia on August 23rd, 
1770, settlement did not take place till January, 26th, 1788. The 
original territory of New South Wales included Queensland, 
Tasmania, Victoria and part of South Australia. 
For more than 30 years after its settlement in 1788, New South 
Wales did not have its own legislature and the Colonial Governors 
legislated by General Orders and Proclamations. English law was 
formally received into New South Wales on July, 25th, 1828. 49 
By virtue of its original settlement as a British colony and by 
virtue of the Australian Courts Act, 1828, s.24, the Limitation 
Act 5° 1623, came into force in New South Wales. 
In time to come, the New South Wales legislature adopted the 
Imperial Statutes dealing with limitation as regards real 
property" and personal property. 52 As such the law of limitation 
that was applied in New South Wales were the Imperial Acts passed 
before the first settlement of New South Wales, together with 
later English legislation which were adopted, or copied by 
colonial legislation, passed over a century ago. There was an 
urgent need for reforming the law relating to limitation of 
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actions as the prevailing law in New South Wales in this area was 
the same as that in England when Queen Victoria came to the 
throne in 1837. 
The New South Wales Law Reform Commission was appointed on 1st 
January, 1966 and asked to review the law relating to limitation 
of actions. The Commission presented the first of its three 
reports on 27th October, 1967 53 and recommended a new Limitation 
Bill. 
The Commission's recommendation inter alia included the 
following:- 
(i) that in actions for recovery of land the time period 
be reduced from 20 years to 12 years and in the case 
of the Crown it be reduced to 30 years instead of 60 
years. 
(ii) at the expiration of the limitation period, the 
extinction of the claim or title should be made the 
general rule. 
(iii) that the law that an acknowledgment and part payment 
of a debt gives a fresh start to the running of the 
limitation period be extended to all causes of action 
and not limited to liquidated amounts. 
The New South Wales Commission had the benefit of the English 
Limitation Act, 1963 and the views and recommendation of the 
Edmund Davies Committee which led to the 1963 Act. In fact the 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission in their recommendation 
•noted that the substance of the English Act of 1963 be adopted, 
and one of the consequences of which would be to allow an 
extension of time to injured persons to claim damages for 
personal injuries where the injured person was not aware of it. 
Furthermore a plaintiff who contracted a certain disease arising 
out of a breach of a statutory duty of his employers and does not 
discover it until the limitation period had expired would be' 
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given an extension. 	Another notable recommendation of the 
commission was a proposal to enable a person who apprehends that 
a mentally ill person has a claim against him could give notice 
to the master, committee or manager of the mentally ill person 
and such person would have three years to institute proceedings. 
A defendant in such circumstances would not have a potential 
claim hanging over his head and once the three years is up, he 
could organise his affairs accordingly. 
The recommendations of the Law Reform Committee were implemented 
by the Limitation Act, 1969, which commenced on 1st January, 
1971. This Act amended and consolidated the law relating to the 
limitation of actions and repealed certain Imperial Acts 54 as 
well as New South Wales legislation. 55 
In 1971, the Law Reform Commission again reviewed inter alia the 
following areas of the Limitation Act, 1969, 56 namely:- 
(i) failure to plead extinction of right and title. 
(ii) adequacy of the provisions as to extinction of right 
and title. 
(iii) recovery of possession of goods before expiration of 
the limitation period. 
The Law Reform Committee proposed a bill to amend the Limitation 
Act 1969, and the District Courts Act, 1912, which was never 
passed. In its third report, 57 the Commission recommended that 
it should no longer be necessary that special notice of action 
be given to public authorities or public officers; that private 
litigants and public authorities should in general be placed on 
an equal footing, so far as concerns the operation of the 
Limitation Act, 1969; and in cases involving actions for damages 
for deaths or personal injury, six years was too long and that 
a period of three years for public authorities be sufficient with 
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an extension of one year if sufficient cause be shown. 
The Act is divided into four parts. 	Part 1 58 contains the 
interpretation provisions and other general matters. Part 11 59 
spells out the various limitation periods which is six years for 
actions on contract, tort, enforcement of recognisance, actions 
to recover money by virtue of an enactment, actions to recover 
arrears of income and enforcement of an arbitral award. Where 
the arbitral award is by deed the period is twelve years as also 
is an action to recover land and actions to redeem mortgaged 
property. Part 11160 deals with postponement of time and in the 
case of disability, confirmation, fraud and mistake time will be 
postponed. The final pare deals with some miscellaneous 
matters. 
1.2.2. 	Tasmania 
Tasmania which was earlier known as Van Dieman's land, separated 
from New South Wales on June, 14th, 1825. 
The substantive law relating to Limitation was contained in 
several statutes as follows:- 
(i) 	Limitation of Actions Act, 1836  
This Act extended to Tasmania provisions contained in three 
Imperial Statutes which are contained in three parts of a 
schedule to the Act as follows:- , 
PART I: Civil Procedure Act, 1833. This Act provided:- 
(a) a limitation period of 20 years for:- 
(i) actions for debt upon any indenture of demise. 
(ii) actions for debt upon any bond or other 
speciality. 
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(iii) actions of debt upon any recognisance. 
(b) a limitation of 6 years for:- 
(i) actions for debt upon an award where the 
submission is not by speciality. 
(ii) actions to enforce recognisance or for money 
levied on any fiere facias. 
(c) a limitation period of 2 years for:- 
"actions for penalties damages or sums of money 
given to the party grieved". 
PART II: Real Property Limitation Act, 1833. Most of the 
provisions of the Act were incorporated into the Limitation of  
Actions Act, 1875 but the remaining parts was a residue after the 
repeal and re-enactment or amendment of its basic sections by the 
Limitation of Actions Act.  1875. The only provision setting up 
limitation periods was section 24, which provided that a suit in 
equity for the recovery of land or rent is barred after the 
period when a right of entry or distress, or an action at law for 
recovery of land would have been barred. 
PART III: Real Property Limitation Act, 1837. This Act provided 
a limitation period of 12 years after the last payment of 
capital or interest, during which a mortgagee of land may make 
an entry or bring an action to recover land. 
(ii) 	Limitation of Actions Act, 1875 
This Act provided a uniform limitation period of 12 years for 
recovery of land or interests in land. It had to be read in 
conjunction with the Real Property Limitation Act, 1833 (Imp) 
which was contained in Part II of the Schedule to the Limitation 
of Actions Act, 1836 to determine at what date a right of action 
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accrued. The limitation period was capable of being extended in 
favour of a remainderman; a person under disability; and the 
owner of a base fee who is in possession of the land. 
(iii) 	Mercantile Law Act, 1935 
This Act provided a 6 year limitation period for action in 
contract and tort, and for arrears of rent under an agreement for 
a lease. Subsequently, this Act was modified by:- 
(i) Limitation of Actions Act, 1965, which provided for 
substitution of a limitation period of two years and 
six months in actions for damages for negligence, 
nuisance or breach of duty, with power in a judge to 
extend the time period to a date not exceeding six 
years from the time when the cause of action arose. 
(ii) Fatal Accidents Act, 1934, as amended by the Fatal  
Accidents Act no. 52 of 1965 which provided for a 
limitation period of two years and six months from the 
date of death with powers for a judge to extend the 
period to six years from the date of death. 
(iii) Administration and Probate Act, 1935 Sec. 27 which 
provided for rights of action to subsist against or 
for the benefit of the estate of the deceased persons 
provided that in the case of tort no action could be 
maintained against the estate unless proceedings were 
pending at the date of death or the cause of action 
arose not earlier than 12 months before the date of 
his death and proceedings are taken not later than 6 
months after probate or letters of administration are 
granted with powers of extension of the six month 
period. 
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(iv) 	Crown Suits Act, 1769  
This Act prevented the Crown from recovering ungranted land which 
had been in the possession of a subject or subjects who have held 
the land in succession for a period of 60 years. The provisions 
of this Act were subsequently modified by section 114A of the 
Crown Lands Acts, 1935 which provided that any Crown land 
reserved for road, public purpose or land forming part of 
foreshore fronting of the sea, lake or river shall not be the 
subject of adverse possession. 
1.2.3. 	Limitation Act, 1974  
A Law Reform Committee was set up, 62 which, when presenting its 
draft report63 on limitations recommended that a Tasmanian Act be 
enacted based on 4 different statutes examined in detail by 
them." 
One of the reasons for proposing a consolidated act on limitation 
by the Law Reform Committee was convenience of reference as the 
substantive law on limitation was contained in eleven different 
statutes, one of which was sub-divided into three parts, causing 
great difficulty of reference to the legal profession. 
Furthermore, in nearly all matters arising, two or more different 
statutes had to be read in conjunction. Another reason noted by 
the committee was the archaism of expression. 
The committee also noted that injustice could arise to land 
holders as the rights of a person who deals with land under one 
system would differ from that of a person dealing with land under 
the other system. 
Although the statutes of limitation have been held to apply to 
Real Property Act, land, the early Tasmanian cases like Re 
Bartlett and Burke v Lock 65 also developed the doctrine of 
"wiping the slate" whereby the period during which a "squatter" 
has been in possession is destroyed by the registration of a 
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dealing, as the latter provides conclusive evidence of the 
ownership of a legal estate by the registered proprietor. This 
doctrine did not create any injustice to the "squatter" as the 
practice was for him to enter a caveat which could not be 
discharged after the relevant limitation period had run, even if 
challenged by the legal owner in a court of law. However since 
1932, 66 a "squatter" had to lodge an application for a vesting 
order in respect of the land claimed. In the meantime the 
squatter could not protect his interest by lodging a caveat as 
he would no longer have an "interest in land" to found his 
caveat. 
So where a "squatter" who is in possession of a land under the 
general law would have obtained an indefeasible fee simple after 
the lapse of the relevant period, a person in similar 
circumstances, who may have been squatting on Real Property Act 
land for even 100 years would still be at the mercy of the 
registered proprietor, unless, the committee recommended that the 
doctrine of 'wiping the slate' be abrogated. 
The recommendation of the Law Reform Committee were given effect 
to with the passing of the Limitation Act, 1974 which came into 
operation on 1st January, 1975, and still remains the basis of 
the law of limitation in Tasmania. This Act is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
This Act is divided into four parts, the first of which contains 
the interpretation provisions. 67 Part II m sets out the limitation 
periods for various causes of actions. A 6 year period is 
allowed for actions on simple contracts, tort including actions 
for damages for breach of statutory duty, actions to enforce a 
recognisance, actions to enforce an award and actions for an 
account. For actions upon a speciality and actions on judgments 
a time period of 12 years is prescribed. Similarly, an action 
to recover land including actions to recover money secured by 
mortgage or charge or to recover proceeds of the sale of land is 
limited to a period of 12 years. For actions in respect of 
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personal injuries the time period is 3 years. 
Part 11169 deals with extension of limitation periods and in the 
event of disability, fraud and mistake or where there has been 
an acknowledgment or part payment by the defendant, the time 
period is extended. 
Part IVm contains certain miscellaneous provisions and inter 
alia extends the provisions of the Act to arbitrations. 
1.2.4. 	Western Australia 
Western Australia was founded in 1829. The legislative power was 
vested in a Legislative Council (pursuant to Order in Council of 
November 1st 1830). The Legislative Council met for the first 
time in 1831. Western Australia adopted several Imperial Acts 
relating to limitation. 71 
In 1878 an act was passed for the further limitation of actions 
and suits relating to Real Property72 which was followed by the 
Limitation Act. of 1935. This later Act consolidated and amended 
the law relating to the limitation of periods for commencing 
actions and suits. 
Some of the earlier acts, m were repealed by the Limitation Act,  
1935 74 which came into operation on 14th April, 1936. The 
present Act in Western Australia is the Limitation Act 1935-1978. 
This Act prescribes a period of 12 years for recovery of land 
and actions of debt for rent upon a covenant in an indenture of 
demise; 6 years76 for actions on contact, tort, actions for 
account and actions of debt upon any award where the submission 
is not by speciality; 4 years 77 for actions for trespass to the 
person, menace, assault, battery, wounding or imprisonment and 
2 yearsm for actions for penalties, damages or sum given by any 
enactment to the party grieved and action for slander where the 
words are actionable per se. 
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Extension of time; is allowed for disabilities, in cases of 
acknowledgment or fraud; or where the person against whom the 
action accrued is absent beyond the seas. In cases of 
disabilities, a maximum period of 30 years is the utmost 
allowance given for disabilities. 
The Act also provides that the limitation provision is applicable 
to set-off and counter-claimm but the Act is not applicable to 
the Crown except where expressly provided and furthermore 
protection is afforded to persons acting in execution of 
statutory or other public duty. 81 
1:2.5. 	South Australia 
South Australia was proclaimed a British Colony on December 29, 
1836. The earliest Act passed in South Australia on limitation 
was the Limitation of Suits and Actions Act82 in 1866. This Act 
was later repealed when the law of limitation was consolidated 
with the passing of the Limitation Actions Act, 1936. This 
latter Act was assented to on 13th August, 1936 and has been 
amended on several occasions. 83 
In September, 1968, the Law Reform Committee of South Australia 
was set up to review various statutes of South Australia. This 
committee reviewed the law relating to limitation of actions and 
presented two reports, 84 relating to limitations. Firstly, in 
its third report, the committee recommended that the application 
for extension of time be made before the final distribution of 
estate under the Testator's Family Maintenance Act, 1918-1943, 
instead of the existing provision which required extension to be 
made before the expiration of 12 months after the grant of 
probate. 
Secondly, the committee in presenting its Twelfth Report noted 
that in South Australia there was no provision relating to the 
extension of time for bringing action. The committee felt that 
the power to grant extension given to the courts in England by 
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virtue of the Limitation Act, 1963, was too restrictive and 
therefore recommended that power to extend time be given in 
relation to any cause of action arising in any jurisdiction of 
the court, other than conferred jurisdiction. 
These recommendation of the Law Reform Committee were accepted 
and the Limitation Actions Act, 1936 was accordingly amended. 85 
The Act provides a period of 15 years 86 for actions to recover 
land or rent or actions for entry or distress. A period of 15 
years is also provided for any action to recover money secured 
by any mortgage, judgment or lien on land or rent or any legacy 87 
and an action based on speciality. 88 A period of six years 89 is 
allowed for commencing actions on simple contracts, actions of 
account, tort, recovery of seamen's wages, damages in respect of 
arrears of rent and actions to recover arrears of rent where 
letting is not by deed. In actions for damages 98 in respect of 
personal injuries, a period of three years is allowed and two 
years for actions for slander. 
The Act vests in the courts a general power to extend the periods 
of limitation. 91 Persons under disability can have the time 
period extended and the maximum extension is limited to 30 years 
from the time at which the right to bring the action or 
proceedings arose. 
1.2.6. 	Victoria 
Victoria separated from New South Wales and constituted a 
separate colony on 1st July, 1851. The laws then in force in New 
South Wales continued to be in force in Victoria. A Legislative 
Council, with powers to legislate for the colony was constituted 
and the Victorian Parliament came into existence in 1856. 
The law in force in Victoria included the following:- 
(i) Imperial legislation introduced in 1828 92 into New 
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South Wales (which included Victoria). 
(ii) New South Wales legislation passed between 1828 and 
1851. 
(iii) Victorian legislation from 1851 onwards. 
(iv) certain acts of the Imperial Parliament before and 
since 1828 in its capacity as the supreme legislature. 
The Imperial Statutes that were in force in Victoria included the 
Limitation Act, 1623. 93 	Certain sections of this Act were 
subsequently repealed in 1915. 	1922, the Imperial Acts 
Application Act, inter alia repealed the Limitation Act 1623. 
Limitation provisions for commencement of Actions and suits 
regarding property were contained in part IX of the Property Law 
Act 1928. 95 Limitation of time for commencing other actions 
appeared in the Supreme Court Act, 1928 98 and the Trustee Act,  
1958  with the Limitation of actions against trustees. 
Besides the above, there were other acts dealing with limitation, 
including The Wrongs Act, 1958 98 which deals with actions in 
respect of wrongful acts or neglect causing death. 
On the 6th December, 1955 the Limitation of Actions Act, 1955 was 
passed which came into operation on 1st January, 1956. 
This was an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to 
limitation of time for commencing actions and arbitration. This 
Act repealed many of the other existing provisions relating to 
limitation. 
Further consolidation in the area of limitation saw the passing 
of the Limitation of Actions Act, 1958 which inter alia repealed 
the 1955 Act. 
The 1958 Act is divided into three parts, the first of which" 
states the periods of limitation for various causes of action. 
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Actions founded on simple contracts and torts have to be 
instituted within a period of six years but for certain torts 
like negligence, nuisance or breach of duty the time period is 
three years. In cases of speciality contracts, actions to 
recover land and actions on judgment, a time period of 15 years 
is allowed. 
The second part" ° of the Act deals with extension of limitation 
periods and in cases of disability or where there is an 
acknowledgment or part payment by the debtor or in cases of fraud 
and mistake the limitation period is extended. 
The final part 101 contains general provisions and inter alia 
extends the operation of the Limitation Act to arbitration, 
foreclosure and the Crown. 
1.2.7. Queensland 
Queensland separated from New South Wales in 1859 and the laws 
in force in New South Wales were declared to continue in force 
in the colony. Therefore all the limitation statutes which were 
in force in 1859 were extended and thus applicable in Queensland. 
In 1956, the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act was passed 
which provided a limitation period in cases of negligence, 
nuisance and breach of duty involving personal injury. This Act 
repealed certain limitation sections found in earlier 102 
legislation which were applicable in Queensland. Later a 
Limitation Act modelled on the United Kingdom Limitation Act of 
1939 was passed subsequently known as the Limitation Act 1960. 
This Act was later repealed as from 1st July, 1975 by the 
Limitation of Actions Act 1974. The 1974 Act repealed l° the 
earlier limitation provisions and consolidated and amended the 
law relating to limitation of action and was assented to on 1st 
November, 1974. The Act is divided into four parts. Part 1 104 
contains an interpretation section and deals with other 
preliminary matters. The second pare 05 deals with the periods • 
32 
of limitation for different classes of actions and is normally 
6 years for actions founded on simple contracts, tort, and 
account; 12 years for actions based on speciality contracts, on 
judgments and actions to recover land and in certain torts like 
negligence, trespass, nuisance and breach of duty where personal 
injury results, the time allowed is 3 years. The third part 106 
deals with extension of the periods of limitation in cases of 
disability or cases where there is acknowledgment or part payment 
or where there is fraud or mistake. The fourth pare" contains 
general provisions and inter alia extends the provisions of this 
Act to cases of Arbitration. 
1.3 THE ATTITUDE OF EQUITY TO TIME 
In tracing the development of the Statutes of Limitation in 
England, 108 we have seen that from a very early period there were 
time limitations applicable to the institution of proceedings 
under common law. 
Due to the deficiencies of the common law courts, petitions for 
redress were often directed to the king or his council. The 
practice was for these petitions to be referred to the chancellqr 
and a separate Court of Chancery eventually arose out of this 
practice, during the reigns of Edward II and Edward III. Equity 
was administered by the Court of Chancery, 109  which had 
jurisdiction in three broad categories" ° of cases. 
Firstly in certain cases it had exclusive jurisdiction, as in 
cases of trusts, married women's settled property and equities 
of redemption. In this category were also cases where no relief 
was available at common law, for example relief against penalties 
and forfeitures. Some of these rights were not recognised at law. 
Secondly, the Court of Chancery also had concurrent jurisdiction. 
In other words they enforced rights which were also recognised 
at law, for example as in contract, mistake, partition, 
partnership and fraud. The Court of Chancery was ready to grant 
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a remedy, which was lost at law, for example where because of an 
accident, a plaintiff had lost the means of asserting his remedy 
at law. 
Finally, the Court of Chancery also had auxiliary jurisdiction 
which it exercised by affording the benefits of its special 
procedure as follows:- 
(i) by compelling discovery of facts or documents. 
(ii) by protecting property pending litigation, by the 
appointment of a receiver or by granting injunction 
and 
(iii) by means of interpleader to prevent injury to third 
parties. 
The Courts of Equity existed side by side with the common law 
courts until the passing of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act.  
1893 and 1875. The effect of the Judicature Acts is frequently 
referred to as "the fusion of law and equity" 111 but Sir George 
Jessel MR in Salt v Cooper 112 said, 
"It was not any fusion, or anything of the kind; it was the 
vesting in one tribunal the administration of law and 
equity in every cause, action or dispute which should come 
before that tribunal". 
1.3.1. 	Nature and Practice of Equity 
Although equity was established to mitigate the harshness of the 
common law, there had always been a tendency by the Court of 
Chancery to follow the common law by analogy. In fact, one of 
the maxims that the Court of Chancery acted on was that "equity 
follows the law", which simply meant that equity would not depart 
unnecessarily from legal principles." 3 This maxim was clearly 
stated by Lord Westbury in Knox v Gve" 4 where he said, 
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"where the remedy in equity is correspondent to the remedy 
at law and the latter is subject to a limit in point of 
time by the statute of limitations, a court of equity acts 
by analogy to the statute, and imposes on the remedy it 
affords the same limitation. This is the meaning of the 
common phrase that a court of equity acts by analogy to the 
Statute of Limitations, the meaning being that, where the 
suit in equity corresponds with an action at law which is 
included in the words of the statute, a court of equity 
adopts the enactment of the statute as its own rule of 
procedure." 
Although equity did not have stipulated time periods for 
commencing proceedings, as did the common law, a person wanting 
a remedy at equity would be required to prosecute his claim 
without undue delay as a person approaching the Court of Equity 
having "slept" upon his right and acquiesced for a long time may 
find that his claim has been barred by his laches. In this 
respect the maxim applied that "equity aids the vigilant, not the 
indolent" ,115 Laches is simply the inordinate delay that 
disqualifies the claimant from seeking equitable relief or 
enforcing an equitable cause of action. 116 
So a delay which prevents a party from obtaining an equitable 
remedy is technically called ilaches'. 117 In other words,laches 
is a defence which a defendant could use to resist an equitable 
claim by the plaintiff. 
The practice of the Court of Chancery was to deny a remedy where 
such remedy was barred in law. This is clearly shown by the 
dicta of Lord Camden in Smith v Clav 118 where he said 
"a Court of Equity... has always refused its aid to stale 
demands, where the party has slept upon his right, and 
acquiesced for a great length of time. Nothing can call 
forth this court into activity but conscience, good faith 
and reasonable diligence. Where these are wanting, the 
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court is always passive and does nothing. 
Laches and neglect are always discountenanced, and 
therefore from the beginning of this jurisdiction there was 
always a limitation to suits in this court.... Expedient 
republica ut sit finis litium is a maxim that has prevailed 
in this court in all time without the help of an Act of 
Parliament. But as the court has no legislative authority, 
it could not properly define the time of bar by a positive 
rule to an hour, a minute, or a year; it was governed by 
circumstances. But as often as parliament had limited the 
time of actions and remedies to a certain period in legal 
proceedings, the Court of Chancery adopted that rule, and 
applied it to similar cases in equity. For when the 
legislature had fixed the time at law, it would have been 
preposterous for equity (which by its own proper authority 
always maintained a limitation) to countenance laches 
beyond the period that law had been confined to by 
parliament. And therefore in all cases where the legal 
right has been barred by Parliament, the equitable right to 
the same thing has been concluded by the same bar." 
1.3.2. Distinction between Acquiescence and Laches 
Acquiescence 119 is a term used to describe a situation where' a 
person stands by and does nothing, whilst to his knowledge, his 
rights are violated. In•such a case where a person stands by and 
allows his right to be violated, without seeking redress he could 
lose his remedy, as Lord Cranworth, L C, made it clear in Ramsden 
v Dvson120 that acquiescence could prevent an owner of land 
establishing his legal title after having stood by while a 
stranger was building on that land. 
Acquiescence would also arise in a situation where the party 
subsequently learned of a violation after it had taken place and 
fails to take any action. So, where a plaintiff whose rights are 
violated fails to institute proceedings promptly, the defendant 
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would be in a position to raise the defence of laches. Laches 
is lapse of time and acquiescence is confirmation of the 
transaction, but the two cannot always be separated. 121 
The Court of Equity in determining whether there had been a delay 
amounting to laches took into consideration the plaintiff's delay 
in bringing an action, for example the defendant may have lost 
all evidence needed to meet the plaintiff's claim. 
The Privy Council in Lindsay Petroleum Co v Hurd 122 described 
laches as follows:- 
"the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an 
arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be 
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the 
party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be 
regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his 
conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that 
remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it 
would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were 
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases lapse 
of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if 
an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, 
is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not 
amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the 
validity of that defence must be tried upon principles 
substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always 
important in such cases are, the length of the delay and 
the nature of the acts done during the interval." 
So where the conduct of the Plaintiff shows that he has either 
waived his right or given an impression to the other party that 
he is not pursuing his claim, he would not be allowed to pursue 
it at a later date because of his laches. 
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1.3.3. The Operation of Equity 
Although equity does not fix a time period as do Limitation 
Statutes, generally it will not grant a remedy if there could be 
said to be acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff. In other 
words, equity considers the circumstance of each case that comes 
before it and if it can be established that the plaintiff by his 
conduct and neglect has lost his right, no remedy will, be given 
by the Courts of Equity. This is clearly shown in the case of 
Allcard v Skinner 123 where the plaintiff in 1968 joined a 
protestant sisterhood which was introduced to her by her 
spiritual adviser. She gifted a number of property to the 
defendant, who was the lady superior of the sisterhood. In 1879 
the plaintiff left the sisterhood and six years later in 1885 
instituted proceedings to recover her property on the grounds of 
undue influence. The court held that she was not entitled to 
recover her property because of the undue delay i.e. laches. 
Furthermore, during the period of delay, the court found that the 
plaintiff had acquiesced. Acquiescence was only significant 
after the undue influence had ceased as was observed by Bowen 
L. J. 124 when she was "surrounded by person perfectly competent 
to give her proper advice" 
Although equity does not stipulate a fixed time period, the 
tendency of the courts has been to look at the Statute of 
Limitation as a guide. 
As Lindley L.J. observed in Allcard's case, 125 "The action is not 
one of those to which the Statute of Limitations in terms 
applies, nor is that statute pleaded. But this action very 
closely resembles an action for money had and received where 
laches and acquiescence are relied upon as a defence: and the 
question is whether that defence ought to prevail. In my opinion 
it ought. Taking the statute as a guide and proceeding on the 
principles laid down by Lord Camden in Smith v Clay, and by Lord 
Redesdale in Hovenden v Lord Annesley the lapse of six years 
becomes a 'very material element for consideration." 
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1.4 LIMITATION ACTS - PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE 
Before embarking on a detailed discussion of the Tasmanian 
Limitation Act, 1974, in Chapter 2, this section deals with the 
nature and effect of Limitation Acts generally. 
Although in some instances Limitation Acts may confer a right on 
a party as in the instance of a party who obtains a good title 
to property by adverse possession, in most cases, the Act whilst 
preserving the substantive rights of a party, under which his 
cause of action arose, be it a contract, tort, etc, denies him 
the remedy, once the stipulated time has passed. 
1.4.1. 	Conferring Riohts 
Are Statutes of Limitation procedural pieces of legislation or 
are they substantive? In other words do these statutes confer 
a right on the defendant or do they merely state that a plaintiff 
cannot successfully prosecute a claim outside the relevant 
limitation period. 
Unfortunately, the early law on this matter in the United Kingdom 
was not clear as there appeared to be conflicting views. Lord 
Denning MR in Mitchell v Harris Engineering Co Ltd 126 expressed 
the view that Statutes of Limitation do not confer any rights and 
are merely procedural. "The Statute of Limitation", he said, 
"does not confer any right on the defendant. It only imposes a 
time limit on the plaintiff." 
However, in Yew Boon Tew v Kenderaan Bas Mara 127 the Privy Council 
rejected the view propounded by Lord Denning and said that 
Statutes of Limitation do confer rights and such statutes could 
well be regarded as both procedural as well as substantive, 
depending on the fact situation. Their Lordship's were of the 
view that, 
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"an accrued entitlement on the part of a person to plead 
the lapse of a limitation period as an answer to the future 
institution of proceedings is just as much a 'right' as any 
other statutory or contractual protection against a future 
suit." 
Although Yew Boon Tew v Kenderaan Bas Mara, was a Malaysian case, 
involving the Malaysian Limitation Statute, it is submitted that 
the view of the Privy Council is preferable to that of Lord 
Denning. This is so because the limitation act does give a legal 
right to a person who is in adverse possession of land. The Act 
furthermore recognises that title to chattels can be extinguished 
after the lapse of the relevant limitation period. In such cases 
it would be wrong to say that the Limitation Acts do not confer 
any right, as the right to title is expressly conferred by the 
Act. 
If Lord Denning's view is accepted, the consequences could have 
far reaching effects on defendants, as any amendments to Statutes 
of Limitations enlarging time for a plaintiff to institute 
proceedings after the initial period has expired and the 
plaintiff is out of time, would leave the defendant with no 
defence. This state of affairs would be quite contrary to one 
of the basic reasons for imposing time limitation, namely to 
protect a defendant from a stale claim. 
The courts have for a long time recognised this principle of 
protecting defendants from stale claims. They have given effect 
to this principle by holding that where amendments to Statutes 
of Limitation result in enlargement of time, a plaintiff whose 
claim was out of time prior to the amendment, will not be allowed 
to have his stale claim revived. 
This attitude of the courts in not granting amendments where to 
do so would revive a stale claim is borne out in both Maxwell v 
Murphy  in  and Yew Boon Tew v Kenderaan Bas Mara. In the former 
case the family of a person killed in a fatal motor accident had 
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12 months from the date of death to bring an action. 
Subsequently under an amending Act which came into force 21 
months after the 12 month period had expired, the period was 
extended to six years. The appellant brought an action about 
three and a half years after the deceased died. 
The question before the High Court of Australia was whether the 
amending Act revived the Appellant's right of action, which was 
statute-barred before the passing of the amending Act. 
It was held by Dixon C J, Williams, Kitto & Taylor J J, that it 
did not revive the right of action, as when the time expired, the 
right of action was terminated or defeated and accordingly the 
plaintiff had lost her right of action before the amendment was 
passed and was without remedy and thus a bar had been imposed on 
the remedy. The judgment of Williams J perhaps sets out this 
principle most succinctly, when he said, 129 
"statutes of limitation are often classed as procedural 
statutes. But it would be unwise to attribute a prima 
facie retrospective effect to all statutes of limitation. 
Two classes of case can be considered. An existing statute 
of limitation may be altered by enlarging or abridging the 
time within which proceedings may be instituted. If the 
time is enlarged whilst a person is still within time under 
the existing law to institute a cause of action the statute 
might well be classed as procedural. Similarly if the time 
is abridged whilst such person is still left with the time 
within which to institute a cause of action the abridgment 
might again be classed as procedural. But if the time is 
enlarged when a person is out of time to institute a cause 
of action so as to enable the action to be brought within 
the new time or is abridged so as to deprive him of time 
within which to institute it whilst he still has time to do 
so, very different considerations could arise. A cause of 
action which can be enforced is a very different thing to 
a cause of action the remedy for which is barred by lapse 
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of time. Statutes which enable a person to enforce a cause 
of action which was then barred or provide a bar to an 
existing cause of action by abridging the time for its 
institution could hardly be described as merely procedural. 
They would affect substantive rights." 
The Federal Court of Malaysia followed the reasoning of Williams 
J in Maxwell v Murphy in Yew Boon Tew v Kenderaan Bas Mara held 
that a subsequent amendment to a limitation statute enlarging the 
time, did not operate retrospectively to revive a cause of action 
which was already statute-barred. This latter case involved an 
appeal from the Federal Court of Malaysia in which a motor-bus 
belonging to the respondents collided with a motorcycle driven 
by the first appellant. The respondents being a statutory body, 
a limitation period of 12 months was prescribed for bringing any 
action for negligence done in the exercise of public duty. An 
amendment in 1974 extended the 12 month period to 36 months. 
Before the amendment came into force the appellant's cause of 
action had been statute-barred for 14 months. Nine months after, 
the appellants issued a writ against the respondents claiming 
damages for injuries caused by the negligence of the respondents' 
servants. The Federal Court of Malaysia in allowing the appeal 
held that the 1974 Act was not retrospective and that accordingly 
the claim was statute-barred. The Federal Court accepted the 
reasoning of Williams J in Maxwell v Murphy and said, 
"on the failure of the respondents to commence action 
within the specified period the appellants had acquired an 
'accrued right' which was designed to give them immunity 
for acts done in the discharge of their public duties... It 
therefore seems to us that in the circumstances of this 
case, the time for the claim was not enlarged by (the 1974 
Act). The Act is not retroactive in operation and has no 
application to a cause of action which was barred before 
the Act came into operation." 
This matter subsequently went to the Privy Council who dismissed 
42 
the appeal, and agreed with the decision of the Federal Court. 
In their judgment the Privy Council made the following 
observationsm 
"Their Lordships consider that the proper approach to the 
construction of the 1974 Act is not to decide what label to 
apply to it, procedural or otherwise, but to see whether 
the statute, if applied retrospectively to a particular 
type of case, would impair existing rights and 
obligations  A Limitation Act may therefore be 
procedural in the context of one set of facts, but 
substantive in the context of a different set of facts. In 
their Lordship's view, an accrued right to plead a time 
bar, which is acquired after the lapse of the statutory 
period, is in every sense a right, even though it arises 
under an Act which is procedural. It is a right which is 
not to be taken away by conferring on the statute a 
retrospective operation, unless such a construction is 
unavoidable... The plain purpose of the 1974 Act, read 
with the 1948 Ordinance, was to give and not to deprive; it 
was to give to a potential defendant, who was not at 13 
June, 1974, possessed of an accrued limitation defence, a 
right to plead such a defence at the expiration of the new 
statutory period. The purpose was not to deprive a 
potential defendant of a limitation defence which he 
already possessed. The briefest consideration will expose 
the injustice of the contrary view. When a period of 
limitation has expired, a potential defendant should be 
able to assume that he is no longer at risk from a stale 
claim. He should be able to part with his papers if they 
exist and discard any proofs of witnesses which have been 
taken, discharge his solicitor if he has been retained, and 
order his affairs on the basis that his potential liability 
is gone, that is the whole purpose of the limitation 
defence." 
It is submitted that the view of the Privy Council that a 
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limitation Act could be procedural in the content of one set of 
facts and substantive in the content of another set of facts is 
correct. Although, generally, limitation statutes are classed 
as procedural in that it gives a defendant a defence to a claim 
not brought within an applicable limitation period, the defence 
does not allow him to challenge the claim on its merits. In 
other words it affords a successful defendant complete immunity 
from any liability under that particular claim regardless of the 
merits of the claim. The claimant's alleged right will however 
remain intact and should there be another remedy available to the 
claimant, apart from the right which is time barred, he will be 
free to pursue that course of action against the defendant. 
More often than not, the claimant's right will be a one-time 
right, as for instance where the defendant is required to perform 
a contract. Should the defendant breach the contract but is able 
to successfully obtain a limitation defence against any remedies 
available to the claimant under law to enforce the contract, the 
claimant is left with a sterile right. 
Their lordship's in Yew Boon Tew v. Kenderaan Bas Mara rightly 
point out that a defendants accrued right to plead a time bar, 
which is acquired after the lapse of the statutory period is 
indeed a right. 
The test adopted by their lordship's was to ascertain whether a 
statute would impair existing rights and obligations of the 
defendant if applied retrospectively. 
If it indeed impairs existing rights and obligations, it would 
be classed substantive. In Yew Boon Tew's case their lordship's 
held that after the lapse of the statutory limitation period the 
defendant acquired a right to plead a time bar which indeed is 
a substantive right although arising out of an Act which is 
procedural. 
Although extinguishing the rights of a claimant is not an 
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objective of the limitation system, there are specific instances 
in the limitation Act of Tasmania where the claimants rights are 
extinguished and a right is bestowed on the defendant, as in the 
case of an adverse possessor who has been in continuous 
possession of the land for a period of 12 years. In this 
instance the Act 131 stipulates clearly that no action shall be 
brought to recover such land. In other words that Act gives the 
adverse possessor a right to that land as against the true 
owner, 132  whose right is extinguished. Similarly, title to 
chattels is also extinguished as soon as the right of action for 
wrongful conversion or detention is extinguished. 133 It follows 
that if title to chattels is extinguished, the true owner would 
not be able to obtain the chattels and the person who obtained 
possession of the chattels by wrongful conversion or by detention 
would have a good title or right conferred by the Limitation Act. 
Again the Act bestows a legal title on a bona fide purchaser for 
value of a legal estate without notice. 134 
So, the view of the High Court and the Privy Council that the 
Limitation Acts are both procedural and substantive is preferable 
to that of Lord Denning who is in minority in holding that such 
statutes are merely procedural and do not confer any rights. 
1.5 The Tasmanian Act compared to the other Australian States 
and the modern English Law 
Having examined briefly the law of limitation in England and 
traced the development of the law of limitation in the various 
states of Australia, it is noted that the English Act forms the 
basis on which the limitation law of the various Australian 
states are modelled on. 
The Limitation Act of Tasmania is very similar both in substance 
and in form to that of the Limitation Act of New South Wales and 
Queensland. In each of these states the Act is divided into four 
parts - the first part dealing with interpretation; the second 
part dealing with the time periods for various causes of action; 
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the third part dealing with extension of the limitation periods 
and the final part dealing with general provisions. 
The time periods for various causes of action are also identical 
in these three states eg. a period of six years is prescribed for 
actions on simple contracts; twelve years on speciality contracts 
and three years for personal injury cases. 
Both the states of Victoria and South Australia have provided for 
a longer time period for bringing actions on speciality contracts 
namely fifteen years as opposed to twelve years in Tasmania, New 
South Wales and Queensland. 
Although all the states of Australia have provided for an 
extension of time in cases where the person entitled to bring an 
action or proceedings is under a legal disability, South 
Australia and Western Australia limits the period of such 
extension in all cases to a maximum of thirty years from the time 
at which the right to bring the action or proceedings arose. 
In Tasmania however, the thirty year maximum extension to a 
person suffering a legal disability is only limited to an action 
to recover land or money charged on land and not to all actions 135 
which is similar to the provisions in Victoria 	and 
Queenslandw . 
The term "disability" is defined in all the various limitation 
acts to include infants and persons of unsound mind. However, 
in Tasmania the term disability is defined to include a convict 
within the meaning of S.435 of the Criminal Code, in addition to 
infants and persons of unsound mind. The Queensland Act is 
similar to the Tasmanian Act in that it also includes a convict 
in its definition of "disability". 
The Tasmanian Act restricts the application of the extension 
provision for disability to persons under the custody of a 
parent, whereas the Courts in Victoria have given a liberal 
interpretation to the word "knowledge" as that of the claimant 
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and not of his servant, agent or parent. 138 
In so far as extension of time is concerned, the Tasmanian Act 
provides for a judge to extend time for the commencement of an 
action if it is just and reasonable to do so. However, there is 
a stipulation that the maximum period of extension is limited to 
six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. 
The current position in England is that the court now has an 
unfettered discretion to extend the three year period in any case 
in which it considers it equitable to do so and if there is no 
prejudice to any party. This provision does not impose any 
judicial fetters on the discretion by restricting it to 
exceptional cases. Even though the discretion is unfettered it 
still remains for the plaintiff to convince the court that it is 
an appropriate case in all the circumstances for the exercise of 
the discretion and for an extension to be granted. 
Victoria introduced a similar scheme in 1983 which not only 
extended the primary limitation period to six years but included 
the "discovery rule" which was the date on which the Plaintiff 
first knows; 
(a) that he has suffered those personal injuries; and 
(b) that those personal injuries were caused by the act or 
omission of some person. 
The 1983 Act also conferred on the court a general discretion to 
extend the limitation period if it considered it just and 
reasonable to do so and sets out guidelines for the assistance 
of the Court in exercising its discretion. 
In New South Wales, however, the "discovery rule" extension was 
rejected and instead an unlimited extension of the limitation 
period can now be granted by the Court in its discretion having 
considered all circumstances of the case and by applying certain 
statutory guidelines. 
47 
Although the problems encountered in England have not arisen 
directly in Tasmania, rather than await for the problems in the 
future it would be prudent to incorporate similar changes to the 
Tasmanian Act and thus prevent injustice arising in the future. 
48 
NOTES 
1. Castles, A C, An Australian Legal History, Law Book Co., 
1982 pages 1 & 20. 
2. 21 Jac 1, c.16. 
3. 3 & 4 Will 4, c.42. 
4. 3 & 4 Will 4, c.27. 
5. 37 & 38 Vict c.57. 
6. s.3 as amended by .4 & 5 Ann C.3 and the Mercantile Law 
Amendment Act, 1856. 
7. Statute of Frauds Amendment Act, 1828 s.4. 
8. Ibid s.3. 
9: The 3 exceptions are Writ of Right of Dower, Writ of Dower 
unde nihil habet, and a quare impedit; See William 
Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol III p 20-21, 25; 
vol VII p 22-23. 
10. 3 & 4 Will 4 c.27. 
11. See Fifth Interim Report of the Law Reform Committee, 1936, 
Cmd 5334, p.6. 
12. The Crown Suits Act, 1769. 
13. Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893. 
14. Workmen's Compensation Act 1925 and Employers Liability 
Act 1880. 
15. Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, Law Reform (Miscellaneous  
Provisions) Act, 1934 s. 1(3); Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 
S. 178. 
16. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924, Article III 6; Carriage  
of Air Act, 1932 Article 29 of 1st schedule. 
17. Copyright Act, 1911 s.10. 
18. Moneylender's Act, 1927 s.13. 
19. Summary Jurisdiction Act. 1948 s.11. 
20. 31 Eliz Cap 5 Section 5. 
21. Local Government Act, 1933 s.84. 
22. Housing Act, 1936 para 2 of second schedule. 
23. Maritime Conventions Act, 1911 s.8. 
24. Trustee Act, 1888 s.8. 
25. Some of the more important Acts include the Maritime 
49 
Conventions Act, 1911 s.8; Public Authorities Protection  
Act 1893, Copyright Act, 1911 s.11; Workmen's  
Compensation Act, 1925 s.14(1); Land Registration Act, 1925 
s.83(11). 
26. Fifth Interim Report, 1936 Cmnd 5334. 
27. The Limitation Act, 1939 was modified to a limited extent 
by the Limitation (Enemies and War Prisoners) Act, 1945, 
the operation of which was retrospective. 
28. S.32 Limitation Act, 1939. 
29. See Shannon NP, The Modern Law Manual for Practitioners,  
Butterworths 2nd Edn, 1946 at p 316. 
30. (1946) Cmnd 6860 para 107; See also HWE Wade, Law Reform 
Limitation of Actions Act, 1954 (1954) CU J 149. 
31. (1962) 1 QB 189; See also discussion of Cartledge v Jopling 
in a note titled "Pneumoconiosis: The Limitation Problem"  
p 106 Sol Jo. 209. 
32. Report of the Committee on Limitation of Actions in cases  
of Personal Injury (1962) Cmnd 1829; See Note "Report on  
Limitation of Personal Injury Actions" p 106 Sol Jo. 867, 
where the author criticises the limitation period of 12 
months as it would be difficult to discover when a person 
should have had his first positive proof of injury or claim 
and further that the 12 month rule would prevent pre action 
negotiations taking place. 
33. See "The Limitation Act" 108 Sol Jo. 22; See also JA 
Jolowic "Limitation Act, 1963" (1964) Camb.L.J. 47. 
34. (1970) 1 QB 393. • 
35. This problem was recognised by the Law Reform Committee 
established 1971 in its Twentieth Report (Interim Report on 
Limitation of Actions in Personal Injury Claims); (1974) 
Cmnd 5360p.6. 
36. Law Commission No. 35 Cmnd 4532. 
37. See Twentieth Report. 
The Committee comprised the following members: 
The Right Hon. Lord Justice Orr - Chairman 
The Hon. Mr Justice Griffiths 
The Hon. Mr Justice Walton 
50 
His Honor Judge Wingate 
T H Bingham, Esq 
Prof A G Guest 
C A Hinks, Esq 
D C H Hirst, Esq 
The Lord Lloyd of Hampstead 
A Martin, Esq 
38. Twentieth Report (Interim Report on Limitation of Actions  
Personal Injury Claims) (1974) Cmnd 5630. 
39. Ibid p. 50, 51. 
40. Final Report on Limitation of Actions (1977) Cmnd 6923. 
41. Ibid pp 74-77. 
42. Ibid pp 56-57. 
43. (1978) Q.B.D. 886 & 905. 
44. Ibid at p 910. 
45. Limitation Act, 1980 ss.1-27. 
46. Ibid ss 28-33. 
47. Ibid ss 34-41. 
48. See G W Paton, Reception of the Common Law in The 
Commonwealth of Australia, The Development of its Laws & 
Constitution 1952; Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of . 
England, 1765 and Sir John Latham "The Migration of the  
common law - Australia" 76 LQR 54. 
49. S. 24, 9 Geo IV, C.83 - an Act which was later called the 
Australian Courts Act 1828. 
50. 21 Jac 1, c.16. 
51. 3 & 4 Will 4, c.27 adopted on 13th July, 1837. 
52. 9 Geo IV, c, 14 adopted on 9th May, 1828. 
53. Report of the Law Reform Commission being the First Report  
on the Limitation of Actions (L R C 3); See "Limitation 
Reform" (1968) 41 AU J 407. 
54. The Imperial Acts repealed include: 
(i) Common Informers Act, 1588 (31 Eliz 1. c) s.5 which 
fixes limitation period or "actions, suits, bills 
indictments or information: for any forfeiture upon 
any penal statute. 
(ii) Limitation Act 1623 (21 Jac 1 c. 16) ss 3,4 & 7. 
51 
(iii) Administration of Justice Act, 1705 (4 & 5 Anne c.3) 
ss 17, 18 & 19. 
(iv) Crown Suits Act, 1769 (9 Geo 3 c.16). 
55. (i) Written Memorandum Act, 1705 (4 & 5 Anne c.3) ss 17, 
18 & 19. 
(ii) Real Estate (Limitation of Actions) Act, 1837 (8 Wm 4, 
No 3) This Act adopted the Imperial Real Property 
Limitation Act 1833 (3 & 4 Wm 4.27). 
(iii) Supreme Court Act, 1841 (5 Vic, No.9). 
(iv) Trust Property Act, 1862. 
(v) Limitation of Actions for Trespass Act, 1884. 
56. Second Report of the Law Reform Commission on the 
Limitation of Actions (L R C 12). 
57. Third Report of the Law Reform Commission on the Limitation 
of Actions (L R C 21). 
58. Limitation Act, 1969, ss 1-11. 
59. Ibid ss 14-26. 
60. Ibid ss 51-62. 
61. Ibid ss 63-77. 
62. The Committee comprised the following: 
The Hon Mr Justice Neasey 
Mr W D Craig 
Mr R J Hoyle 
Mr G H Thompsom 
Mr P V Manser 
Mr R M Webster 
63. Tasmanian Law Reform Committee working papers and reports 
vol. 1. 
64. The Statutes examined by the committee are: 
Limitation Act, 1939 (Imp) 
Limitation Act, 1963 (Imp) 
Limitation of Actions Act, 1958 (Vic) 
Limitation Act, 1969 (NSW) 
65. 	[1907] Tas S.R. 26 & [1910] Tas S.R. 73. 
66. See Real Property Act, 1862 ss. 146-156. 
67. Limitation Act, 1974 ss. 1 & 2. 
68. Ibid ss 3-25. 
52 
69. Ibid ss 26-32. 
70. Ibid ss 33-40. 
71. Lord Tenterdens Act, 2 & 3 WILL IV, C.71 as adopted by 6 
Gul IV,4 and Limitation of Actions (Real Property) Act 3 & 
4 Gul IV, C.27 as adopted by 6 Gul IV 4. 
72. The Real Property Limitation Act, 1878, 42 Vict. No. 6. 
73. Limitations of Actions (Real Property) Act, 3 & 4 Gul IV 
C.27 and The Real Property Limitation Act, 1878, 42 Vict, 
No. 6. 
74. 26 Geo V, XXXV. 
75. Limitation Act 1935-1978 s. 38(1)(d). 
76. 	Ibid s.38(1)(c)(i), (ii), (v) & (vi). 
77. Ibid s.38(1)(b). 
78. Ibid s.38 (1)(1)(c). 
79. Ibid ss 40 & 41. 
80. Ibid s.18. 
81. Ibid s.46. 
82. Ibid ss 47A & 48. 
83. 30 Vic,1866-7 No.14. 
84. (i) Limitation of Actions (Amendment Act) 1948. 
(ii) Limitation of Actions & Wrongs Act (Amendment) Act 
1956. 
(iii) Limitation of Actions Act (Amendment) Act,  1959. 
(iv) Statutes Amendment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act,  
1972. 
(v) Limitation of Actions Act (Amendment) Act,  1975. 
85. Third and Twelfth Report of the Law Reform Commission of  
South Australia presented in 1969 and 1970 respectively. 
86. Statutes Amendment __(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1972, 
No. 58 of 1972. 
87. Limitation Act 1935 - 1975 s.4. 
88. Ibid s.33. 
89. Ibid s.34. 
90. Ibid s.35. 
91. Ibid ss 36 & 48. 
92. 9 Geo IV C.83. 
93. 21 James 1, Cap 16. 
53 
94. ss.3, 4, 6 & 7 repealed by Supreme Court Act 1915; ss 1 & 
2 superseded by Real Property Act, 1915 pt II. 
95. Ibid Division 7, ss 80-90. 
96. Ibid Part VI, s.79. 
97. This includes Pt IX of the Property Law Act, 1928; Division 
7 of the Supreme Court Act, 1928 and Pt VI of the Trustee  
Act 1953. 
98. This Act can be traced back to 1910. Parts III & IV of the 
1958 Act were amended by the Wrongs Act, 1972 which was 
passed on 5 Dec 1982. 
99. Limitation of Actions Act, 1958 ss 4-22. 
100. Ibid ss 23-27. 
101. Ibid ss 28-35. 
102. Includes Limitation Provisions in the Distress Replevin &  
Ejectment Act, 1867; and the Trustees and Executors Act,  
1897-1924. 
103. Included in the repeal are The Limitation (Persons under  
Disabilities) Act, 1962, The Limitation Act, 1960 and 
certain sections of the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions  
Act 1956. 
104. Limitation of Actions Act, 1974 ss 1-8. 
105. Ibid ss 9-28. 
106. Ibid ss.29-40. 
107. Ibid ss.41-43. 
108. See Para 1.1 (infra). 
109. For a full discussion on Equity and Equitable jurisdiction 
see Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn Vol 16 para 1201-
1215; 	Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, Equity Doctrines &  
Remedies 2nd Edn Butterworths 1984. 
110. These 3 categories are that of Professor Storey. 
111. See for instance Halsbury's Law of England 4th Edn Vol 16 
para 1201. 
112. (1880) 16 Ch D 544 at 549. 
113. See Burgess v Wheate; A G v Wheate (1759) 1 Eden 177 at 
195, per Clarke M R; 28ER652 at 660; 
114. (1872) L.R. 5HL 656; 42 LJ Ch 234. 
115. See Smith v Clay 27ER 419; (1767) 3 Bro CC 639n, per Lord 
54 
Camden. 
116. J S Williams, Limitation of Actions in Canada, 1972 pg, 30. 
117. R E Megarry & P V Baker, Snell's Principles of Equity,  
(1973) p. 33. 
118. 27ER 419; (1767) 3 Bro CC 639. 
119. For a discussion on the distinction between acquiescence & 
Laches see Brunyates Limitation of Actions in Equity (1932) 
p. 188-190; Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn para 1473- 
1474; 1476-1478. 
120. (1886) L.R. 1HL 129 at p.140. 
121. G W Keeton & L A Sheridan, Equity, (1976) at p.22. 
122. (1874) L.R. 5PC 221 at p.239. 
123. (1887) 36 Ch D 145. 
124. at p.192. 
125. at p.186. 
126. (1967) 2 All E R 682 at 686. 
127. (1982) 3 All E R 833. 
128. (1957) 96 CLR 261. 
129. at p. 277. 
130. (1982) 3 All E R 833 at 840. 
131. Limitation Act, 1974, s.10(2). 
132. See para 3.2(b) infra. 
133. Limitation Act, ss.6(1) & (2). 
134. Ibid s.16A. 
135. Limitation Act, 1974, s.26. 
136. Limitation of Actions Act, 1936-1975 s.31(c). 
137. Limitation of Actions Act, 1974-1978, s.29(2)(b). 
138. See para 5.5 (infra). 
55 
CHAPTER 2. THE SCHEME OF THE TASMANIAN ACT 
Each state in Australia has made statutory provision dealing with 
the Limitation of the rights of action. 1 
In Tasmania, the Limitation Act, 1974 2 came into operation on 1st 
January, 1975.3  The Limitation Act, 1974 applies, subject to 
certain exceptions' to all actions begun within the jurisdiction 
of the Tasmanian Courts. 
2.1 SCOPE OF THE ACT 
The Limitation Act, 1974, is described in its long title as an 
Act "to consolidate with amendments certain enactments relating 
to the limitations of actions and arbitrations." 
The Schedule to the Act gives a list of earlier general 
enactments dealing with limitation which were repealed. In some 
instances whole Acts have been repealed and in other cases the 
extent of repeal is limited only to certain sections, dealing 
with limitation provisions in those enactments. 
The term 'action' is widely defined to include 'any proceedings 
in a Court of Law' 5 and includes a set-off or counter-claim. 6 
Although the definition of 'action' under the Act is very wide, 
yet it does not apply to every single proceeding in a Court of 
Justice. For instance, a criminal prosecution will not be 
included as the term action is normally used only for civil 
proceedings. 7 
The Act is divided into four parts. The substantive provisions 
dealing with periods of limitation and extension of the 
limitation period which are allowed in certain circumstances are 
dealt with in Parts II and III. The general matters relating to 
the application of the Act are dealt with in Parts I and IV. 
Generally the Act prescribes two periods of limitation - six 
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years and twelve years. The six year period is applicable to 
personal action which include actions founded in simple contract, 
quasi-contract; for and including actions for damages for breach 
of statutory duty; actions to enforce a recognisance or award 
not under Seal; actions for an account; actions to recover a sum 
recoverable under an enactment other than a penalty or 
forfeiture; actions to recover rent or damages; actions to 
recover arrears of interest. 
The twelve year period applies to all actions to recover land; 
actions to recover money secured by mortgage or charge or to 
recover proceeds of sale of land; actions in respect of any claim 
to the personal estate of deceased persons; actions on speciality 
contracts and judgments. 
There are five instances where a period shorter than six years 
is prescribed and two instances where a period greater than 
twelve years is prescribed by the Act. 
In personal injury cases, where action is brought for damages for 
negligence, nuisance or breach of duty the Act prescribes a three 
year period and a two year period for actions to enforce a claim 
or lien in respect of salvage services; action to enforce a claim 
or lien against a vessel; and in an action to recover penalty or 
forfeiture. 
The Act prescribes a one year period for actions under the Fatal  
Accidents Act, 1934. 
In actions to recover land including actions to recover land in 
cases of adverse possession, where the claimant is the Crown the 
time period is thirty years and not twelve. 
2.1.1. Proceeding to which Limitation Act Applies:  
The Limitation Act, 1974, applies to all actions for which a 
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period of limitation has been provided by the Act. This would 
include personal actions based on contracts, torts, personal 
injuries, conversion as well as actions in respect of land, rent, 
money secured by charges and trust property. Besides these 
actions, the Limitation Act, also applies to various other 
specific cases. 
(i) Estates of Deceased Persons 
The Act applies to actions concerning the estates of deceased 
persons on their personal representatives other than actions for 
which a special period of limitation is prescribed by any other 
enactment. 
Express provision is made in the Act limiting any claim to the 
personal estate of a deceased person or to a share or interest 
in such estate; whether under a will or on any intestacy to 12 
years from the date when such interest accrued. 8 
(ii) Arbitration 
Where a dispute is referred for determination in a judicial 
manner other than in a Court of Law, it is called an 
arbitration. 9 
Time may be relevant in arbitration cases at two stages, first 
in the commencement of the arbitration proceedings itself and 
secondly in the enforcement of the arbitration award. The 
Limitation Act applies to arbitration in the same manner as it 
applies to actions in the Supreme Court" but does not apply to 
arbitration for which a period of limitation is prescribed by any 
other enactment." 
In considering when the right to proceed to arbitration arises 
the same principle that determines when a cause of action arises 
in a court of law will be applied 12 even though there is a 
provision in the submission to say that no cause of action arises ' 
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until an award is made. 13 The limitation period that would be 
applicable to the arbitration proceedings would be either those 
prescribed by the Limitation Act or other enactment applicable 
to the matter. As regards the commencement of the arbitration, 
the Act stipulates that where the submission is based on an 
arbitration agreement, the commencement date will be the date 
when one party serves on the other a notice requiring him to 
appoint, or to agree to the appointment of, an arbitrator, or 
where the arbitration agreement names or designates the 
arbitrator, to submit the dispute to the person named or 
designated. 14 
(iii) Proceedings by or Against the Crown 15 
The Limitation Act applies to actions by or against the Crown. 
Proceedings by or against the Crown are governed by the Act, in 
the same way as proceedings between subjects. 16 However, 
proceedings by the Crown for the recovery of any tax or duty or 
any interest thereon are specifically excluded. 
Proceedings by or against the Crown includes proceedings by or 
against any government department or any officer of the Crown. 17 
In respect of actions to recover lane and in connection with 
leases 19 , the Crown receives more favourable treatment than 
others. 
The position under early common law was that no proceedings were 
maintainable against the sovereign as the Courts being the king's 
own could have no jurisdiction over him. 20 However, since then 
the cloak of immunity has been removed and today the Crown is 
just as liable as any of its subjects although the Crown is still 
privileged in having a limitation period which is much greater 
than its subjects. 
(iv) Foreclosure 
Foreclosure is the extinction of the mortgagor's equity of 
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redemption. 22 	Upon non-payment of a debt when due, and 
notwithstanding that the mortgagee may have a power of sale, the 
mortgagee may commence an action requesting the equity of 
redemption of the mortgagor be extinguished. In so doing the 
property will vest absolutely in the mortgagee. 
Section 23 (5) of the Act reads: 
"Nothing in this section applies to a foreclosure action in 
respect of mortgaged land, but the provisions of this Act 
relating to actions to recover land shall apply to such an 
action." 
The provisions relating to actions to recover land 23 apply, to 
time period for instituting foreclosure. Any such action must 
be instituted before the expiration of twelve years from the date 
on which the right of actions accrued. 24 Buckley L J in Williams  
v Thomas28 describing an action to recover land said, 
"the expression....does not mean regain something which the 
plaintiff previously had and lost but means' obtain any 
land by judgment of the court' yet it is not limited to 
obtain possession of any land by judgment of the court." 
Accordingly, foreclosure action (whereby a mortgagee obtains 
legal estate in the land thus destroying the mortgagor's equity 
of redemption) is classifiable as an action to recover land. A 
foreclosure action in respect of a mortgage of personalty, would 
be barred after twelve years from the date on which the right to 
foreclosure accrued 28 , however where the mortgagee has been in 
possession of the mortgaged property after the right of action 
has accrued the right is deemed not to have accrued until the 
mortgagee has discontinued possession. 27 
It is specifically provided that foreclosures under the Real  
Property Act, 1862 28 fall within the provisions of the Limitation 
Act 1974. 
60 
2.1.2 Proceedings to Which the Limitation Act Does Not Amply 
Generally the Limitation Act, 1974 does not apply to any action 
or arbitration for which a period of limitation is prescribed by 
any other statute, and more specifically the Act does not apply 
in the following instances:- 
(i) 	Equitable Remedies 
Although actions and proceedings on equitable right fall within 
the Act29 , claims for equitable relief like specific performance, 
injunction and so on do not come within the limitation period 
provided in the Act30 . So in other words the time limitation 
applicable under Division II to simple contracts 31 , awards on 
submissions not under sea1 32 , specialties33 , actions to enforce 
judgments, sums recoverable under any enactment m and tort36 will 
not be applicable to claims for equitable relief. However, the 
court may apply time limit by analogy, and normally equity did 
apply the Statute of Limitations by analogy as illustrated in the 
maxim that 'equity follows the law'. As there are no Tasmanian 
cases on point, I have included a number of English cases where 
the statute of limitation have been discussed in proceedings for 
equitable relief. 
When the remedy in equity corresponds to a similar remedy at law, 
equity normally applies the corresponding common law limitation 
period by analogy. So in Friend v Young37 where a manufacturer 
brought an action for account due against a commission agent 
after the death of one of the partners of the commission agent 
company, the court held that by the death of one of the partners 
the agency was determined and consequently no "debt or 
obligation" under the Partnership Act, 1890 had been incurred 
while the deceased was a partner and thus his estate was not 
liable. 
Sterling J, in his judgment said m 
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"in this case there is no question that the Courts of Law 
and those of equity have concurrent jurisdiction with 
reference to such a claim as this: indeed, as has already 
been stated, an action at law has been brought and judgment 
recovered for the very sum in question against the 
surviving partner.... A court of equity, therefore, ought 
to give effect to any bar created by statute which could be 
available at law." 
In Knox v Gye39 , Lord Westbury said, "Where a court of Equity 
frames its remedy upon the basis of the common law, and 
supplements the common law by extending the remedy to parties who 
cannot have an action at common law, there the court of equity 
acts in analogy to the statute; that is, it adopts the statute 
as the rule of procedure regulating the remedy it affords. Where 
the remedy in equity is correspondent to the remedy at law, and 
the latter is subject to a limit in point of time by the Statute 
of Limitations, a court of equity acts by analogy to the statute, 
and imposes on the remedy it affords the same limitation." 
Although equity applies the relevant Statute of Limitation by 
analogy it need not always follow the law. In Holmes & another 
v Cowcher" at the date of the commencement of an action for 
redemption, interest due under a mortgage was in arrears for 
substantially more than six years. After commencement of the 
action, the property charged was sold by the mortgagee pursuant 
to his statutory power of sale, with the agreement of the 
mortgagors. The issue in this case was whether the mortgagee was 
entitled, out of the money realised from the sale of the property 
to keep interest which had accrued more than 6 years before the 
action was brought and thus barred by statute. 
In his judgment Stamp J quoted with approval a passage from the 
judgment of Sir Richard Kindersley V-C in Edmunds v Waugh° . 
"Moreover, it does not appear to me to come within the 
spirit of the Act, which, it must be remembered, is an Act 
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taking away existing rights and which must be construed 
with reasonable strictness. The intention of the 
legislature, I think, was that if a man chose to let 
interest run into arrear for more than six years, and then 
come to a Court of Justice to recover the interest, he 
should be entitled to recover six years' interest; but it 
does not follow that the legislature intended that a 
mortgagor who has lost his legal right, and comes to the 
Court insisting on his equity to redeem, should be allowed 
- although he has failed to pay the interest which he ought 
to have paid for more than six years - to redeem on payment 
only of six years' interest. There would be no justice in 
such a construction of the statute. Is the omission of the 
mortgagor to pay the interest which he ought to have paid 
less culpable than the omission of the mortgagee to demand 
and enforce payment of it." 
In allowing the mortgagee to keep from the money realised from 
the sale, interest which had accrued more than six years before 
the action was brought, Stamp J, said42 , 
"Plainly, if I am to follow what Sir Richard Kindersley V-C 
said, as I must clearly do, equity does not, in this 
respect, follow the law, and ought not to be held so to 
do." 
So, whilst it is true that where the remedy in equity corresponds 
to a similar remedy at law, equity normally applies the common 
law remedy by analogy, it need not always do so, if it would be 
inequitable to do so. 
(ii) Trustees 
The Act stipulates a period of six years for actions by 
beneficiaries against trustees for recovery of trust property ° . 
If a beneficiary is able to prove fraud or fraudulent breach of 
trust against a trustee or where a trustee has trust property or 
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proceeds from trust property which he has converted to his own 
use no period of limitation applies. 
Where fraud is intended to be charged, it must be distinctly 
charged, and its details specified. General allegations, however 
strong are insufficient to amount to an averment of fraud of 
which any court ought to take notice." 
In such cases, where a beneficiary seeks to avoid the Limitation  
Act by pleading fraud, fraudulent breach of trust or converting 
trust property or proceeds to his own use, he must ensure that 
sufficient particulars are given in the Statement of Claims as 
otherwise the pleading could be struck out under Order 210 
r.17(1) 45 or under the inherent jurisdiction of the courts." 
This is clearly shown in an English case, Dow Hager Lawrence v 
Lord Norreys & Others47 where the court held that a general 
averment of fraud is not sufficient; the statement of claim must 
contain precise and full allegations of facts and circumstances 
leading to the reasonable inference that the fraud was the cause 
of the deprivation and excluding other possible causes. As the 
appellant was unable to do so, the court by virtue of its 
inherent jurisdiction dismissed the action as an abuse of the 
procedure. Lord Watson in the course of judgment said, 
"where a plaintiff in order to escape from the statute of 
limitations, brings charges of concealed fraud, for the 
first time, at a distance of seventy years, it appears to 
me that the duty of making a full and candid statement is 
specifically incumbent upon him. And unless the nature of 
the frauds alleged is in itself calculated to suggest the 
improbability to their being discovered by ordinary 
research, it is equally his duty to state the 
considerations to which he ascribes his ignorance of their 
existence." 
It is submitted that the view of Lord Watson is sound, as a 
beneficiary, in pleading fraud, fraudulent breach of trust and 
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so on is actually saying that the Limitation Act does not apply 
in these circumstances and if in fact a beneficiary is to get the 
benefit of such a provision he should be in a position to give 
all relevant details which shows fraud or fraudulent breach of 
trust on the part of the trustee, as otherwise any beneficiary 
who is dissatisfied with the trustee could just plead fraud, or 
fraudulent breach of trust without giving sufficient particulars 
and thus obtain the benefit of this section and in so doing put 
the trustee into great inconvenience. 
In fact Odgers, Principles of Pleading and Practice, state that 
"Counsel must insist on being fully instructed before 
placing a plea of fraud on the record. Such a plea should 
never be drafted on insufficient material, nor without 
warning to the client, if appropriate, that by adopting 
such an aggressive line of defence he may double or treble 
the amount of damages which he may ultimately have to 
pay. ,,48 
(iii) Claim for Tax, Duty by Crown 
In any actions to recover any tax or duty or interest thereon by 
the crown, the Act expressly provides that the provisions of the 
Act will not be applicable. 49 
(iv) Admiralty Actions in Rem 
The general restrictions on time to institute proceedings founded 
on contract or on tort do not apply to actions in Admiralty which 
are enforceable in rem. An action in admiralty can be classified 
either as an action in rem or an action in personam. The former 
is an action on a res or 'against a thing'. The word 'res' when 
used in admiralty usually refer to such things as ships and their 
charges and freight. A writ of summons is normally served on the 
vessel, which is arrested and subsequently sold to meet the 
claims of the plaintiffs. 50 However, an action to recover 
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seamen's wages is an exception and falls within the Act." The 
relevant provisions in the Act are sections 8(2) to 8(4). These 
provisions are similar to section 8 of the Maritime Conventions  
Act 1911 52 , which is an Imperial Act. Although this Imperial 
Act was extended to all Her Majesty's Dominions, it was expressly 
provided that its provisions do not extend to the Commonwealth 
of Australia. 53 
The operation of s.8 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1974 is 
restricted to claims in respect of damage or loss to cargo or 
property or loss of life or personal injury where such loss or 
damage is occasioned - wholly or partly by the fault of another 
vessel. This was confirmed by an obiter remark of Taylor J in 
Burns Philip & Co Ltd v Nelso & Robertson Ltd 54 . This case 
turned on a construction of s.396 (1), Navigation Act, 1912-1953 
(Cwlth) which is in the same terms as s.8 of the Limitation Act, 
1974 of Tasmania. 
In the course of his judgment, His Honor Taylor J said, 
"In approaching the construction of sub-section (1), it is, 
I think, of importance to bear in mind that it deals with 
distinct categories of claims, that is to say, it deals 
with claims in respect of loss or damage to vessels, their 
cargo and persons on board, and claims in respect of savage 
services. But it does not deal with all claims in respect 
of damage to vessels, their cargo and persons on board; its 
operation is restricted to cases where the damages 
occasioned, wholly or partly, by the fault of another 
vessel." 
These obiter remarks were accepted as persuasive by Hewson J in 
the later case The Niceto De Larrinanga Navarro (Widow) v 
Larrinanoa Steamship Co Ltd 56 , where the court was faced with an 
interpretation on section 8 Maritime Conventions Act, 1911 (which 
is similar in terms to s.8 Limitation Act 1974 (Tas). 
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His Lordship stated; 
"This section imposes an entirely new period of limitation 
in respect of the actions enumerated, subject to the 
proviso. It should be noted that the words of this section 
only apply to claims in respect of damage or loss to cargo 
or property or loss of life or personal injury which lie 
against the other vessel. Claims of this nature which is 
against the vessel carrying the person, cargo or property 
in question do not appear to be affected by this period of 
limitation." 
Since section 8(2) of the Tasmanian Limitation Act, 1974 is 
similar to s.8 of the Maritime Conventions Act, 1911, it is 
submitted that s.8(2) of the Tasmanian Act will likewise be 
invoked only if there are two vessels involved and the claim 
relates to damage to vessels, their cargo and persons on board 
or in respect of salvage services. The time period for 
proceeding under s.8(2) or s.8(3) 56 is 2 years from the date of 
damage, loss or injury or in a salvage claim 2 years from the 
date of such service, with powers in the court to extend this 
period57 notwithstanding that the time has expired. 58 
(v) Alienation of Crown Land 
Although the Act provides that the Crown would not be able to 
bring an action to recover land after 30 years and any other 
person after 13 years, it expressly provides that this provision 
does not apply to land which has been reserved or set out as road 
in any Act or in connection with alienation of crown land, 
dedicated under any Act for any public purpose or reserved in any 
Crown grant, or land which forms part of the foreshore or bed of 
the sea. 59 
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(vi) Bona Fide Purchaser for Value" 
The Act also stipulates that where a right has accrued to any 
person, that action cannot be brought against any person who 
bona fide purchased a legal estate in land for value without 
notice of the circumstances which gave rise to the right of 
action 61 
So that if A purchased a land from B in good faith and for value 
without notice that C had been in adverse possession of that 
property for over 12 years, C who has a right of action would not 
be able to enforce it against A. 
To successfully invoke this doctrine, the purchaser must 
establish in the words of Fry, J, in Re Morgan 62 
"that he took all reasonable care and made inquiry, and 
that, having taken that care and made inquiry, he received 
no notice of the trust which affected the property." 
The holder of a legal estate must take without notice of the 
prior equitable interest in order to take priority over it. 
Notice may be actual, constructive or imputed. Actual notice is 
where a purchaser has actual notice of the relevant facts. 
Sometime it may be difficult to draw a line between what will and 
will not constitute notice of a fact. Constructive notice is 
where notice of matters would have come to the purchasers 
attention if he had made all the usual and proper inquiries and 
inspections. A purchaser of a legal estate can plead lack of 
constructive notice if he has made all reasonable inquiries and 
has found nothing to indicate the presence of a prior, existing 
equitable interest. 
Under the deeds registration system, interests creating or 
affecting interest in general law land may be registered. Where 
a purchaser is purchasing an interest in general law land, it 
will be reasonable to expect him to search the deeds register to 
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determine if there are any subsisting interests in the land he 
is purchasing. 
Imputed notice is notice acquired or deemed to be acquired by any 
agent of the purchaser of the legal estate. If the purchaser 
appoints a solicitor to act for him in the purchase of the 
property, any notice, actual or constructive received by his 
solicitor is imputed to the purchaser. 63 
(vii) Other Cases 
By using the usual rule of statutory interpretation, the Act 
would not apply to proceedings for which no period of limitation 
is stipulated by the Act. 
At common law, Criminal proceedings are generally excluded from 
the operation of the limitation provisions. The maxim of the 
common law applicable in criminal proceedings is nullum tempus 
occurrit rege or there is in general no limitation of time on the 
institution of criminal proceedings. In Tasmania, criminal 
proceedings would be outside the scope of the Act because they 
are not 'actions' as defined in S.(1) of the Act. It would 
appear that the Limitation Act would not apply to enforcement of 
a charge by a debenture holder as is illustrated in the Victorian 
case of Re Otway Coal Co. In this case the company issued a 
first debenture to secure $25000 and in 1925 it created several 
second debentures to rank equally among the creditors after the 
first debenture, for a sum of $30,000. In 1935, the first 
debenture holder appointed a receiver and the property was 
eventually sold for $55,000. The second debenture holder 
appointed another receiver. The court was of the opinion that 
the only way in which a debenture holder can enforce his charge 
is by sale. Accordingly his right is not a right to sue for a 
debt within the meaning of section 82 of the Victorian Statute  
of Limitations (Supreme Court) Act, 1928, so as to be barred 
after six years, nor to bring an action to recover land, under 
the Property Law Act, 1928 (Vic) as that would be barred after' 
69 
fifteen years. 
As such the debt was not barred by lapse of time and the second 
debenture holders were entitled to the surplus. 
2.2. CONFLICT OF LIMITATION ACT PROVISIONS WITH LIMITATION 
PERIODS IN OTHER STATUTES  
2.2.1. Workers Compensation 
The 1974 Act is not an exhaustive provision of the law of 
limitation and as such it is not uncommon to find specific 
limitation period provisions in various other statutes, which 
limit the time within which a specific statutory action must be 
instituted. These specific time periods may be different from 
those provided in the Limitation Act and thus there could be 
conflict between the time provisions in these Acts. In the event 
of a conflict between, the time periods in a specific act and in 
the Limitation Act which is to prevail? 
The Supreme Court of Tasmania was faced with a conflicting 
provision as regards time for instituting proceedings under the 
Workers Compensation Act, 1927 which has now been superseded by 
the Workers Compensation Act, 1988 and the Limitation of Actions  
Act 1965 in E A Watts Pty Ltd v Hawkins ° S.9 (7) 66 of the 
Workers Compensation Act provided that in the case of a worker 
accepting payment of compensation under the Act, in respect of 
any injury, the civil liability of his employer would cease at 
the end of 12 months after the date of injury. 
The Limitation of Actions Act provided on the other hand in 
S.1 (1) "Notwithstanding any other law or rule of law to 
the contrary, an action of damages for negligence, 
nuisance, or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by 
virtue of a contract or of a provision made by or under an 
Act or independently of any contract or any such provision) 
where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for negligence, 
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nuisance, or breach of duty consist of or include damages 
in respect of personal injuries of any person shall except 
as provided in subsection (2) of this section, be commenced 
within a period of two years and six months from the time 
when the cause of action arises." 
The Tasmanian Supreme Court held, 
....The Limitation of Actions Act, 1965, is not an Act 
conferring a right on a limit to bring an action within the 
period of two years and a half. It is an Act which limits 
or curtails his common law right to bring an action (if a 
cause of action exists) to a period of two years and a half 
or by leave of the court within an upper limit of six 
years  The Act is plainly concerned only to prescribe 
maximum periods of time of universal application within 
which certain actions may be brought. It follows that 'any 
other law or rule of law to the contrary' can be a law 
which prescribes a maximum period in excess of the periods 
prescribed by S.2. A law which prescribes in special cases 
a maximum period less than those prescribed periods is not 
a 'law to the contrary'." 
The court was of the view that the provisions in the Workers'  
Compensation Act relate to substantive rights and are not 
procedural provisions and accordingly such substantive rights 
were not caught by the words 'any other law to the contrary' in 
S.2 of the Limitation of Actions Act. 
This decision must be questionable, as the phrase 'any other law 
to the contrary', it is submitted, is very wide and should 
include laws dealing with substantive rights as well as 
procedural matters and furthermore they are certainly wide enough 
to embrace laws providing a period less than those prescribed by 
the Limitation Act. 
A better interpretation would be to view the right under common 
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law and that under Workers' Compensation as two separate and 
concurrent rights except that the common law right is curtailed 
whenever a person receives compensation under the Workers' 
Compensation Act. In fact this approach was taken in a New South 
Wales case by Jacobs, J A in Andreoli v Sernack Pty Ltd 67. The 
Supreme Court of New South Wales, had to decide on the limitation 
provision under s.63 (3a) of the Workers' Compensation Act, 1926 
which required a person to institute common law proceedings 
within three years of the receipt of Workers' Compensation and 
the Statute of Limitation which provided a six year period to 
institute proceedings. 
In his judgment, Jacobs, J A stated, 
"However, I think....that the two rights must be regarded as 
existing concurrently, the right to Workers' Compensation and the 
right to commence a common law action until appropriate periods 
of limitation have passed, and that the right to commence an 
action at common law must be regarded as continuing throughout 
the whole period of six years after the occurrence of the injury 
except so far as that right may be curtailed by S.63". 
In cases of Contracts of Insurance, it is not unusual to find a 
time period of 12 months within which an insured would have to 
institute proceedings for breach, although the Limitation Act 
allows a period of up to 6 years for actions based on 
contracts. 68 
Not only is the insured given a shorter period of time to 
institute proceedings but often he is called upon to comply with 
• other requirements such as submitting the claim to arbitration 
as a pre-requisite to commencing an action in a court of law. 
Such clauses are lawful and the insured would be required to 
comply with the arbitration requirement within the stipulated 
time. 
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There are two New South Wales cases and one Victorian case on 
point. Firstly, in Re Woolooma Timber Co Pty Ltd and Sec.7 of 
the Arbitration Act69 , the court held that the requirement in the 
clause of the insurance policy that the claim should have been 
referred to arbitration within one year after the destruction or 
damage, was not satisfied by the request to appoint an arbitrator 
or the agreement of the parties to arbitrate, and in order to 
satisfy the clause there must have been a reference to 
arbitration. In other words, in order to comply with that 
requirement there had to be in fact a formal reference in 
accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act and that 
reference had to take place within the 12 month period. 
However this decision was over-ruled in Gosford Meats Pty Ltd v 
Queensland Insurance Co. Ltdm . A policy of insurance given to 
the plaintiff by the Defendants contained an arbitration clause, 
which provided, inter alia that after the expiration of one year 
after the accrual of a cause of action the insurer would not be 
liable in respect of any claim therefrom unless such claim should 
in the meantime have been referred to arbitration. 
Within one year after the accrual of a cause of action arising 
out of the policy it was agreed between the parties that the 
matter be referred to arbitration and an arbitrator was chosen 
and agreed to act. No further steps were taken within the year. 
Macfarlen J dismissed a summons for a declaration that the 
dispute had been duly referred to arbitration. The court stated, 
"It is therefore in our opinion, a compliance with its 
requirement that, within the year, the parties intention or 
desire to go to arbitration shall in any manner but with 
sufficient clarity and certainty, have been manifested. We 
have spoken of the matter thus far as if what was required 
was such a manifestation on both sides. But we are far 
from saying that there may not be a unilateral "reference" 
in the relevant sense, particularly on the part of the 
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insured, there being, of course communication to the other 
side. However, we express no concluded opinion as to this, 
since on the facts of this case the occasion does not 
arise. It is not necessary in our opinion, to a 
"reference" in this sense that there should have already 
been or should at the same time be, an appointment of an 
arbitrator or arbitrators. All that is necessary is a 
manifestation, sufficiently clear and certain, of an 
intention or desire that there should be arbitration. 
There must of course be an existing unresolved difference; 
but it is not essential that the nature of this difference 
be stated as part of what is only a manifestation of the 
intention or desire of the parties with respect to a matter 
which is common ground between them." 
So to comply with the time period, namely one year as in the 
above cases, in New South Wales, there need not be a formal 
reference as is required under the Arbitration Act but merely a 
clear intention or desire that the matter should be the subject 
of arbitration. 
In the Victorian case of Grieve v Northern Assurance Co n the 
court was asked to determine the validity of a condition for 
forfeiture if action was not brought within 3 months after 
rejection of a claim. It was argued that the condition was 
invalid in that it purported to prevent a plaintiff maintaining 
an action in a court of law during the period of time allowed by 
the Statute of Limitation. The court in rejecting this argument 
held that a condition in a policy of insurance that if a claim 
should not be made within 3 months after a claim under it had 
been rejected, all benefits under the policy should be forfeited, 
affords a good ground of defence to any action on the policy. 
In Tasmania no problem arises as to the time of an arbitration 
as s.33 (3) of the Limitation Act, 1974 clearly states that 
"an arbitration shall be deemed to be commenced when one 
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party to the arbitration serves on the other party a notice 
requiring him to appoint an arbitrator or agree to the 
appointment of an arbitrator, or, where the submission 
provides that the reference shall be to a person named or 
designated in the submission, requiring him to submit the 
dispute to the person so named or designated." 
So in Tasmania, time will commence when notice is given by one 
party to the other. 
2.1.3. Unpaid Rates and Municipality Charges  
Again, the courts have held that where the period of limitation 
stipulated in the Limitation Act differs from that in other acts 
dealing with rates or assessments, the provisions in the latter 
acts will prevail. 
Decisions in Victoria and New South Wales, show that in the event 
of a conflict between limitation provisions in some other acts 
and the provisions in the Limitation Act itself, the tendency of 
the courts has been to lean in favour of the former. 
In the Victorian case of Mayor etc of the City of Richmond v The 
Federal Building Society and others 72 , the court was called upon 
to interpret S341 of the Local Government Act, 1903m, which 
provided inter alia that rates remained a charge on the property 
until it is paid. 
Madden C J in delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court in 
Victoria said, 
"The effect of the Statute of Limitations upon debts 
charged on land is that the charge shall remain no longer 
than 15 years from a certain time. But under S341, the 
charge is to remain not until 15 years have elapsed, but 
until the money is paid, and it appears to be quite 
impossible to give any other meaning to the words than 
their ordinary meaning." 
75 
Similarly in The Borough of Tamworth v Russell, the court had 
to decide on S176 of the Municipalities Act, 1867, which provided 
that over-due rates or assessments remained a charge on the 
property. 
Although in the first instance the Statute of Limitation was 
successfully relied on, when the matter went on appeal the court 
held that the Statute of Limitation did not apply. 
So it would appear that where a statute provides for rates to be 
a charge on a property, the Limitation Act is effectively ousted. 
Although there are no cases in point in Tasmania, by analogy it 
would appear that the situation in Tasmania would be the same as 
that in Victoria and New South Wales. 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
The Tasmanian Act like the English Act and the Limitation Acts 
of the other Australian States spells out proceedings to which 
the Act applies and in what instances they are inapplicable. 
One notable area to which the Act does not apply is to equitable 
relief like specific performance, injunction and the like. 
Although the Limitation Act does not apply to cases where an 
equitable remedy is sought, the Court normally applies the common 
law limitation period by analogy, if the remedy in equity 
corresponds to a similar remedy at law. However, where it would 
be inequitable to follow the limitation period stipulated by the 
Limitation Act, the court of equity will not do so. The 
Limitation Act is not exhaustive, in the sense that there could 
be limitation provisions found in other statutes as well. 
This would inevitably give rise to conflict between the time 
provisions found in the Limitation Act on the one hand, and the 
time period allowed under these other statutes. 
In the event of a conflict arising between the time provisions 
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in the Limitation Act and another statute the Court may very well 
approach the issue of which provision prevails by considering 
whether the time provisions in the other statute confer a 
substantive right on the claimant. 
In referring to the Limitation of Actions Act, 1965, the 
Tasmanian Supreme Court has held that it does not confer a right 
but merely limits or curtails the litigants common law right to 
bring an action. 
If the court finds that the time provisions found in the other 
statute confer a substantive right •than they would in all 
ptobability say that provision should take precedence over the 
provisions found in the Limitation Act. 
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NOTES 
1. NSW: Limitation Act, 1958 
Victoria: Limitation of Actions Act, 1936-1975 
South Australia: Limitation of Actions Act, 1936-1975 
Western Australia: Limitation Act, 1935-1978 
Queensland: Limitation of Actions Act, 1974-1978 
Tasmania: Limitation Act, 1974 
2. For the corresponding section to the Tasmanian Act in the 
other states please look at Appendix II. 	Set out in 
Appendix I, in tabular form are the various time limits 
provided by the Act for various causes of action. The 1974 
Act is divided into 4 parts; Part I is the preliminary 
part which contains the interpretation sections. Part II 
contains the periods of limitation for the various causes 
and has two divisions. Division II deals with limitation 
periods for contracts, tort, personal injuries and 
conversion whereas Division III deals with actions in 
respect of land, rent, money secured by charges and trust 
property. 	Part II deals generally with extension of 
limitation periods and in cases of disabilities or in cases 
of acknowledgment or part payment an extension is granted. 
The final part-Part IV contains several miscellaneous and 
supplemental provisions: 
Section 39(1) of the 1974 Act states that it did not 
operate to revive any actions barred by the earlier 
limitation statutes unless there has subsequently been an 
acknowledgment or part payment by the debtor. This 
provision is now of little practical importance. 
3. Limitation Act, 1974 s.1(); Prior to the commencement date, 
there existed in Tasmania Imperial Acts and the Limitation  
Acts of 1836, 1875 and 1965 (see Chapter 1 para. 1.2(f) 
infra). Section 40(1) of the Limitation Act 1974 expressly 
repealed the Imperial Acts and Section 40(2) repealed the 
state Limitation Acts of 1836, 1875 and 1965, the Fatal  
Accidents Act 1965 and certain sections of the other Acts 
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mentioned in Part II of the schedule. 
4. As to the proceedings to which the Act does not apply see 
para 2.1.2 infra. 
5. Limitation Act, 1974 s.2(1). 
6. Ibid s.35. 
7. See China v Harrow UDC (1954) 1 QB 178 at 185 (per Goddard 
LCJ). 
8. Limitation Act, 1974 s.25. 
9. For a detailed discussion on Arbitration see Russell on 
Arbitration, 18th Edn 1970 and Halsbury's Laws of England 
4th Edn vol 2, pp 255-356. 
10. Limitation Act, 1974 s.33(1). 
11. Ibid S.38. 
12. Per Atkinson J. Pegler v Railway Executive (1946) 62 TLR 
474 at 477. 
13. Limitation Act, 1974 s.33(2). 
14. Ibid s.33(3). 
15. Generally see Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn vol 11 
para 1401. 
16. Limitation Act, 1974 s.37(1). 
17. Ibid s.37(2). 
18. Ibid s.10(1). 
19. Ibid s.12(3). 
20. See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn vol 8 para 966. 
21. Generally on the subject of Foreclosure see Fisher & 
Lightwood's Law of Mortgage - ELG Tyler, 8th Edn, 1969, pp 
322-328. 
22. See Wakefield Bank v Yates (1916) 1 Ch 452, CA. 
23. Limitation Act, 1974 ss 10-12. 
24. Ibid s. 10(2). 
25. (1909) 1 Ch 713 at 730. 
26. Limitation Act, 1974 s.23(2). 
27. Ibid s.23(3). 
28. Ibid s.34. 
29. Ibid s.2(1) See definition of "action" and "Land". 
30. Ibid s.9. 
31. Ibid s.4(1)(a). 
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32. Ibid s.4(1)(c). 
33. Ibid s.4(3). 
34. Ibid s.4(4). 
35. Ibid s.4(1)(d). 
36. Ibid s.5 & 6. 
37. (1987) 2 Ch 421. 
38. at p 432. 
39. (1872) LR 5HL 656 at 674. 
40. (1970) WLR 834. 
41. (1886) LR lEq 418 LR 418. 
42. at p 1226. 
43. Limitation Act, 1974 ss. 10(1); 10(4) (a) & (b). 
44'. Wellington v Mutual Society (1880) 5 App Cas at p 697. 
45. "the defendant or the Plaintiff, as the case may be, must 
raise by his pleading all matters which show that the 
transaction is either void, or voidable in point of law, 
and all such grounds of defence or reply, as the case may 
be, must be pleaded, which, if not raised, would be likely 
to take the opposite party by surprise, or would raise 
issues of fact not arising out of the preceding pleading, 
as, for instance, fraud, equitable defence, Statute of 
Limitations, stopped, release, payment, performance, facts 
showing the illegality or invalidity of any contract either 
by Statute or common law, Statute of Fraud, or the Sale of 
Goods Act 1896." 
46. See Keith Mason, Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, 57 AUJ 
449. 
47. (1890) 15 App Cas 210. 
48. Odgers, Principles of Pleading & Practice in Civil Actions  
in the High Court of Justice, Casson D.B & Dennis H, 
Stevens & Sons, 22 Edn 1981. 
49. Limitation Act, 1974 s.37(1). 
50. British Shipping Laws Vol 1, Admiralty Practice McGuffie 
KC, Frugeman PA, Stevens & Sons, 1964 p.5. 
51. Limitation Act, 1974 s.8(1). 
52. Maritime Conventions Act s.8 "No action shall be 
maintainable to enforce any claim or lien against a vessel 
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or her owners in respect of a damage or loss to another 
vessel, her cargo or freight, or any property on board her, 
or damages for loss of life or personal injuries suffered 
by any person on board her, caused by the fault of the 
former vessel, whether such vessel be wholly or partly in 
fault, or in respect of any salvage services, unless 
proceedings therein are commenced within two years from the 
date when the damage or loss or injury was caused or the 
salvage services were rendered, and an action shall not be 
maintainable under this Act to enforce any contribution in 
respect of any overpaid proportion of any damages for loss 
of life or personal injuries unless proceedings therein are 
commenced within one year from the date of payment: 
Provided that any court having jurisdiction to deal with an 
action to which this section relates may, in accordance 
with the rules of court, extend any such period, to such 
extent and on any such conditions as it thinks fit, and 
shall, if satisfied that there has not during such period 
been any such reasonable opportunity of arresting the 
defendant vessel within the jurisdiction of the court, or 
within the territorial waters of the country to which the 
plaintiff's ship belongs or in which the plaintiff resides 
or as his principle place of business, extend any such 
period to an extent sufficient to give such reasonable 
opportunity. 
53. S.9(1) Maritime Conventions Act, 1911. 
54. (1957) 1 Lloyds Rep 267. 
55. (1965) 3 All E R 930. 
56. Limitations Act, 1974, s.8(2). 	An action to enforce a 
claim or lien against a vessel or her owners in respect of 
damage or loss to another vessel, her cargo or freight, or 
any property on board her, or damage or loss of life or 
personal injuries suffered by any person on board her 
caused by the fault of the former vessel, whether that 
vessel be wholly or partly in fault, shall not be brought 
after the expiration of two years from the date on which 
the damage, loss or injury was caused. (3) An action to 
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enforce a claim or lien in respect of any salvage services 
shall not be brought after the expiration of two years from 
the date on which the services were rendered. 
57. Ibid s.8(4). 
58. Ibid s.8(5). 
59. Ibid s.10(1), 10(4) (a) & (b). 
60. Generally on the doctrine of bona fide purchaser see 
Barnsley's Conveyancing Law & Practice 2nd Edn pp 379-381. 
61. Limitation Act, 1974 s.16A. 
62. (1881) 18 Ch D. 93, 102. 
63. Bradbrook, McCallum and Moore, Australian Real PropertV 
Law, 1991 pp 98-106. 
64. (1953) VLR 537. 
65. :1968: Tas S R 83. 
66. This Section was amended by the Workers' Compensation 
(Alternative Remedies) Act, No. 93 of 1973 by inserting a 
new sub-section 7. 
67. (1966) 2 NSWR 123. 
68. Limitation Act, 1974 s.4(1) (a). 
69. (1969) 1 NSWR 168. 
70. (1970) 3 NSWR 400. 
71. (1879) 5 VLR 413. 
72. (1909) VLR 413. 
73. "All rates and other monies due to any municipality 	 in 
respect of any property.... shall with interest thereon as 
in this Act provided be and until paid remain a charge 
upon such property." 
74. (1886) WN 57. 
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CHAPTER 3. WHEN TIME BEGINS TO RUN 
3.1. IN CASES OF CONTRACTS, TORTS AND PERSONAL ACTIONS 
The general rule as to the commencement of the Limitation period 
stipulated by statute, is from the date of accrual of the cause 
of action, which arises when the breach occurs and not when the 
damage is suffered. 1 From the moment a breach occurs the 
plaintiff is assumed to be in a position to prove all the 
elements of a civil wrong and establish a prima facie case 
against the defendant. 
Unfortunately, the Act does not define the term "cause of 
action." However a number of old English cases have defined the 
term as follows; Firstly, in 1888, Lord Esher defined cause of 
action as 
"every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff 
to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to 
the judgment of the court. 2" 
In 1891, Lindley L J said in Reeves v Butcher, 3 
II 	 the cause of action arises at the time when the debt 
could first have been recovered by action. The right to 
bring an action may arise on various events; but it has 
always been held that the statute runs from the earliest 
time at which an action could be brought." 
Lord Dunedin in Board of Trade v Cayzer, Irvine & Co. 4 , defined 
cause of action to mean "that which makes action possible." 
For an action to be brought there must be an identifiable 
plaintiff who could institute proceedings and an identifiable 
defendant on whom process could be served. So the starting point 
for the limitation period in most cases would be from the time 
parties could be identified and all the elements of a civil wrong 
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exist, to enable the plaintiff to prove a prima facie case 
against the defendant. The inability to trace the defendant does 
not prevent the cause of action from accruing 5 , although without 
finding the whereabouts of the defendant, it might mean that the 
plaintiff cannot commence proceedings. However, a cause of 
action cannot arise unless there is a party in existence, capable 
of suing and another party in existence, who can be sued. 6 For 
all the elements of a civil wrong to exist, the plaintiff must 
be in a position to prove his claim. In other words if the 
plaintiff is contemplating an action in negligence for instance, 
he/she should be able to prove that the defendant owed him/her 
a duty; that the defendant was in breach of that duty; and 
arising out of the breach the plaintiff suffered damages or loss 
and that such damages or loss was foreseeable. 
3.1.1. 	Actions on Contract 
The general periods of limitation for all common law actions are 
provided for in the Act. 7 In the case of contracts, the Act 
makes a distinction between simple contracts and contracts under 
seal. In the case of simple contracts, a period of six years 8 
is provided from the date on which the cause of action accrued; 
in cases of contracts under seal (or speciality contracts) the 
time period is twelve years') from the date of accrual of the 
cause of action. Perhaps a suggested reason for giving the 
former such a shorter time period could be due to the fact that 
since simple contracts could be made in writing or parol and in 
many cases because of their informal nature it could be difficult 
to prove these cases with the lapse of time, whereas speciality 
contracts because they are signed, sealed and delivered, they are 
provable for a much longer period. 
The Act does not define a simple contract. However, Blackstone's 
Commentaries l° defines simple contracts as, 
"Debts by simple contract are such, where the contract upon 
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which the obligation arises is neither ascertained by 
matter of record, nor yet by deed or special instrument, 
but by mere oral evidence, the most simple of any; or by 
notes unsealed, which are capable of a more easy proof, and 
therefore only better than a verbal promise." 
In Halsbury's Laws of England" simple contracts are defined 
"to include all contracts which are not contracts of record 
or contracts under seal. Simple contracts may be express 
or implied, or partly express and partly implied." 
In Anson's Law of Contract, a contract is defined as an 
'actionable promise or promises' 12 
In the absence of a definition of a simple contract in the 
Limitation Act, it is suggested that the above definitions should 
apply to the Act. 
(i) 	Determination of Breach 
Having decided that a cause of action has accrued, the next vital 
• step is to identify the exact point of time that gives rise to 
the cause of action. In other words, the plaintiff should be in 
a position to identify the time the breach occurred, as the 
material time for commencement of the Statute of Limitation is 
the date of the breach and not the date when the damage occurs n . 
That the operative time is the date of breach is demonstrated in 
Gibbs v Guild 14 where Field J., said, 
"It was well settled that in actions on assumpsit the time 
ran from the breach of the contract, for that was the gist 
of the action, and the subsequent damage, though happening 
within six years next before the suit, did not prevent the 
application of the statutes." 
In a case of a simple contract where A contracted to sell 1000 
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tons of wheat to B to be delivered on 20th December, 1985, a 
breach would occur on the 20th December 1985 if the wheat was not 
so delivered. 
If the wheat was to be delivered over 5 separate dates and the 
plaintiff A, is in breach of the first two deliveries, the 
problem becomes more complex. In this instance, A is in breach 
of the first two deliveries, but the time for performance of the 
next three deliveries is yet to come. Would the cause of action 
against A arise on the date when he was supposed to deliver his 
first instalment or must B wait until A fails to deliver the last 
of the 5 instalments? In such a case, if the innocent party 
accepts the initial breach as a repudiation of the contract, his 
cause of action accrues at once. 15 
However, if the initial breach does not give rise to a discharge 
either because it is not sufficiently fundamental 16 or because 
the innocent party declines to accept it as a discharge, each 
time a breach occurs, a separate cause of action arises". So 
where a seller makes defective deliveries in respect of one or 
more instalments, or the buyer neglects or refuses to take 
delivery of or pay for one or more instalments, this will not 
necessarily permit the innocent *party to treat himself 
discharged. In each case the question to be asked is whether the 
breach is a repudiation of the whole contract or whether it is 
a severable breach. If it is a severable breach the innocent 
party could only claim damages for the said breach and does not 
have a right to treat the whole contract as repudiated. It is 
possible that the breach or breaches may amount to an express or 
implied renunciation of the contract. However, if they amount 
only to a failure of performance, they must go to the root of the 
contract in order to justify discharge. 18 
(ii) Money Lent 
Generally, where no time for repayment is specified in a contract 
of loan, or where the loan was expressed simply to be repayable ' 
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"on demand", the lender's cause of action accrues when the loan 
was made and time begins to run from the date of the loan. Six 
years19 from the date of the loan, the lender's right to recover 
the loan is barred, despite the fact that the lender has not made 
a demand. 20 
As an example, where A makes a loan of $5000 to B on 1st January, 
1983 payable on 31st December, 1983. Here it is an express term 
of the loan that A cannot call back the loan till 31st December, 
1983. So, as far as A is concerned time runs from 31st December, 
1983, because that is the earliest period he could have recalled 
the loan. So in Reeves v Butcher21 , which is an English case, 
the plaintiff lent money to the defendant and agreed that if the 
defendant paid interest quarterly, he could not call in the money 
for five years. There was also a provision in the agreement that 
if the defendant should make default in the payment of any of the 
quarterly interest payment for twenty-one days the plaintiff 
might call in the principal. No interest was ever paid and the 
plaintiff commenced proceedings within 6 years after the period 
of the loan i.e. after 5 years had expired. 
The Court of Appeal held that the Statute of Limitation was a 
good defence, for that the time began to run from the earliest 
time at which the plaintiff could have brought her action - i.e. 
twenty-one days after the first instalment of interest became 
due. 
As a second example, A makes a loan of $5000 to B on 1st January, 
1983, payable on demand. Here normally time runs from the date 
of the loan i.e. 1st January, 1983. However, one would have to 
look at the surrounding circumstances to ascertain whether the 
parties had intended that demand should be a condition precedent 
to the action. A demand would be a condition precedent only on 
the promise by a party to pay a collateral amount and not where 
he is principally liable for the debt. In re J Brown's Estate 22 
a father and son made a joint and several covenant to pay the 
principal sum secured by a mortgage "on demand". The father who 
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was a surety died 5 years later and no action was brought against 
the father's estate in respect of his liability on the covenant 
in the mortgage until nine years after his death. Chitty, J 
said, 
"now, for those interested in the testator's estate it is 
said that the meaning of the words "on demand" is the same 
as that which has been attributed to them in promissory 
notes and the like. The law is quite settled that, with 
regard to a promissory note payable on demand, no demand is 
necessary before bringing an action, and indeed the Statute 
of Limitations begins to run from the making of the note." 
H 	It is plain that a distinction has been taken and 
maintained in law, the result of which is that where there 
is a present debt and a promise to pay on demand, the 
demand is not considered to be a condition precedent to the 
bringing of the action. But it is otherwise on a promise 
to pay a collateral sum on request, for then the request 
ought to be made before action is brought." 
Therefore, where a surety undertakes to pay on demand, a demand 
is a condition precedent to liability and only when a demand is 
made and not complied with, does the creditors cause of action 
accrue. 
An action to claim the principal amount of interest due under a 
mortgage of land, is contractual in nature and as such can fall 
within the rules relating to contract as well as to an action to 
recover money secured by mortgage or other charge. 23 In the 
English case of Wallis v Crowe 24 , the court treated the claim as 
falling under the rule of contract. In this case the defendant's 
jointly and severally guaranteed the payment of the principal and 
interest moneys secured by a mortgage and undertook to pay the 
principal and interest if the mortgagor defaulted. The mortgagor 
defaulted and the principal moneys became due on 3rd June, 1930. 
The court held that after 6 years from the date of default, an 
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action for principal and interest was barred against the 
guarantors. The court also held that as regards interest the 
guarantee was a continuing one, which meant that a fresh 
liability arose in every case of default and that the liability 
was not barred until 6 years from the date on which it arose. 
(iii) Guarantees 
A guarantee is the promise of one person to be answerable for the 
debt or obligation of another if that other person defaults. 
Generally, in a contract of guarantee the primary obligation is 
owed by the borrower or principal debtor and a secondary 
obligation which is assumed by the guarantor or surety. 
Chitty, J in re Brown's Estate, observed that where there is a 
promise to pay a collateral sum, a demand ought to be made prior 
to an action being brought 25 . This arises in the case of 
guarantees, as the guarantor is not liable in the primary sense, 
since the primary debt is the responsibility of the borrower. 
The guarantor's liability arises only when the borrower defaults 
and when a demand is made by the lender to pay the collateral 
sum. Time in this case will only start to run from the date of 
demand. In the Victorian case of Union Bank of Australia Ltd v 
Barry26 , A, gave a guarantee to a Bank to secure the repayment of 
an advance made by the Bank to B "in case the said B should make 
default in payment of such advance and interest or any part 
thereof".. B's account with the Bank continued to be overdrawn 
till she passed away. The Bank did not make any demand on B 
during her lifetime but made a demand on her executors within 6 
years of the bringing of the action. The court held that no 
default was made within the terms of the guarantee until after 
demand and that the Statute of Limitations did not begin to run 
until such demand was made. A was therefore liable. 
Depending on the wording of the contract, the guarantor is 
generally not liable for the total amount of the principal debt 
but merely for the amount in default by the principal debtor. 
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In Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Colonial Finance Mortaage 
Investment & Guarantee Corp Ltd 27 , the guarantors gave a 
continuing guarantee to the Bank and undertook to pay all 
advances and debts owing or to become owing by the customer to 
the Bank "to the extent of $12,500 and interest on the same 
respectively or any part thereof respectively". The customer 
failed to pay a portion of the overdraft on one occasion and 
interest on the overdraft on another occasion and the bank made 
demand on the customer on both occasions. The court held that 
a cause of action arose against the guarantor when the customer 
failed to pay part of the principal debt on demand. However, the 
cause of action against the guarantor was not for the whole 
amount:of the guarantee but only the amount on which the customer 
defaulted. Therefore time began to run against the bank as to 
that portion of the indebtedness only, and the guarantee 
continued as security to the Bank for the balance. The court 
also held that as against the sureties, the statute ran as 
regards interest as well as the principal sums demanded. The 
liability of the guarantor in the event of a default by the 
borrower was also raised in the House of Lords in Hyundai Heavy 
Industries Co Ltd v Papadopoulos and Others 28 . In this case the 
guarantors agreed with a firm of shipbuilders to guarantee 
payment by the buyers, who had contracted with the shipbuilders 
to build a vessel. The buyers defaulted on the second instalment 
and the shipbuilders pursuant to a provision in the contract, 
took steps to terminate the contract. 
The House of Lords held that notwithstanding the notice of 
cancellation of the contract given by the shipbuilders, the 
buyers remained liable for payment of the second instalment 
because that was a liability arising before rescission, and 
accordingly the guarantors also remained liable under the 
guarantee for the buyers' default in paying that instalment. 
(iv) Sale of Goods  
In a contract of Sale of Goods, where the property in the goods 
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has passed to the buyer, the seller's right of action for the 
price accrues at the time for payment specified in the contract. 
In the absence of any contract, delivery of goods and payment of 
the price are concurrent conditions; that is to say, the seller 
must be ready and willing to give possession of the goods to the 
buyer in exchange for the price, and the buyer must be ready and 
willing to pay the price in exchange for possession of the 
goods. 3° As far as the buyer is concerned, if he wants to 
institute proceedings against the seller for breach of an express 
or implied warranty, then the cause of action would arise from 
the time the goods are delivered and not when the defect is 
discovered or damages ensures, This was decided in Mack v 
Eli-y31 , where a purchaser bought a piano in 1904 on a time 
payment system which she completed in 1912. In 1915 she brought 
an action against the vendor for breach of warranty, alleging 
that the piano was secondhand and not new as warranted. The 
court held that since the warranty was made once and for all in 
1904, time started running from the date of contract and thus the 
action was statute barred. 
Although time runs from the date of the contract, or date of 
delivery in the case of warranty, if the party who gives the 
warranty makes unsuccessful attempts to carry out what he has 
warranted, time does not commence to run until the date of his 
final unsuccessful attempt. So in Swan Pools Ltd v Batter 32 , the 
plaintiff, in 1971, agreed to supply and install a fibre glass 
swimming pool and agreed to rectify and make good any damage or 
defect caused by faulty workmanship or materials which appeared 
in relation to the fibre glass tank within three years after the 
commencement of filtration. Between 1972 and 1978 the plaintiff 
made several unsuccessful attempts to rectify certain defects 
which ended in the owner replacing a new tank. In an action by 
the Commissioner of Consumer Affairs for damages for breach of 
warranty, the plaintiff pleaded that the breach of warranty 
alleged had occurred more than 6 years prior to the commencement 
of the action and that it was statute barred. 
91 
Mitchell, J in his judgment said, 
"In Larking v Great Wester (Nepean) Gravel Ltd, Dixon J (as 
he then was) discussed the difference between a covenant 
imposing a continuing duty and one which is broken once and 
for all when the duty is not undertaken. The learned judge 
distinguished between a covenant 'by a lessor to put the 
demised premises in repair' which is 'broken once and for 
all if a reasonable time for putting the premises in repair 
elapses without his doing so' and a 'lessee's covenant to 
keep them in repair' which 'is continuing'. His honor 
discussed the fact that the time to perform a covenant may 
be enlarged with the consent of the covenantee. In my view 
this was the situation in the present case. The warranty 
was to rectify and make good any damage or defect which 
appeared within 3 years of the commencement of filtration. 
The appellant had a reasonable time within which to rectify 
the damage. The finding of the learned trial judge was 
that the fibre glass pool was incorrectly manufactured and 
that the defects could not be economically repaired but 
that the fibre glass needed to be replaced with a new 
structure. The finding was not challenged....The breach of 
warranty occurred when the reasonable time expired and in 
my opinion it expired at about the beginning of 1978." 
It is submitted, that the approach taken by Mitchell, J is 
correct; Time cannot be said to run against the plaintiff when 
the defendant is attempting to carry out repairs for which he had 
given a warranty. In this case the defendant purported to carry 
out the repairs pursuant to the warranty over a period of six 
years, during which time the plaintiff could have lost his claim, 
if time started to run from the time of the sale. Furthermore, 
if time starts to run from the date of the delivery of the goods, 
unscrupulous defendants could mislead innocent plaintiffs by 
prolonging repairs or attempting to remedying defects until the 
limitation period has expired. 
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(v) Solicitors & Professional Advisers 
As far as a solicitor is concerned, the duty he owes to his 
client is contractual 33 although in many cases the client may 
have a claim against the solicitor for the tort of negligence. 
The relationship between solicitor and his client is fiduciary 
in nature and as such in the event of a breach of this fiduciary 
duty, a client could institute proceedings as part of the 
doctrine of undue influence. 34 Thus in Tate v Williamson35 the 
principle was stated that, 
"Where two persons stand in such a relation that, while it 
continues, confidence is necessarily reposed by one, and 
the influence which naturally grows out of that confidence 
is possessed by the other, and this confidence is abused, 
or the influence is exerted to obtain an advantage at the 
expense Of the confiding party, the person so availing 
himself of his position will not be permitted to retain the 
advantage although the transaction could not have been 
impeached if no such confidential relation had existed." 
Again Lord Hudson in Phipps v Boardman [1967] 2AC 46 at 105, 
which is the leading case dealing with the solicitor-client 
fiduciary relation, stated as follows: 
"The proposition of law involved in this case is that no 
person standing in a fiduciary position, when a demand is 
made upon him by the person to whom he stands in the 
fiduciary relationship to account for profits acquired by 
him by reason of the opportunity and the knowledge, or 
either, resulting from it, is entitled to defeat the claim 
upon any ground save that he made profits with the 
knowledge and assent of the other person." 
In determining the time when the cause of action arises, in the 
case of a contract, the normal practice is to use the general 
contractual rule i.e. it arises from the moment of breach and not 
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when the damage is suffered or negligence discovered. This is 
illustrated by the decision of Ward v Lewis. There the 
defendant, a solicitor advised the plaintiff, who was his client 
to invest certain trust monies in two building societies. The 
societies went into liquidation and the plaintiff lost 
financially. The defendant was in breach of his contract with 
the plaintiff, in that he had failed to exercise reasonable care 
and skill in giving his advice. The plaintiff instituted 
proceedings against the defendant within 6 years of the 
societies' liquidation, but more than 6 years after the date of 
the defendant's advice. The court held that the plaintiff's 
action failed as the cause of action arose when the defendant in 
breach of his contract to use due skill and care, tendered 
negligent advice and not when the plaintiff suffered damage. 
It is submitted, that in such cases, time should run from the 
date of the loss or from such date when the plaintiff could have 
reasonably discovered that the defendant's advice was negligent. 
In fact until the plaintiff suffers loss, there could be no way 
of proving that the defendant's advice was negligent and that he 
was in breach of his contract to use skill and care. This would 
be the case with professional advisers such as Bankers, who 
normally, in the course of their business are called upon to give 
their opinion about the credit-worthiness of another party. Take 
the case of a Banker, giving a Bankers opinion about the credit-
worthiness of a third party which in practice would possibly be 
given with a disclaimer of responsibility. A, relying on this 
opinion enters into a contract with the third party and 
eventually the third party is adjudicated a bankrupt causing 
severe financial loss to A. In this case A's cause of action in 
contract against the Bank could arise on the date of the opinion 
and not from the date of his financial loss. Now assuming the 
time period between the date of the opinion and the date of A's 
financial loss exceed 6 years, A would be unable to successfully 
claim against the Bank in contract. It is submitted that in such 
cases as the above, where the action is based on a breach of a 
contract, the time should start to run only from the date of 
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damage or when the negligence is discovered, or ought to have 
been discovered, by a reasonable person. The present rule as it 
stands would mean that in many instances the claimant would be 
left with no remedy under contract. This is because, it would 
be difficult to prove that the advice given was in breach of 
contract, until the date of damage or until the negligence is 
discovered, by which time the claim would be statute-barred. 
(vi) 	Shares 
An action for unpaid calls and interest thereon have been held 
to be a claim on contract. In Land Mortgage Bank of Victoria Ltd 
V Reid37 there was a provision in the Articles of Association 
which read 'any member whose shares have been forfeited shall, 
notwithstanding, be liable to pay and shall forthwith pay to the 
company all calls, instalments, interest and expenses owing upon 
or in respect of such shares at the time of forfeiture until 
payment at the rate of ten per cent per annum.' 
3.1.2. 	Action Based on Tort38 
An action based on tort must be instituted within six years from 
the date on which the cause of action arose 39 . However in 
actions in respect of personal injuries falling within s.5(1) 40 , 
the limitation period is three years from the date on which the 
cause of action accrued. This period is subject to a 
discretionary provision whereby a judge may extend the time 
period up to six years from the date on which the cause of action 
arose. 41 S.5(1) clearly states that the personal injury cases 
which fall within this section are 
"an action for damages for negligence, nuisance, or breach 
of duty (whether that duty exists by virtue of a contract 
or a provision made by or under an enactment or 
independently of any contract or any such provision)..." 
95 
'Personal injuries' is defined to include 'any disease and 
impairment of a person's physical or mental condition' 42 . All 
other actions in tort, apart from those personal injury cases 
contemplated by S.5(1) and including actions for damages for a 
breach of statutory duty, fall under S.4(1) (a) and the time 
period is six years from the date on which the cause of action 
arose. That every case of personal injury does not fall within 
S.5(1) was recognised by Cox J, in the unreported Tasmanian case 
of Maher v Turvev43 . In this case the plaintiff suffered 
injuries at work and by virtue of a clause in the contract of 
employment the plaintiff had agreed that in the event of any 
injury he would receive the benefits provided under the Worker's  
Compensation Act.  1927. 
The court held that this payment to the plaintiff under the 
provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act, 1927, which has now 
been superseded by the Workers Compensation Act, 1988 was a 
payment of an amount due under a contract and thus it did not 
fall under S.5(1) of the Limitation Act, 1974 but rather under 
S.14(1)(a). 
Cox J in his judgment said, 
	the rights given to the plaintiff by the contract in 
question come into play on the happening of such 
eventualities as would give rise to a worker's right to 
receive any given benefit. If a man is permanently 
incapacitated by a tortious act, he may recover damages for 
his loss of earning capacity, both present and future, and 
the court will in awarding them take into account the wages 
he would have received but for the injury. In a case such 
as this, the plaintiff is not entitled to payment of wages 
which it is anticipated he may lose in the future. The 
contract gave him a right to weekly wages so long as the 
incapacity for work in fact lasted. He could not sue under 
the contract for payment of wages not then lost. His 
right to recover weekly wages under the contract only 
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accrued after each weekly period of incapacity elapsed. 
Similarly, the costs of medical treatment would only be 
recoverable under the contract when it had been incurred. 
The failure of the defendant to pay such sums would then 
constitute a breach of the agreement." 
Cox J in his judgment said that the word "actions for breach of 
duty" in S15(1) did not contemplate an action on a contract to 
pay monies on the contingency of any person sustaining personal 
injuries. 
The phrase "actions for breach of duty" however has been held to 
include actions for trespass for intentional injury in Long v 
Hepworth" where the plaintiff received eye injuries when the 
defendant wrongfully and intentionally struck her face with a 
handful of cement. Cooke, J., held that the expression 'breach 
of duty' was wide enough to cover an intentional trespass. 
Likewise, an action or trespass to the person, where the trespass 
was unintentional, is also included in the phrase 'actions for 
breach of duty as was held in the Victorian case of Kruber v 
Gresiak45 , but in such cases of trespass to the person, where the 
trespass was unintentional, proof of negligence is a necessary 
ingredient. 
The courts have held that damages for loss of consortium or of 
servitium consequent upon personal injury to the plaintiff 's wife 
or servant are 'damages in respect of personal injury to any 
person' under S.5(1) of the Act." 
(i) 	Classification of Torts 
Generally torts can be classified under two categories 47 . 
Firstly, those that are actionable per se (such as libel and 
trespass), where the cause of action is complete the moment the 
wrongful act is committed although the plaintiff may not be able 
to identify the tortfeasor till a later date. The second 
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category of torts are those actionable upon proof of damage (such 
as negligence and malicious prosecution) where the plaintiff 
would have to prove actual damage. 
It is important for a practitioner to determine firstly into 
which of these categories his clients case falls. If the action 
falls into the first category then time commences to run from the 
commission of the tort, whereas if it falls within the second 
category, time starts to run from the date of damage. 
However, there are certain torts, (such as false imprisonment) 
which are continuing torts. In these cases, the cause of action 
acbrues continuously throughout the period of false imprisonment 
and an action may be brought at anytime in respect of the false 
imprisonment occurring in the previous six years." 
(ii) 	Negligence 
To constitute negligence, there must be a duty owed to the 
plaintiff, a breach of that duty and arising out of that breach, 
the plaintiff must have suffered injuries or sustained damages. 49 
The duty may arise by virtue of a contract or independent of 
contract. If the duty arises by virtue of a contract, then 
normally time will run from the commission of the negligent act 
and not from the occurrence of damage. In the famous case of 
Donoghue v Stevenson 50 it has been settled that a manufacturer 
owes a duty of care to the ultimate consumer of his goods. This 
is quite distinct from any contractual duty he may owe to a 
purchaser. In this case time would run against the consumer from 
the moment he suffers damage. In other words, the plaintiff's 
cause of action accrues upon the occurrence of the damage. 
This, it is submitted should be the correct approach as there 
could be a substantial time interval between the negligent act 
and the resulting damage and if the plaintiff's cause of action 
should arise at the time of the negligence, he might very well 
find that he is barred by the Statute of Limitation by the time 
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he suffers damage. 
It is not uncommon to find specific legislation which gives 
rights to persons to institute proceedings on the happening of 
certain events. In such cases time will only start to run from 
the moment all the requirements stated in that legislation are 
complied with. For instance in the South Australian case of 
Carslake v Guardian Assurance Co" the court had to consider 
whether the requirements of S.113 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1959 
has been complied with in order to ascertain when time commenced 
to run. In this case the plaintiff claimed damages for injuries 
received in a road accident and the defendant successfully 
pleaded that the action was statute-barred. The plaintiff 
appealed. The South Australian Supreme Court was called upon to 
consider S.11352 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1959 as amended and 
36(1) 53 of the Limitation of Actions Act, 1936-1975. 
Bray, C J said in his judgment, 
"what are the facts which have to happen to entitle an 
injured plaintiff who sues the insurer of a deceased driver 
under S.113 to succeed? As I can see it they are: 
1. an insured person must have caused bodily injury by 
negligence in the use of an insured motor vehicle. 
2. the insured person must be dead. 
3. the plaintiff must be a person who could have obtained 
a judgment in respect of that bodily injury against 
the insured person if he were alive. 
4. as such a person he must have given a notice 
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of S.113(1)(b). 
Bray C J was of the view that in limitation actions, the cause 
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of action does not accrue until all the facts have happened which 
are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. 
Only when all the 4 events enumerated above have happened can it 
be said that a cause of action arose against the insurer. 
Although the accident occurred on 1st December, 1971, and notice 
was given on 28th June, 1973, the court held that the three year 
period mentioned in S.36(1) of the Limitation Act (S.A.) started 
to run from the 28th June, 1973, i.e. from the date of the 
notice. Until the 4th event enumerated above has been complied 
with viz notice given, time cannot start to run. 
In Tasmania, the legislation governing liabilities in respect of 
death or bodily injury arising from motor accidents is the Motor  
Accidents (Liabilities & Compensation) Act, 1973. Section 16(1) 
allows an action to be brought against the Motor Accidents Board, 
and S.16(2) states that a notice of intention to make a claim, 
together with a short statement of the grounds is to be furnished 
to the board in the 3 months following the accident and not later 
than 9 months if the court should grant an extension. However, 
S.16 (2A) provides that after the expiration of 9 months the 
court could still grant an application to extend the time "if it 
is satisfied that the granting of the application in the 
circumstances is just and reasonable in the circumstances." 
Unlike the South Australia provision, the Tasmanian Act does 
provide a primary period of 3 months, although the court is 
vested with a discretion to extend this period. Other than this, 
the Tasmanian provision is in substance similar to the South 
Australian provision and it is thus submitted that in Tasmania 
the time under the Limitation Act would only commence to run 
after notice has been duly given under the Motor Accidents 
(Liabilities & Compensation) Act, 1973. 
(iii) 	Deceit 
Where an action is based on the tort of deceit, the plaintiff has 
to prove that the defendant fraudulently made a false statement 
to the plaintiff intending that the plaintiff should act on it 
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and the plaintiff in fact acted on it and suffered damage. As 
Lord Fitzgerald said in Derry v Peek 54 "the action of deceit at 
common law is founded on fraud." 
In such cases S.32 of the Limitation Act states that 
"the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the 
plaintiff has discovered the fraud or could with 
reasonable diligence have discovered it." 
Although the six year period for tort prescribed in S.4(1)(a) of 
the Act is applicable, the cause of action will not accrue until 
the plaintiff suffers damage and thereafter time does not run 
until the Plaintiff has or ought to have discovered the fraud. 
(iv) Position in the United Kingdom 
As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, the question of 
Limitation in respect of negligence has been discussed in a 
number of recent cases. 
In Cartledge v E Jopling & Sons Ltd 55 , Lord Reid said, 
"a cause of action accrues as soon as a wrongful act has 
caused personal injury beyond what can be regarded as 
negligible, even when the injury is unknown to and cannot 
be discovered by the sufferer, and that further injury 
arising from the same act at a later date does not give 
rise to a further cause of action." 
He then went on, however, to say, 
"it appears to me to be unreasonable and unjustifiable in 
principle that a cause of action should be held to accrue 
before it is possible to discover any injury and, 
therefore, before it is possible to raise any action. If 
this were a matter governed by the common law I would hold 
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that a cause of action ought not to be held to accrue until 
either the injured person has discovered the injury or it 
would be possible for him to discover it if he took such 
steps as were reasonable in the circumstances. The common 
law ought never to produce a wholly unreasonable result, 
nor ought existing authorities to be read so literally as 
to produce such a result in circumstances never 
contemplated when they were decided. But the present 
question depends on statute, the Limitation Act, 1939, and 
section 26 of that Act appears to me to make it impossible 
to reach the result which I have indicated. That section 
makes special provisions when fraud or mistake is involved; 
it provides that time shall not begin to run until the 
fraud has been or could with reasonable diligence have been 
discovered. Fraud here has been given a wide 
interpretation, but obviously it could not be extended to 
cover this case. The necessary implication from that 
section is that, where fraud or mistake is not involved, 
time begins to run whether or not the damage could be 
discovered. So the mischief in the present case can only 
be prevented by further legislation." 
New legislation was indeed passed in the form of the Limitation 
Act 1963 56 . This Act extended the time limit for action for 
damages where material facts of a decisive character were outside 
the knowledge of the plaintiff until after the action would 
normally have been time barred. However, this provision applied 
only to actions for damages consisting of or including personal 
injuries. It would thus appear that Parliament had deliberately 
left unchanged the law regarding damages of other types. This 
is borne out in Bagot v Stevens Scanlan & Co Ltd 57 where Diplock 
L J said that damage from breach of duty by an architect for not 
ensuring that the drains of a new house were properly constructed 
must have occurred at the time they were improperly constructed. 
This view was followed by Lord Denning, M R in Dutton v Bognor 
Regis Urban District Counci1 58 where the owner of a building 
instituted an action for negligence against a local authority for 
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inspection and approving the foundation of the building. Lord 
Denning said that the damage was done when the foundations were 
badly constructed. 
Fortunately, this view did not prevail for too long as the Court 
of Appeal in Sparhan-Souter v Town & Country Developments (Essex)  
Ltd 59 held that where a house is built with inadequate 
foundations, the cause of action does not accrue until such time 
as the plaintiff discovers the damage, or ought, with reasonable 
diligence to have discovered it. The main reason for this view 
was that until the owner had discovered the defective state of 
the property he could resell it at a full price, and, if he did 
so, he would not suffer damage. Geoffrey Lane L J said, 
"There is no proper analogy between this situation and the 
type of situation exemplified in Cartledae v E Jopling &  
Sons Ltd (1963) A C 758 where a plaintiff due to the 
negligence of the defendants suffers physical bodily injury 
which at the outset and for many years thereafter may be 
clinically unobservable. In those circumstances clearly 
damage is done to the plaintiff and the cause of action 
accrues from the moment of the first injury albeit 
undetected and undetectable. That is not so where the 
negligence has caused unobservable damage not to the 
plaintiff's body but to his house. He can get rid of his 
house before any damage is suffered. Not so with his 
body." 
However, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in Pirelle General Cable 
Works Ltd v Oscar Faber & Partners" disagreed with the contrast 
drawn by Geoffrey L J between the position of a building owner 
and an injured person. 
He said, 
"It seems to me that there is a true analogy between a 
plaintiff whose body has, unknown to him, suffered injury 
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by inhaling particles of dust, and a plaintiff whose house 
unknown to him sustained injury because it was built with 
inadequate foundations or of unsuitable materials. Just as 
the owner of the house may sell the house before the damage 
is discovered, and may suffer no financial loss, so the man 
with the injured body may die before pneumoconiosis becomes 
apparent, and he also may suffer no financial loss. But in 
both cases they have a damaged article when, but for the 
defendant's negligence, they would have a sound one." 
So in the above case where the plaintiff discovered cracks in the 
chimney about seven years after its construction the House of 
Lords held that the date of accrual of a cause of action in tort 
for damages caused by the negligent design or construction of a 
building was the date when the damage came into existence, and 
not the date when the damage was discovered or should with 
reasonable diligence have been discovered. As such the 
plaintiffs claim was statute-barred. 
It is hard to conceive why the plaintiff in Pirelli's case should 
be burdened with the responsibility of having to climb up the 
roof periodically to check if any cracks were appearing on his 
chimney. Surely if he had entrusted the building of a chimney 
to a specialist he should not be burdened with the responsibility 
of keeping constant check on his chimney. In such cases, it is 
submitted that time should commence to run from the time the 
plaintiff first discovered the cracks or from such time he ought 
reasonably to have discovered them. 
Pirelli's case was applied, nevertheless, in Dove v Banhams  
Patent Locks Lte. In this latter case the defendants fitted a 
security gate in 1967 in a premises which was subsequently sold 
to the plaintiff. In 1979 a burglar broke down the security gate 
and stole valuable property of the plaintiff. The court held, 
giving judgment for the plaintiff that the cause of action in 
tort arose on the date when the damage came into existence, 
namely when the gate was broken down by the burglar in 1979 and • 
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not when it was installed and, therefore, the plaintiff's claim 
was not time barred. 
It will be observed that although the same test was used in 
Pirelli's case and Dove's case, in the latter case, the date of 
damage was apparently known to the plaintiff because it was on 
that date the house was burgled and there would be no excuse for 
him to plead otherwise. 
From the above two cases it would appear that although fixing the 
cause of action to arise on the date when the damage arises prima 
facie appears to be reasonable, it could in some cases place 
undue responsibilities and burden on plaintiffs who may not be 
in a position to discover the resulting damages without incurring 
additional costs or effort. 
As far as personal injuries are concerned, in England, the 
present position is that a plaintiff is entitled as of right to 
sue outside the normal limitation period, provided he does so 
within a relatively short time after the date on which he 
realises that he has a good cause of action against the 
defendants. Furthermore, a residual discretionary power is 
vested in the court to extend this period of time. 
In Tasmania, the discretionary power to extend time is found in 
S.5(3) 
"Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of 
this section, upon application being made by the person 
claiming the damages referred to therein a judge, after 
hearing such of the persons likely to be affected by that 
application as he may think fit, may, if he thinks that in 
all the circumstances of the case it is just and reasonable 
so to do, extend the period limited for the bringing of the 
action for such period as he thinks necessary, but so that 
the period within which the action may be brought does not 
exceed a period of six years from the date on which the 
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cause of action accrued." 
This section, it is submitted, appears very ambiguous. On the 
one hand it purports to give the court an unfettered discretion 
to extend time "for such period as he thinks necessary". On the 
other hand it seems to limit the maximum period within which an 
action could be brought, ...so that the period within which the 
action may be brought does not exceed a period of six years from 
the date on which the cause of action accrued." 
It is submitted that the problem faced by Cartledge's case could 
arise in Tasmania under the present legislation i.e. time would 
run whether or not the damage could be discovered and despite the 
limited discretionary power of the court, it could very well 
leave the plaintiff with no recourse, if he happens to be 
unfortunate in not discovering that he has a good cause of action 
within the six year period. 
It is suggested that the Tasmanian Act, be amended to provide 
that in cases of personal injuries, the plaintiff should have a 
reasonable time from his "date of knowledge" to institute 
proceedings. 
The Tasmanian Act only allows for an extension of time in the 
case of disability and unlike some other states in Australia 62 
does not allow for an extension of time from the date of 
knowledge of the applicant. 
3.1.3 Other Personal Actions  
(i) 	Recognisance 
The Act states that a period of 6 years is allowed for actions 
to enforce a recognisance° . A recognisance is defined in 
Blackstone's Commentaries as, 
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"An obligation of record, which a man enters into before 
some court of record, or a magistrate duly authorised, with 
condition to do some particular act, as to appear at the 
assizes, to keep the peace, to pay a debt, or the like. It 
is in most respects like another bond, the difference being 
chiefly this, that the bond is the creation of a fresh debt 
or obligation de novo, the recognisance is an 
acknowledgment of a former debt upon record." 
As a recognisance is a form of contract, time normally will run 
from the date on which it was entered into. 
(ii) Award 
In the case of a submission not under seal, any action to enforce 
it would have to be brought within 6 years from the date on which 
the cause of action accrued. 65 
In this case it is not certain whether the cause of action on an 
award arises at the date of the award or on breach of its terms. 
The case of Bremer Deltransnort v Drewrey66 seems to suggest that 
the latter view to be the more acceptable view since the court 
held that an enforcement action is founded on breach of an 
implied agreement to abide by the award. 67 
If an award is given under seal, then presumably it would be 
treated as a speciality for which a period of twelve years is 
provided. 68 
(iii) Judcrment 
Normally, the date on which a judgment becomes enforceable is the 
day on which it is pronounced, given or made, unless the judgment 
itself stipulates that it is to take effect at a later date. So 
the cause of action will accrue when the judgment becomes 
enforceable and continues for a period of twelve years 69. A ' 
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distinction is made between actions for enforcement of judgments 
and actions on judgments for which a time period is stipulated 
by the Act. This distinction is explained in the case of W T 
Land & Sons v Riderm as follows:- 
"it follows from the above brief survey that the right to 
sue on a judgment has always been regarded as a matter 
quite distinct from the right to issue execution under it 
and that the two conceptions have been the subject of 
different treatment. 
Execution is essentially a matter of procedure - machinery 
which the court can, subject to the rules from time to time 
in force, operate for the purpose of enforcing its 
judgments or orders.... The two subjects were formerly 
quite independent and distinct, the one from the other, and 
we are quite unable to attribute to the definition of 
'action' in the Limitation Act, 1939, the effect of merging 
the two together." 
As far as the Tasmanian Act is concerned, S.4(4) reads, 
"An action shall not be brought upon a judgment after the 
expiration, of 12 years from the date on which the judgment 
became enforceable." 
The phrase "upon a judgment" is wide enough to include actions 
on judgments as well as actions for enforcement of judgment. It 
is submitted that it is futile to differentiate actions on 
judgment from actions to enforce judgments. Such execution 
proceedings, it is submitted are actions on judgment, as 'action' 
is defined to include any proceedings in a court of law n . In 
practice, most judgments are enforced by execution. 
108 
3.2. ACTIONS IN RESPECT OF LAND 
The Limitation Act provides that the normal period to recover 
land is twelve years from the date on which the right of action 
to recover it accrued. 72 
3.2.1 Definition 
'Land' includes corporeal hereditament, rent charges and any 
legal or equitable estate or interest therein, including an 
interest in the proceeds of the sale of land held upon trust for 
sale, but excludes incorporeal hereditament m . 'Rentcharge' 
includes annuity or periodical sum of money charged upon or 
_payable out of land and excludes rent-service or interest on a 
mortgage of land74 . From the definition it appears that an 
action for rentcharge in principle is not different from an 
action to recover landed property, as rentcharge is included in 
the definition of land and furthermore the term 'right of action 
to recover land' includes a right to enter into possession of the 
land or, in the case of rentcharges, to distrain for arrears of 
rent. 75 
3.2.2. Adverse Possessionm 
(i) Historical Development of the Rule of Adverse Possession 
The rule of adverse possession derives from English law which was 
received into the new colony of Van Dieman's Land. 
Title to land in the early English common law depended on 
"seisin", which was feudal possession of a freehold estate in 
land. 
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England did not have any system of land registration like the 
Australian Torrens system. Therefore, under the English law an 
intending Vendor had to prove ownership of the land to the 
purchaser. Unfortunately ownership of land could not be proved 
by reference to any Register and the Vendor would have to prove 
a good "root of title" for a specified period of time. This 
meant that a Vendor would have to prove a chain of possession 
from previous owners and in England by the Real Property 
Limitation Act, 1874, an intending Vendor was required to trace 
his ownership back for 60 years. 
The various actions to recover land was also based on showing 
prior possession. However this system was subject to 
difficulties such as the problem for the dispossessed owner in 
proving his claim with the passing of time and ejectment becoming 
more unjust as the squatter became more settled on the land, 
particularly where improvements had been made to the land. 
Consequently, legislation was enacted to make title to land more 
certain. The earliest English legislation aimed at making title 
more certain by limiting the action for recovery of land by 
reference to a certain event. The first such legislation 
required that, to recover land from an adverse possessor, the 
owner had to show seisin of land at the time of the King's last 
voyage to Normandy. Failing this title would go to the adverse 
possessor. 
Later Statutes set the limitation dates as the coronation of 
Henry III in 1216, Henry III's first trip to Gascony and the 
coronation of Richard I. The limitation date of 3 September, 
1189 ("time immemorial") operated for some 265 years. 
The next stage in the development of limitations legislation was 
the establishment of limitation periods similar to those 
recognised today, rather than dates. 
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The statute provided a prescribed period, within which period an 
action may be brought for the recovery of land. Action was 
barred after the prescribed period expires. 
The Act of Limitation with Proviso (1540) was the first such 
statute which prescribed a limitation period of 60 years. An 
adverse possessor who shows that he has been in possession of the 
land for 60 years would not be ejected. An owner would have to 
prove seisin of the land for the preceding 60 years and if he 
could not, the remedy to recover the land was barred. This 
statute did not incorporate the principle of extinction. The 
owner's remedy was barred by time but not his title to the land 
which was unaffected. 
Subsequently, by the Statute of Limitations, 1623 once the 
limitation period had expired, not only the owner's right to 
bring an action was barred but his title was also extinguished. 
The next development in the area of adverse possession was the 
enactment of the Real Property Limitation Act 1833 which reduced 
the period for bringing an action for recovery of land to 20 
years and also provided that the right of the legal owner to the 
disputed land should cease to exist as soon as the owner's remedy 
was barred by the statute. 
From 20 years the limitation period was further shortened to a 
period of 12 years by the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874. 
All these statutes demonstrated that possession was the essential 
characteristic of ownership of land in England. 
English law was received into the colony of Van Dieman's Land and 
by this reception certain English Statutes applied. 	The 
Australian Courts Act, 1828 (UK) confirmed the application of 
Imperial legislation to the colonies. 
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In 1836, a limitation Act was enacted by Governor McArthur which 
extended specific English limitation legislation to Van Dieman's 
Land. The Limitation Act, 1836 (6 Will IV Cap16) specifically 
recited the Real Property Limitation Act, 1833. The limitation 
period of 20 years under the English limitation period was thus 
applicable to Van Dieman's Land. 
In 1875, the Real Property Limitation Act, was passed in Tasmania 
which reduced the 20 year period to 12 years. 
Subsequently, the Limitations of Actions Act, 1934 (Tas.) 
repealed much of the contents, of the 1875 Act but the 12 year 
period for recovery of land and for claims arising under adverse 
possession remained unchanged. 
The present Limitation Act, 1974 later consolidated the various 
limitation statutes that were applicable in Tasmania. 
Under the Crown Suits Act, 1769 it was possible to acquire title 
to Crown land in Tasmania by adverse possession. The imperial 
Act that applied in Tasmania provided for a period of 60 years 
adverse possession. This period of 60 years was reduced to a 
period of 30 years by the Limitation Act, 1974. 
(ii) Limitation and Prescription 
The effect of a limitation is similar to prescription in result 
although different in principle. Prescription is basically a 
rule of evidence arising under common law, although statute has 
extended it to rights like easements and profits which can be 
acquired over land belonging to others. Whilst prescription 
operates positively to vest a title, limitation operates 
negatively by extinguishing the title of the legal owner. 
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(iii) When cause of action accrues 
The right of action to recover land accrues to the real owner, 
when there is a person in possession of the land against whom the 
limitation period can run. In other words, when there is 
possession adverse to the owner, then the cause of action 
accrues. n Any person who had been in possession of a property 
for the duration of the limitation period could not extinguish 
the title of the time owner. To succeed in a claim for adverse 
possession the claimant must establish that he has been in 
continuous actual physical occupation of all the land claimed by 
him. 78 An occasional or sporadic use of the land will not 
suffice. Any gap in possession will vest the control of the 
property in the time owner whose rights will remain unscathed. 
As Lord Macnaughten stated in The Trustees, Executors & Agency 
Company Ltd & Templeton v Short79 
"If a person enters upon the land of another and holds 
possession for a time, and then, without having acquired 
title under the statute, abandons possession, the rightful 
owner, on the abandonment, is in the same position in all 
respects as he was before the intrusion took place. There 
is no one against whom he can bring an action. He cannot 
make an entry upon himself. There is no positive 
enactment, nor is there any principle of law, which 
requires him to do any act, to issue any notice, or to 
perform any ceremony in order to rehabilitate himself." 
Once the cause of action has accrued and the adverse possessor 
continuously remains in possession for 12 years, the true owners 
right of action will be barred and his estate extinguished. 8° 
The true owners right of action to recover land accrues and 
continues only if there is adverse possession and in a situation 
where the adverse possessor abandons the land he is occupying 
before the 12 year period, the true owner will have no right of 
action. 81 However, the true owners rights are revived and he 
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obtains a fresh right of action if the property is again taken 
into adverse possession. 82 In other words a right of action only 
accrues, and time only runs, if there is a person in adverse 
possession. Such a person in adverse possession must not be 
disqualified from relying on the Limitation Act. The Act clearly 
states that a trustee ° cannot rely on the Act for protection 
from his beneficiary and furthermore a beneficiary in possession 
cannot claim title by adverse possession against the trustees or 
against his co-beneficiaries. 84 
Again, the Crown is in a privileged position in that the 
Limitation period is 30 years85 and not 12 years. Furthermore, 
the defence of limitation is not available in actions brought by 
the Crown to recover land for public purpose if such land has 
been reserved or set out as a road, or dedicated for any public 
purpose or reserved in any crown grant or forms part of the 
foreshore or bed of the sea, or for recovery of part of a block 
which fails to qualify as a minimum lot." 
The Act clearly stipulates when a right of action arises in cases 
of present interests in land, future interest in land and in 
cases of settled land and land on trust. 
Each of these instances, will be examined separately: 
3.2.3 Present Interests in Land 
Where a person has a present right to possession of land, he 
would deem to have a present interest in land. This would be so 
even though he does not have actual physical occupation, as where 
the property is tenanted. This is referred to as an estate in 
possession. 88 The Act recognises three different situations 
under which a claim could arise. 
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(i) 	Dispossession or Discontinuance 
Firstly, where the person bringing an action to recover the land 
or some person through whom he claims had been in possession and 
has been dispossessed of it or has since discontinued 
possession. 89 'Disposed' would imply that a person's land had 
been taken over by another against his wishes, whereas 
'discontinued' would suggest a voluntary giving up or abandonment 
of the property whilst he was entitled to possession. 
John Doe" distinguishes dispossession and discontinuance as 
follows: 
"Dispossession arises where the squatter drives the owner 
out: discontinuance where the owner goes out and the 
squatter moves peaceably in. There can be no dispossession 
or discontinuance where the owner has merely failed to use 
and enjoy the land: the squatter must have done something 
inconsistent with the lawful owner's right of use and 
enjoyment, but it is not necessary that the new owner 
should be aware of the squatter's action. The squatter 
must prove possession on his part and dispossession of or 
discontinuance by the rightful owner." 
Fry, J in Rains v Buxton91 stated, 
"the 	difference 	between 	dispossession 	and 	the 
discontinuance of possession might be expressed in this 
way: the one is where a person comes in and drives out the 
others from possession, the other case is where the person 
in possession goes out and is followed in by others." 
The Act states that, 
"the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the 
date of discontinuance or dispossession." 
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In other words time would start running from the moment a person, 
other than the true owner obtains possession and it is not 
necessary for the true owner to be driven out of possession but 
where he abandons possession or dies, and another takes over, 
time will commence to run. Until there is adverse possession, 
time will not commence to run as there is nobody against whom the 
owner is failing to assert his rights. 
(ii) 	Recovery of Land Belonging to Deceased 
In the case of an action to recover land of a deceased person 
whether under a will or intestacy where prior to his death, the 
deceased was in possession of the land or in possession of the 
land charged in the case of a rentcharge, the right of action 
accrues from the date of death of that deceased. 92 This 
provision would apply to claims of real property of a deceased, 
whether under a will or intestacy, where the deceased was in 
possession of real property, prior to his death, and in such 
cases, time would run from the date of death. If this provision 
was left alone without any qualification, it would have given 
rise to some problems as no one will be able to deal with a 
deceased's estate, be it movable or immovable property without 
first obtaining a grant of probate, where the deceased had made 
a will or a grant of letters of administration in cases of 
intestacy. In practice, in cases of complicated estates, it may 
take several years before a grant is finally made by the court 
and thus it would be inequitable to allow time to run from the 
date of death. To overcome this problem S.20 states, 
"For the purposes of the provisions of this Act relating to 
actions for the recovery of land an administrator of the 
estate of a deceased person shall be deemed to claim as if 
there had been no interval of time between the death of the 
deceased person and the grant of letters of 
administration." 
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So then, in view of this provision time will not start running 
until the grant of probate or letters of administration by the 
court. 
(iii) 	Where Deed of Assurance Created 
In the case of a failure to take possession under a deed 
"the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued on the 
date when the assurance took effect". 93 
Under this provision time would only start running if there is 
adverse possession as A Beckett J pointed out in Gregory v 
Poole94 that the Statute of Limitations does not commence to run 
against the owner of land merely because he has not taken 
possession thereof, if the land remains unoccupied. 
3.2.4. Future Interests in Land 
Where a land owner creates an interest in his land which will in 
effect grant possession at some time in the future, he is said 
to have created a future interest in land. 
If a settler transfers land to a trustee upon trust for "my wife 
X for life and then for my son in fee simple" he has in fact 
created a life interest in possession for his wife X, who is 
entitled to immediate possession of the land and a future 
interest for his son Y, whose interest arises in the future after 
the expiration of the life interest of X. Although the interest 
arises in the future Y, has nevertheless a present subsisting 
interest, 95 which he could sell or dispose of inter vivos or by 
will. So a future interest is one which gives a person a present 
right to the possession of land at a future time 96 . 
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(i) Alternative Periods 
Two limitation periods are applicable to the owner of a future 
estate. Firstly, where adverse possession began before the 
reversion or remainder fell into possession, the reversioner or 
remainderman has twelve years from the commencement of the 
adverse possession. Alternatively, the reversioner or 
remainderman had six years from the falling into possession of 
his interest. In other words he could sue either within twelve 
years of the previous owner's dispossession or within six years 
of his own interest vesting in possession, whichever is the 
longer period97. If for example, A has life interest in 
Blackacre with the remainder to B in fee simple and an adverse 
possessor X dispossesses A fifteen years before A's death, B 
would have six years commencing from the time of A's death, to 
successfully recover Blackacre. However, if X had dispossessed 
A three years before his death, B would have nine years from A's 
death as in this case the twelve year period commences to run 
from the date of dispossession. 
However, if X takes possession of Blackacre only after the death 
of A, then B's interest would not be a future interest and the 
relevant provision to apply would be the general rule under 
S.10(2) of the Act. 
(ii) Entails 
The alternative six year period is not applicable to a 
reversioner or remainderman expectant upon an entail in 
possession, if his interest could have been barred by the tenant 
in tail98 . So if B grants land to A in tail, retaining the fee 
simple reversion and X dispossesses A, B's reversion is barred 
twelve years after the dispossession, even though he had no right 
to the land during that period. 
118 
As Megarry & Wade point out that this rule demonstrates the 
precarious nature of an interest expectant upon an entail as it 
may be barred by limitation, as well as by disentailment, and the 
owner is powerless to intervene. 
Again the Crown in this instance is in a privileged position, as 
where the Crown is entitled to the succeeding estate, the period 
will be 30 years"° instead of 12 years and in the case of non 
possession the longer of the two periods of thirty and twelve 
years applies. 
Once time commences to run, it would continue to do so 
notwithstanding the fact that the person to whom the right of 
action accrues conveys his interest to another party. 1 
So that in the case of a settlement by a person against whom time 
has begun to run it will not give the remainderman under the 
settlement any more time than what the settler originally had. 
This provision also covers a situation where a right of action 
accrues to some person through whom the person making the 
assurance claims. For example, where a right of action accrues 
to A, time begins to run against A and against B who claims 
through A where B makes an assurance to C and so on, C and all 
others are also affected by the same time constraints as B and 
A are. When a person has successive interests, that is where he 
is entitled to any estate or interest in that land, if his right 
to recover the estate or interest in possession is barred by the 
Limitation Act, neither he nor anyone else claiming through him 
could successfully institute proceedings to claim the future 
estate or interest. 102  
3.2.5. Settled Land and Land on Trust 
The Act specifically provides that subject to S.24(1) the 
provisions of the Act apply to 'equitable interest on land, 
including interests in the proceeds of sale of land held on trust 
119 
for sale, in like manner as they apply to legal estates." 3 
The definition of iland' 1" inter alia includes equitable estate 
or interest, including an interest in the proceeds of the sale 
of land held upon trust for sale so that for the purpose of the 
Limitation Act, equitable interests in land and proceeds of sale 
of land held on trust for sale are 'land'. 
Future interests other than terms of years and reversions will 
come within the ambit of this section, which clearly provides 
that the legal estate would not be barred while equitable 
interests subsist. Normally, the legal estate would be 
extinguished on the expiration of twelve years, 105 from the date 
a stranger took possession of the land, but in view of these 
provisions the legal estate will not be extinguished so long as 
a beneficial interest in the land to any person has not either 
accrued or been barred or for so long as the right to claim the 
proceeds of the sale has not accrued to any person or been 
barred. 
The effect of these provisions is also to suspend the operation 
of S.21 which provides "subject to section 13, at the expiration 
of the period prescribed by this Act for any person to bring an 
action to recover land (including a redemption action or an 
action to compel discharge of a mortgage) the title of that 
person to the land shall be extinguished". During this period 
of suspension the owner of the legal estate could proceed to 
institute action to recover the land. 106 In view of these 
provisions, what then would be the position of an adverse 
possessor? Would he be able to get a good title? Yes, he would, 
but only after all the equities are barred:" 
This is so because adverse possession under the Act means 
possession by some person in whose favour the period of 
limitations can run, and in this case the period of limitation 
will only commence to run after all the equities are barred. 
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As far as a trust property is concerned, the adverse possessor 
could be a stranger, the trustee or another beneficiary. 
Each of thee categories will be dealt with separately. 
(i) Adverse Possession by Stranger  
Where a trust property is the subject of adverse possession by 
a stranger, the trustee's title to the trust property will not 
be barred until all the beneficiaries have been barred. So, if 
land is held on trust for A for life with remainder to B, 12 
years of adverse possession of the land by X would bar A's 
equitable interest and, but for the provisions mentioned above, 
would bar the trustee's legal estate. 
In this case time will not commence to run against B's equitable 
interest until A's death and the same accordingly applies to the 
trustees legal estate. Once the 12 years have run, the trustee 
will hold the legal estate on trust for X for the life of A, and 
subject thereto on trust for B. This would be so even if A is 
the trustee, as will normally be the case with settled land. 
(ii) Adverse Possession by Trustee 
As far as trustees are concerned, there is no way that they could 
obtain title by adverse possession. In other words, there is no 
period of limitation for an action by a beneficiary to recover 
trust property from the trustee, or in the case of a sale, the 
recovery of its proceeds in the trustees' possession or sums 
converted to the trustees' use, or in respect of any fraud by the 
trustees. 
Thus if land is conveyed to X and Y as tenants in common, X 
cannot obtain a title to the land as against Y, no matter how 
long he excludes Y from the land or from its rents and profits, • 
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as both X and Y hold the land on trust for themselves as tenants 
in common and X is thus a trustee for Y. 
(iii) Adverse Possession by Beneficiary 
Time does not begin to run against the trustees or beneficiaries 
if settled land or land held on trust for sale is in the 
possession of a beneficiary who is not solely and absolutely 
entitled. 
In other words such a beneficiary cannot be adverse to the 
trustee or to his other co-beneficiaries. 
3.2.6. Forfeiture and Breach of Condition 
The Act also provides for recovery of land in the event of a 
forfeiture or breach of condition. 
In the event of a forfeiture or breach of condition, a right of 
action to recover land accrues and time commences to run from the 
date of forfeiture. 108 Time would only run from the date of 
forfeiture, if the party intends to take advantage of the 
forfeiture to recover the land. The other option he would have 
would be to wait for the determination of the prior interest by 
lapse of time. 
3.2.7. Certain Tenancies 
Provisions in the Act which govern the running of time in certain 
types of tenancies will now be examined. 
(i) Tenants at Will and at Sufferance 
In cases of tenancies at will, time commences to run from the 
date of the determination which is at the expiration of a period 
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of one year from the date of commencement. u° 
The running of time could be postponed by payment of rent. If 
there is nothing done to postpone the running of time, a tenant 
at will, gets a good title to the land after twelve years from 
the date of determination of the tenancy that is 13 years from 
the date of commencement of the tenancy. Tenants at will are 
definitely in a better position than tenants under a fixed term 
lease, as in the former case time begins to run against the 
landlord only after the expiration of one year from the 
commencement of the tenancy. 
So where a tenant holds from the landlord as tenant at will, he 
will be barred 13 years from the commencement of the tenancy, 
however, where either rent is paid or written acknowledgment 
made, time begins to run afresh. In the case of a tenancy at 
sufferance, time will run from the commencement of the tenancy 
as strictly speaking, a tenancy at sufferance is not really a 
tenancy but adverse possession m . A tenancy at sufferance will 
arise where a tenant having entered under a valid tenancy, holds 
over without the assent or dissent of the landlord. 112  
(ii) 	Yearly or Periodic Tenant  
In the case of a tenancy from year to year or other period, the 
tenancy is deemed to be determined at the expiration of the first 
year or other period and the right of action is deemed to have 
accrued at the date of such determination. 113 If there is a lease 
in writing, then this section will not apply and time in that 
case will start to run when the tenancy is determined by a notice 
to quit or otherwise. In the event of any payment of rents by 
the tenant, the right of action shall be deemed to have accrued 
on the date of the last receipt of rent and time runs from then. 
So, a tenant under yearly or other periodic tenancy who does not 
hold under a lease in writing is in a similar position to a 
tenant at will. A landlord is entitled to receive rent from his 
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tenant and if for some reason, the rent is received by some 
person other than the landlord, the landlord's cause of action 
arises from the moment the other person wrongfully received rent 
and time begins to run as from the date the other person receives 
rent from the tenant. 114 
However, in order to invoke this section the following conditions 
must be met: 
(i) There must be a valid lease in writing. 
(ii) The yearly rent should be not less than $100.00. 
(iii) The rent must be received by a person wrongfully 
claiming to be entitled to the reversion. 
(iii) Actions for Recovery of Rent 
As far as landlords are concerned, the Act stipulates that no 
action could be brought to recover arrears of rent or damages 
after six years from the date on which the arrears become due. 115 
Each time the rent falls due and is not paid, the landlord has 
a fresh cause of action, so that where several instalments remain 
unpaid, the landlord will now have several causes of action, 116  
but if the landlord's title has been extinguished by the Act, 
then he would not be able to sue for arrears, even if they fall 
due six years before commencement of the action. 117 
3.2.8. 	Mortgages 
The Limitation Act does not treat an action for redemption of 
mortgaged land as a action to recover land, and therefore the 
provisions which deal with the accrual of right of action to 
recover land do not apply. Also the provision which requires 
some person to be in adverse possession of the land if time is 
to run would be inapplicable. 1 ' 8 
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Under this section actions which concern the property mortgaged 
and secondly actions that deal with the principal sum secured and 
interest thereon will be considered. 
(i) Actions Relating to the Mortgaged Property 
In redemption actions, the Act states that the mortgagee must be 
in possession for twelve years. 119 If the mortgagee could prove 
that he has been in continuous possession for twelve years, then 
the mortgagor or any person claiming through him will be barred. 
In other words, when the mortgagee takes possession, the 
mortgagor's right to redeem accrues and time starts to run 
against him, 120 so that after the expiry of 12 years, he will be 
barred and his title extinguished. t However, whenever the 
mortgagee in possession receives any sum in respect of principal 
or interest or receives an acknowledgment in writing from the 
Mortgagor acknowledging the Mortgagee's title or his equity of 
redemption, time is stopped. 122 As against the land the 
mortgagee's remedies are two fold. Firstly he could take an 
action to recover land and his right arises by virtue of the 
mortgage that he executed. In this case, the cause of action 
accrues and time starts to run against the mortgagee on the 
execution of the mortgage:23 The mortgagee's other remedy is to 
foreclose. 124 
Foreclosure is the extinction of the mortgagor's equity of 
redemption and this will normally arise when the mortgagor fails 
to repay in accordance with his covenant 125 , so the mortgagee's 
cause of action will arise when there is a failure to make 
repayment and time starts to run against him from that date. 
(ii) Actions for Principal and Interest 
The relevant provision in the Act relating to actions to recover 
money charged on property is S.23(1) which reads, 
"No action shall be brought to recover any principal sum of 
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money secured by a mortgage or other charge on property, 
whether real or personal, or to recover proceeds of the 
sale of land, after the expiration of twelve years from the 
date when the right to receive the money accrued, 
notwithstanding that the money is by any Act or instrument 
expressed to be a charge until paid." 
It is rather curious that the section makes reference to 
"proceeds of sale of land" as the definition of "land" in the Act 
includes "an interest in the proceeds of sale of land" 126. Any 
action instituted by mortgagees of land other than a mortgagee 
who is in possession of mortgaged land, which is covered by S.18, 
wduld normally be under Sections 12-15 as S.3 applies only to 
foreclosure actions, in respect of mortgaged personalty. As far 
as actions to foreclose mortgaged personalty, they would be 
barred twelve years after the date on which the right to 
foreclose accrued 127. However, in two instances, the period is 
extended: (i) If after expiration of 12 years from the date the 
right to foreclose accrues, the mortgagee was in possession, his 
right to foreclose is deemed to have accrued on the date his 
possession discontinued 128 . (ii) Until the interest falls into 
possession, the rights to foreclose is postponed 129. So in cases 
of foreclosure of personalty, time would run from the last of 
three dates, viz the date on which the right to foreclose 
accrued; the date on which the mortgagee lost possession; the 
date on which future interest fall into possession. The scope 
of S.23(4) is limited by S.23(5) which excludes from the 
operation of this section "a foreclosure action in respect of 
mortgaged land." S.23(4) does, however, apply to the right of 
action to recover the principal sum charged on a future interest 
in land or personalty. So, if the property includes both present 
and future interests, time will not run against the present 
interests so long as the future interests are not determined. 
In other words, if for example, life policies are included and 
if they have not matured or been determined, then time will not 
commence running against the present interests until such time 
the policy matures or are determined. In a case where arrears 
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are claimed by a subsequent encumbrancer and a prior encumbrancer 
had been in possession during the whole period in which the 
arrears accrued, the subsequent encumbrancer has one year to 
recover the arrears and time runs from the moment the prior 
encumbrancer discontinues possession." ° Capitalisation of 
interest commonly found in mortgages of future interest is dealt 
with in S.23(7)(b) which reads, 
"where property subject to a mortgage or charge comprises 
any future interest or life insurance policy and it is a 
term of the mortgage or charge that arrears of interest 
shall be treated as part of the principal sum of money 
secured by the mortgage or charge, interest shall not be 
deemed to become due before the right to receive the 
principal sum of money has accrued or is deemed to have 
accrued." 
So, clearly in the case of recovery of arrears, time will only 
start running after the principal sum of money has accrued or is 
deemed to have accrued. Mortgagees are prevented from either 
exercising a power of sale, leasing or making other disposition 
and realisation of the mortgaged property, or appointing a 
receiver or in any other manner affecting the mortgaged property, 
once the time period provided by the Act has expired. 131 It 
appears that the Act has not made any provisions for unpaid 
annuities charged on personal property. Such annuities cannot 
be called principal sum charged on property, nor are they arrears 
nor rent. 
In cases of fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the 
trustee was a party or privy or where the trustee has got trust 
property or received proceeds from trust property and converted 
to his own use, no time period runs under the Act. 132 However in 
all other cases, where the Act does not prescribe a period of 
limitation, an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property 
or in respect of any breach of trust is barred after six years 
from the date on which the right of action accrued. 133 In the 
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event of a future interest where an action is instituted by the 
remaindermen, the six year period against the trustee will not 
commence to run until their interests have fallen in. 134 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
It would be noted that for computing the period of limitation, 
it is vital to establish precisely when the cause of action 
arises, as time starts running from the accrual of the cause of 
action. 
In cases of contracts, the cause of action normally arises on the 
date of the breach and not when the damage is suffered. Although 
in the majority of cases, this rule does not cause too much 
problems, there could be cases where it could operate unjustly 
on a plaintiff as he might not discover that he has a good cause 
of action, until the damage occurs. 
The accrual of the cause of action in torts would be dependant 
on whether the particular tort is actionable per se or only upon 
proof of damage. If the tort falls within the first category, 
time commences to run from the commission of the tort whereas in 
the latter case, time starts to run from the date of damage. 
As far as actions to recover land, the Limitation Act, 1974, has 
given a very wide meaning to 'land' which includes almost all the 
interests, both legal and equitable, that exist in real property. 
Generally, the true owner's cause of action arises only when his 
property has been the subject of adverse possession. Once there 
is adverse possession time would continue to run and the effect 
of time having run is to bar the real owners right of action and 
extinguish his estate. 
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CHAPTER 4. 	WHAT STOPS OR SUSPENDS THE RUNNING TIME  
4.1 IN CASES OF CONTRACTS, TORTS AND PERSONAL ACTIONS  
In respect of simple contracts and torts, the Tasmanian 
Limitation Act (1974) provides in S.4(1) as follows: 
"Except as otherwise provided in this Division, the 
following actions shall not be brought after the expiration 
of 6 years from the date on which the cause of action 
accrued, that is to say:- 
(a) Actions founded on simple contract (including contract 
implied by law) or founded on tort, including actions 
for damages for breach of statutory duty." 
For a speciality contract the Act provides in S.4(3) as follows: 
"An action upon a speciality shall not be brought after the 
expiration of 12 years from the date on which the cause of 
action accrued, but this subsection does not affect any 
action for which a shorter period of limitation is 
prescribed by any other provision of this Act". 
The general rule is that, once time has started to run, it cannot 
be suspended. However, there are circumstances which generally 
suspend the running of time in a limitation period. The plaintiff 
can take some positive steps to prevent time from running. The 
most common act which prevents time running is for the plaintiff 
to institute proceedings. A more onerous way is to obtain the 
agreement of the other party not to plead the Limitation Act and 
such agreement could be either express or implied and made before 
or after the limitation period has expired. However, any 
agreement, not to rely on the Limitation Act would have to be 
supported by consideration l and expressed in very clear terms2 . 
Sometimes, the running of time could be suspended by a statutory 
instrument made by Parliament in times of war or where a state 
of emergency has been declared. Other instances where the running 
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of time is suspended include the period during the administration 
of creditors and deceased estates; when a sequestrian order is 
made; and on presentation of a winding up petition for companies. 
(i) History 
The general rule that once time has started to run, it cannot be 
suspended was reiterated by Lord Abinger, C.B. in Rhodes v 
Smethurst3 where he said, 
"where an action has once accrued and the Statute has begun 
to run, there being a capacity of suing and being sued, the 
Statute continues to run". 
It seems that this rule applies even through at some state during 
the period, it would be temporarily impossible to commence any 
proceedings as was the case in Rhodes's case where the cause of 
action accrued in 1829 against a person who died in 1830. The 
appointment of his personal representative was not finalised 
until 1835 owing to disputes over his will. 
The court rejected a suggestion that the intervening period 
between 1830 and 1835 be omitted in calculating the statutory 
period and in his judgment Lord Abinger, C.B. said 4 , 
"Therefor the legislature, as it appears to me, has by its 
own enactment shown in what cases the period of time in 
which there existed a disability in the plaintiff or 
defendant not being able to sue, should or should not form 
part of the six years limited by the statute. We have 
therefore, as I think, both authority and reason for 
concluding that the period of time from which the 
computation is to begin, is when the action accrued, and 
that when the statute has once begun to run, any portion of 
time in which the parties are under disabilities must 
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nevertheless form part of the six years". 
In his judgment Alderson B., said 5 
"It appears to me that if the statute begins to run it must 
continue to run - that is to say, as soon as there is a 
cause of action, a plaintiff that can sue and a defendant 
that can be sued in England, from that time that date of 6 
years begins to run, and unless that were so, great 
inconvenience would follow; for it would be very difficult, 
in almost every case, to ascertain whether the statute had 
or had not run, and we should be obliged to take a great 
many documents and statements, a great many beginnings and 
endings, and should have added up to those precise periods 
to time, out of which the six years would have to be made 
out; so that great inconvenience would result; and 
therefore it is better to apply the law as it at present 
stands; it being far better that a particular injury should 
be inflicted on one individual, than that great 
inconvenience should be applied to all the community". 
The principle that once time has commenced, it continues to run, 
is again supported by the case of Jenkins v Jenkins ° where the 
owner of considerable real property died intestate in 1853 and 
his heir died in 1866 leaving his son the plaintiff, who took out 
letters of administration and commenced action against the 
defendant, who had occupied the land since 1853, without 
acknowledging the title of the plaintiff or his father. The court 
held that the statute of limitation began to run in 1853 and thus 
the plaintiff's action was statute-barred. Sir J. Martin, C.J. 
in his judgment stated 7 , 
"Now, it is an inflexible rule that nothing stops the 
statute running when once it has begun to run." 
Counsel for the plaintiff argued that no time ran against the 
administrator before his letters of administration were granted, 
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during the interval from 1866 to 1880. The Chief Justice 
distinguished Murray v East India Comriany 8 , where the action was 
brought by an administrator upon bills accepted by the defendants 
after the death of the intestate. It was held that between the 
death and the grant, time did not run. Sir J. Martin, C.J. agreed 
that the statute will run only from the time of the grant but 
this is so only, if it had not begun to run before. In this case 
time had started to run in 1853 when the defendant took 
possession of the deceased's property. 
(ii) The Tasmanian situation 
The Limitation Act itself recognises that, in certain 
circumstances, strict adherence to the time period would not be 
fair and thus provides certain exceptions. For instance, certain 
disabilities of the plaintiff existing when the cause of action 
accrues9 are excluded. 
4.1.1 Should the Courts be given a Discretion?  
Apart from these few statutory exceptions, namely cases of 
infancy; cases of mental disorder where a person is incapable of 
managing his property or affairs; where a person is a convict and 
disability by reason of war circumstances, it would appear that 
no other qualifications on the absolute nature of the primary 
rule would ever be entertained by the courts. 
In Prideaux v Webber l° an action was brought after the 
Restoration for assault, battery and false imprisonment. It was 
argued that the action was in time because at the date of the 
complaint and until just before the action was brought, "rebels 
had usurped the government, and none of the king's courts were 
open". However, this argument was rejected and the proceedings 
were held to be out of time, since "there is not any exception 
in the Act of such a case". 
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Also in Rhodes v Smethurst, supra the court was not prepared to 
omit the period during which there was a dispute on the 
deceased's will which delayed the appointment of the personal 
representative. Alderson B., in that case stressed that 
convenience is best served by the refusal to admit other 
exceptions. 
It is submitted that the few statutory exceptions under Division 
1 of part III of the Limitation Act for which extension can be 
granted are inadequate. Apart from cases of disability, mental 
illness or disability by reason of war circumstances and infancy, 
the courts should be given a discretionary power to extend time 
in any other case where it would be inequitable to allow time to 
run, once it has commenced. Although it could be argued that a 
wide discretion would give rise to more uncertainties in that the 
defendant could never be certain that a statute barred claim 
would not be resurrected, a discretion could have avoided the 
outcome of Prideaux v Webber where the plaintiff was not at 
fault. If the plaintiff is ready, willing ad able to prosecute 
a claim, the plaintiff should not be penalised just because the 
courts are closed. In other words, if the plaintiff has taken all 
steps within his power to institute proceedings but is unable to 
go one step further to file the proceedings in court because the 
courts are shut, he should not be unduly penalised. 
A better approach it is submitted, would be to say that the 
statute once it has begun to run, goes on running only in cases 
in which the plaintiff could have proceeded with the action, but 
fails to do so, through his own neglect. In other words, if it 
was within the power of the plaintiff to proceed with the action 
and if he fails to do so promptly, he should be penalised. 
However, if there is a delay because of circumstances beyond his 
physical control, as where the courts were shut as in Prideaux 
v Webber supra or where there is a delay in the appointment of 
the personal representative because of a dispute on the 
deceased's will as in Rhodes v Smethurst supra, that period 
should be omitted when calculating the time period for purposes 
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of the Limitation Act. 
4.1.2 	Commencement of Action 
Once time has started to run, it cannot normally be suspended 
unless and until some definite and readily identifiable step is 
taken by the plaintiff. An identifiable step that the plaintiff 
could take is to institute proceedings. Where a plaintiff 
institutes proceedings, the running of time is suspended. The 
concept of instituting proceedings would appear to be 
straightforward, but it is an over-simplication, as on closer 
examination it does not state what is precisely meant by 
iristituting proceedings. For instance, when is a plaintiff deemed 
to have instituted proceedings? 
Should it be the time 
(a) when the plaintiff instructs his solicitors to issue 
process, 
(b) when the writ of summons is actually filed in the 
registry of the court, or, 
(c) the day the writ is served on the defendant? 
There may be considerable delay from the time a solicitor is 
instructed to issue a writ of summons and the actual date of 
filing the summons, Again, there could be considerable delay 
before the writ is served on the defendant. Delay in service can 
arise as in most cases, personal service is required. This may 
pose a problem if the defendant tries to evade service. Of course 
there are provisions for substituted service of the writ, but 
there will inevitably be a considerable lapse of time before the 
writ is served on the defendant by means of substituted service. 
Substituted service is granted after all attempts at personal 
service have failed. 
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Ideally, the institution of proceedings should be 
(a) something simple as far as the plaintiff is concerned 
as in a case where time is about to run out, the 
plaintiff could act immediately to preserve that 
right. 
(b) it should be some unmistakable act where there could 
be no argument as to when or whether that act had been 
done. 
(c) that act having been done, it should come at once to 
the notice of the defendant". 
Although ideally all the above 3 conditions should be met, in 
practice this is not possible especially when personal service 
on the defendant is required and the possibility of the defendant 
evading service of process makes it difficult to fulfil condition 
(c). 
Time ceases to run upon the issue of process by the court 
registry 12 . A plaintiff is required to commence his action within 
the relevant limitation period. In other words he need only issue 
a writ or other process within the limitation period to stop time 
running 13 . He is not required to serve within the period, so long 
as he serves within the twelve months of issue. The issue of 
process satisfies conditions (a) and (b) in that it is an 
unmistakable act on the part of the plaintiff which he fulfils 
by presenting the writ of summons with appropriate fee to the 
court. The court official receives the writ and seals it and 
records the date of issue. So, as far as the plaintiff is 
concerned, if the plaintiff can identify the cause of action and 
the defendant to sue, time can be stopped by issuing a writ. 
However, the law as it stands does not satisfy condition (c) in 
that the defendant would not be aware that process has been 
issued against him until the writ is served on him, which would 
be months after the limitation period has expired. As the writ 
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can be served any time within 12 months from the date of issue 
and bearing in mind that the court has power, on application by 
the plaintiff to renew the writ, there is a possibility that the 
defendant may not be aware that proceedings have been instituted 
against him until long after the limitation period has expired. 
Certainly one of the objects of the law of limitation is to 
enable a potential defendant to be confident, after the lapse of 
the relevant period, that he can no longer be sued. This object 
is not achieved if the defendant has no notice of the date of 
issue until the writ is served on him as by the time a writ is 
served on the defendant it could be well past the limitation 
period allowed for that cause of action. So if A wants to 
commence an action against B for breach of contract, A would have 
6 years from the date of B's breach to institute proceedings. 
However, if A issues a writ of summons on B on the last day of 
the 6 year period, he would have another 12 months to serve the 
writ on B. If A cannot serve the writ on B during the ensuing 12 
months, he could renew the writ for a further 6 months under The 
Rules of Supreme Court, Order 8 Rule 1(1). So effectively, it 
could take up to seven and a half years before B is served with 
the writ and it is only at the time of service that B gets to 
know that an action has been commenced against him. 
It is not satisfactory to say that time should stop running from 
the date of service as this could give rise to several practical 
problems. Firstly, whether process has been effectively served 
is a question that cannot always be answered as precisely as the 
question whether it has been filed, especially where service is 
effected by post. Secondly, some special provision would be 
required for substituted service e.g. advertisements in 
newspapers. Thirdly, an unscrupulous defendant could evade 
service for a considerable time by moving and leaving no address 
or he may delay service by going abroad, since process cannot be 
served out of the jurisdiction without the leave of the court. 
If service of process is chosen as the effective terminus ad 
quem, which means the end of a calculation of time, a plaintiff 
would face considerable difficulty in trying to get a writ served 
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especially where negotiations with the defendant breaks down 
shortly before the expiration of the limitation period, thus 
leaving the plaintiff insufficient time to make an application 
to the court for leave to serve out of the jurisdiction or to 
effect substituted service. 
It is submitted, that one way to overcome these practical 
difficulties and at the same time ensure that the defendant has 
immediate knowledge of the issue of process against him is to 
require the plaintiff to give the defendant notice of the issue 
of process within say, 7 days from the date of the issue of the 
writ which is to be sent to the last known address of the 
defendant. 
If it is made mandatory for the plaintiff to give notice of the 
issue of process to the defendant, then to all intents and 
proposes we could accept the date of issue as the terminus ad 
quem, as all the three conditions outlined above would be 
satisfied. 
As far as the defendant is concerned, he would have notice that 
process has been issued, although it may be several months before 
the writ is finally served on him. So, even though the statutory 
period has expired, so long as the defendant has notice that 
process has been issued before the expiry of the time period he 
would know that he has to preserve his records and be prepared 
to defend the suit. 
(i) Where the Last Day for Process Falls on a Holiday 
It is now well settled that where the limitation period or the 
last day on which formal notice has to be given falls on a day 
when the registry of the courts are closed, the time is extended 
to the first day thereafter on which the registry is open. 
This was the decision in Pritam Kaur v S. Russell & Sons Ltd 14 
where the plaintiff's husband was killed at work because of a 
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fatal accident. The limitation period of 3 years expired on 
September 5, 1970 which was a public holiday. The plaintiff's 
solicitors filed a writ on Monday September 7, being the next 
available date on which the court offices were open. The question 
whether the writ has been issued in time was tried as a 
preliminary issue and held that the action was statute-barred. 
However, Lord Denning M.R. in allowing the appeal said 15 , 
"the important thing is to lay down a rule for the future 
so that people can know how they stand. In laying down a 
rule, we can look to parallel fields of law to see the rule 
there. The nearest parallel is the case where a time is 
prescribed in both the County court and the High court is 
this: if the time expires on a Sunday or any other day on 
which the court office is closed, the act is done in time 
if it is done on the next day on which the court office is 
open. I think we should apply a similar rule when the time 
is prescribed by statute. By so doing, we make the law 
consistent in itself and we avoid confusion to 
practitioners. So I am prepared to hold that when a time is 
prescribed by statute for doing any act, and that act can 
only be done if the court office is open on the day when 
the time expires, then, if it turns out in any particular 
case that the day is a Sunday or other day then the time is 
extended until the next day on which the court office is 
open. 
In support of this conclusion, I would refer to Huqes v 
Griffiths (1862) 13 C B N S 324. It was on a different 
statute, but the principle was enunciated by Erie C.J., at 
p. 333: 'where the act is to be done by the court and the 
court refused to act on that day, the intendment of the law 
is that the party shall have until the earliest day on 
which the court will act'..." 
The decision in Pritam Kaur v S. Russell & Sons Ltd was applied 
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in The Clifford Maersk is where the plaintiff alleged that their 
cargo was delivered in a damaged state by the defendant 
shipowner. Under the Hague Rules an action in respect of damaged 
cargo had to be brought within one year after delivery. Because 
of investigations, the defendant allowed the plaintiff several 
extensions of the one-year period, the last of which expired on 
a Sunday. The plaintiff issued a writ on the Monday following. 
The court held that in determining whether an act was done in 
time under an agreed time limit which expired on a day when the 
court offices were closed, the time extended to the next ensuring 
day on which the offices were open. 
However, Pritam Kaur v Russell & Sons Ltd was distinguished in 
Swainston v Hetton Victory Club 16 . This case involved a complaint 
of unfair dismissal that was presented to the Industrial Tribunal 
on a Monday, as the last day for presenting the complaint fell 
on a Sunday on which the offices of the tribunal were closed. 
Though the tribunals offices were closed, there was a letter box 
through which communication could be posted at all times. The 
Court of Appeal held that since presentation of a complaint to 
an Industrial Tribunal for the purposes of the Act did not 
require any action on the part of the tribunal, a complaint could 
be presented if it was communicated to the tribunal through a 
channel of communication held out by the tribunal as being an 
acceptable means of communication. As such, since the complainant 
could have posted his complaint on the Sunday, which was the last 
day and he failed to do so, he was out of time when he presented 
it on the Monday. 
The proposition of law laid down in Pritam Kaur's case, is still 
good law. However, it is clear from the judgment that the 
proposition is limited to cases where a statute provides for an 
act to be done and that act can only be done if the court 
registry is open on the day when the time expires. For example, 
where a writ or originating summons has to be taken out, it has 
to be stamped and filed in the court registry. In such cases 
where the presentation of a writ is not the unilateral act of the 
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one party but one which involves a court official as well, who 
has to stamp and assign a number to the writ and enter it into 
the cause register, time will be extended to the next working 
day, if the last day for filing the claim happens to fall on a 
non-working day. 
However, if the institution of a claim is to be done by the 
unilateral act of the one party alone, and does not involve any 
others, and if there is an acceptable means of presenting that 
claim, (even on a non-working day as in Swainston's Case) then, 
if the last day for presenting the claim falls on a non-working 
day, the action will be statute-barred if not presented on that 
day. 
It is submitted that in cases where one party can unilaterally 
present a claim, he should be allowed an extension to the next 
working day, if the last day for presenting a claim falls on a 
non-working day and in the event that there was no acceptable 
means of communication. In other words that the rule in Pritam 
Kaur's case would have been applied to Swainston's case, if not 
for the presence of a letter box located in front of the office, 
which the court found was held out by the tribunal as a 
acceptable means of receiving a complaint. 
It has been seen that the issue of a writ of summons stops the 
running of the statutory period. An action is defined in the Act 
to include any proceedings in a court of law. So, where the 
proceedings are not started by writ, time ceases to run at the 
date of the issue of the originating process, as for instance, 
an originating summons or an originating notice of motion. 
(ii) Amendments to Process 17 
Another issue that often arises and which I shall now examine is 
the question of amendment to a writ which has been filed within 
the stipulated time period. Before granting such an application 
the courts are careful to consider whether any injustice is done ' 
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to the defendant. The granting of an amendment could raise a new 
cause of action, which would have been barred by statute as out 
of time. Thus the courts are careful to ensure that the plaintiff 
is prevented from introducing a new cause of action by amendment 
which he would have been precluded otherwise as out of time. In 
the course of deciding when an amendment would be granted, the 
courts have drawn a distinction between a set-off and a counter-
claim. In Mc Donnell & East Ltd v McGregor 18 in the trial of an 
action for unliquidated damages, the defendant sought to amend 
his defence by adding a set-off of certain liquidated debts. The 
learned judge having disallowed the amendment, the defendant 
pleaded the same items by way of counter-claim, Dixon, J. in his 
judgment said, 
"under the rule the distinction between set-off and 
counter-claim has, I think, been maintained. Its practical 
importance is illustrated by the decision of McKinnon, J., 
in the case of Lowe v Bentley, (1928) T L R 388, which 
applies to the present case. When the indebtedness of a 
plaintiff to a defendant is pleaded by the latter as an 
answer in whole or in part to the former's case, lapse of 
time will not bar the answer unless the indebtedness 
accrued more than the statutory period before the issue of 
the plaintiff's writ. But McKinnon, J., decided that in the 
case of a counter-claim the period of limitation must be 
calculated back from the time when the counter-claim was 
made. That decision, which I accept, involves the 
maintenance of a clear distinction between set-off 
affording an answer to a cause of action, and a counter-
claim amounting to a cross-action." 
(iii)(a) When Amendments will be Granted 
In Harris v Reggatt 19 the court had to consider whether to allow 
. the amendment of a statement of claim after expiry of the time 
limited for action, where the amendment sought to add a paragraph 
alleging, in the alternative, a contract made between the 
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plaintiff and the members of the committee of the management of 
the hospital other than the plaintiff. The court held that all 
that was new in the proposed amendment was an allegation against 
the defendants as members of the committee of management of a 
contractual obligation already alleged and described as against 
the defendants as members of the association. This was 
sufficiently closely related to what had been alleged previously 
to make it fair that it should be allowed, despite the fact that 
the period of limitation had run. 
Sholl, J. said, 
"if we say that the law is that the plaintiff cannot be 
allowed, after the period of limitations hasrun, to set up 
a new cause of action, we use the term in a special sense 
meaning a 'new case' varying so substantially from what has 
previously been set up that it would involve investigation 
of matters of fact or question of law or both, different 
from what have already been raised and of which no fair 
warning has been given so that it would be unfair and 
unjust to the defendant to put him in peril of a judgment 
founded on the new matter." 
The court also granted leave to amend a writ of summons in 
Hristeas v GMH Pty Ltd2° in a claim for damages for personal 
injuries. The plaintiff in his original writ alleged that he had 
been engaged for the task of welding with an electric welding 
apparatus and on 16th October, 1963 his body had come into 
contact with a live electrified portion of such apparatus, 
whereby he suffered injuries. He subsequently sought leave to 
amend his writ by alleging that his injuries resulted from 
repeated operations by him during an unspecified period ending 
16th October, 1963 of a pressure hand-grip which required 
repeated vigorous contractions of his right hand. The Supreme 
Court of Victoria, in deciding that leave to amend was properly 
granted, stated the general rule that leave to amend should be 
granted unless injustice is done to the defendant, but an 
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amendment may be refused if it would permit the plaintiff to 
raise a cause of action which would be barred under S.5(6) of 
Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic), if a writ were issued in 
respect thereof at the date of seeking leave to amend. But if the 
proposed amendment does not raise a new cause of action or a 
different case, but merely changes or provides an additional 
approach to the same facts based on the same cause of action, the 
amendment should be allowed despite the expiration of the 
limitation period. 
The court also allowed an amendment in a negligence action 
introducing breach of statutory duty as a cause of action in 
Christodoulopoulos v Rowntree & Co (Aust) Pty Lte. There the 
Victorian Supreme Court held that although the amendment raised 
a new cause of action, in the technical sense, it did not 
introduce a new case or new set of ideas and the court should in 
the exercise of its discretion allow it. 
Again, where an amendment is the addition in the claim of another 
member of a class of dependents, an amendment after the expiry 
of time for action will be allowed. In Dickson v Lusher22 , the 
plaintiff sued to recover from the defendants damages for 
negligence in the conduct of certain litigation under the 
Compensation to Relative Act, 1897-1953 (NSW), undertaken by them 
as solicitors for the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought to amend 
her claim to include a claim for a child of the deceased after 
the time limited for commencing an action against the defendants 
had expired. The court held that as the right sought to be 
enforced by the plaintiff belonged to all members of the class 
of dependents defined in the Act and as the solicitors were 
retained by the plaintiff on behalf of that class, the amendment 
should be allowed. 
The courts will allow an amendment if the amendments did not 
change the plaintiff's cause of action but merely amounts to the 
particularising of the facts. In Black v City of Melbourne 23 
where a bather was injured in an enclosed sea water bath when he • 
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dived from a platform, claimed damages on the basis of breach of 
duty by the local authority in failing to use reasonable care to 
prevent damage from an unusual danger, namely, a submerged piece 
of timber. The plaintiff successfully obtained leave to plead 
that he had his head on the bottom and that the defendant had 
failed in its duty to him to warn him cf the unusual danger 
constituted by the combination of the depth of water and the 
platform from which he had dived. 
Finally, the courts will generally grant an amendment even to 
introduce a new cause of action based on the same facts, where 
the defendant cannot show any prejudice to him as a result of 
allowing the amendment. In Swain v North Thames Gas Board24 , the 
plaintiff suffered injuries when her gas stove exploded. The 
pleading alleged negligence against the defendants. Browne, J., 
allowed the pleading to be amended out of time at the trial to 
also allow allegations of breach of contract under the Sales of  
Goods Act, 1893 on the same facts for the tort action, namely the 
explosion. 
Although we have seen that the issue of a writ of summons stops 
the running of the statutory period, an action is defined in the 
Act to include any proceedings in a court of law. So, where the 
proceedings are not commenced by writ, time ceases to run at the 
date of the issue of the originating process, as for instance, 
an originating summons or an originating notice of motion, or a 
petition. 
In the case of an arbitration, there are specific provisions 
dealing with this point 25 . An arbitration is deemed to have 
commenced when one party to the arbitration serves on the other 
party a notice requiring him to appoint or agree to the 
appointment of an arbitrator. So that time would stop running, 
when such a notice is given by the one party to the other. 
(iii)(b) When Amendment Will Be Refused 
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If the amendment introducing a cause of action is covered broadly 
in wide terms in the writ but not relied on in the statement of 
claim, normally the plaintiff would not be allowed to re-
introduce it in the statement of claim. 
Kitto, Menzies and Owen J.J. in Renowden v McMullin 26 held that 
although the endorsements on a writ may be wide enough to cover 
a number of causes of action, if the statement of claims omits 
to rely upon one of them the cause of action so omitted is to be 
taken to have been abandoned. In such circumstances if the 
plaintiff later seeks the leave of the court to amend his 
statement of claim in order to re-introduce in the proceedings 
the cause of action which he had abandoned, he will not, except 
in very peculiar circumstances, be allowed to do so, if, at the 
date when he seeks to re-introduce it, a writ issued in respect 
of that cause of action would have been statute-barred. 
The courts have refused an application for an amendment where the 
effect of it was to introduce a new party to the proceedings. In 
Church v Lever & Kitchen Pty Ltd 27 the Supreme Court in New South 
Wales held that no amendment ought to be permitted joining a 
defendant which would thereby deprive him of an immunity acquired 
under the Statute of Limitations (NSW) for to do so would be to 
work injustice upon him. 
Where the effect of an amendment is to introduce a new cause of 
action, an amendment was refused in Horton v Jones (No. 2) 28 . 
There the plaintiff brought an action for damages for breach of 
contract as well as a auantum meruit claim for services rendered. 
Both actions were unsuccessful. 
The plaintiff then made an application to substitute a count of 
account stated instead of damages for breach of contract. The 
application was refused as it was held that the proposed 
amendments would substitute new cause of action for those 
originally sued upon and that these causes of action if set up 
in an action commenced on the date of the application for leave 
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to amend, would have been barred by lapse of time. 
Finally, Williams, J. in Bainbridge-Hawker v Minister for Trade 
& Customs (C'th) 29 , has summarised the instances where amendments 
have been disallowed. 
"The cases where amendments of writs or pleading have been 
refused because at the time of the application the cause of 
action has become barred by some statute of limitation 
would appear to fall into three broad categories. 
1. where there is proper plaintiff but it is sought to 
add to the causes of action being sued upon a new 
cause of action which is out of time at the date of 
the application. 
2. where the writ has not been served within twelve 
months and has become ineffective and it is sought to 
renew the writ after the causes of action which it 
includes would have become barred. 
3. where there is a defect in the title of the plaintiff, 
because either he is the wrong plaintiff or he is a 
fictitious person, there being no such person alive at 
the date of the writ, and is sought to add a new 
plaintiff after the causes of action included in the 
writ have become barred." 
From an examination of the above cases, it is clear that where 
a party seeks leave to amend a writ, and the effect of such an 
amendment is either to introduce a new party to the proceedings 
or a new cause of action, the courts would generally disallow 
such applications. A party who pleads a cause of action in the 
writ, but does not rely on it in the statement of claim would be 
deemed to have abandoned that cause of action and thus generally 
will not be allowed to re-introduce that cause of action, if at 
the date of re-introduction, the said cause of action would have 
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been barred by statute. 
4.1.3 By Agreement 
Although the time limit provided in the Act is statutory and 
effect must be given to it, however harsh the outcome may be in 
any particular case, there is nothing to prevent parties from 
consenting to extend the time period. So in The Clifford Maers0 13 
the plaintiffs alleged that the cargo carried and delivered by 
• the defendant shipowner was in a damaged state. Under the Hague 
Rules31 an action in respect of damage to cargo had to be brought 
within one year after delivery. Because of investigations into 
the causes of the damage, the cargo owners requested and were 
granted extensions of the limitation period on four occasions. 
Sheen J. agreed with the submission by counsel for the plaintiffs 
that the letter seeking extension of time is a contractual 
agreement which was given in consideration of the plaintiffs 
refraining from issuing a writ. 
Once time has started to run, an agreement not to enforce a claim 
will not prevent time from running unless a restriction on the 
operation of the limitation period is expressed in very clear 
terms. In Cave v E C (Holdings) Ltd 32 , a statute-barred debt to 
an unsecured creditor was acknowledged by the defendants in 
September, 1955 when preparing a scheme of arrangement approved 
by the court in November, 1955. 
That scheme provided, inter alia, by clause 42 that 
no unsecured creditors...shall take any steps during the 
trial period to enforce any claim they may have against the 
company without leave of the court.' 
The trial period as extended expired on 14 November 1963 and on 
12 January 1965 the plaintiff began an action for recovery of the 
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debt. The plaintiff claimed that it was an implied term of clause 
42 that the operation of the Act should be suspended during the 
trial period and its extension, Roskill, J., in his judgment said 
the rule, that once a period of limitation had begun to run, it 
continued running until the point of time when it expired, had 
become less rigid. However, any contractual restriction on the 
operation of the Limitation Act, 1939 (UK) after the period of 
limitation had begun to run, as in this case, had to be clear, 
although it did not have to be expressed in so many words. Had 
the framers of clause 42 intended to provide that the Act should 
cease to run for a period of time equal to the trial period they 
would have said so in the plainest terms, but they had not; the 
rights of the plaintiff and defendants were merely in suspense; 
he could have issued a writ at any time solely to preserve his 
rights under the Limitation Act, and he might or might not have 
been granted leave to enforce them during the trial period. 
4.1.4 Statutory Instrument and the Running of Time 
It would also appear that regulations having statutory force can 
also suspend the running of time. In Bell v Gosden33 the Defence 
(Evacuated Areas) Regulations, 1940 had provided that in certain 
cases rent payable in respect of houses in the evacuated areas 
should not be recoverable during the period of evacuation. 
The Court of Appeal held that since these regulations, if they 
applied, had the force of statute, no action could be brought 
while they were in force and accordingly the running of time was 
suspended. Sir Raymond Evershed, M.R. said 34 , 
"In my judgment, the necessary effect of the regulation, 
which has, of course, the effect of an Act of Parliament 
when set beside the Limitation Act, is that, so long as it 
applied and the rent was irrecoverable by its terms the 
running of time under S.17 must be treated as 
suspended...That is, I think, clear from the language of 
S.17 itself - 'no actions shall be brought'. The basis of 
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the section is that, if, during the period a person can 
bring an action but he does not do so, but delays for six 
years, then thereafter he shall be barred." 
In Whitford's Ltd (In Liquidation) v Carter 35 the court held that 
the running of the Limitation Act was suspended when the 
enforcement of claim is prevented by moratorium legislation. In 
this case the Act37 forbade a vendor of land under a contract 
dated before the commencement of the Act from taking any 
proceedings (except by leave of the court) for the recovery of 
principal moneys due under the contract, but provides by S.10 
that if a purchaser under such a contract is in arrears for a 
period of 12 months in respect of any payment of principal or 
interest, and has made during any period of six months no payment 
in respect of any portion of the amount due under the agreement, 
the vendor may serve one month's notice on him of intention to 
exercise his rights under the agreement. After the expiry of such 
notice the vendor may proceed to exercise his rights under the 
agreement unless the purchaser has paid the arrears or the court 
otherwise directs. S.13 of the Act provides that no period of 
time during which the enforcement of any right or claim is 
prevented by the Act shall be taken into account in computing the 
time limited by any statute of limitations or otherwise for the 
enforcement of such right or claim. The defendant agreed to 
purchase certain land from the plaintiff on payment of a deposit 
and balance by monthly instalments. The agreement also provided 
for interest to be paid quarterly on the balance outstanding. The 
defendant having only paid one instalment, the vendor served 
notice on him under S.10 of the Mortgagees' Rights Restriction  
Act, 1931 and upon expiry commenced an action. It was contended 
for the purchaser that as the claim did not accrue within 6 
years, the vendors' action was barred by the Limitation Act. The 
court held that the vendors' claim was not barred by the 
Limitation Act, 1935, as, until the vendor had given notice under 
the provisions of S.10 of the Mortgagees' Rights Restriction Act, 
he was prevented from exercising his rights as vendor, and by 
virtue of the provisions of S.13 of that Act, time had not run 
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against the vendor under the Limitation Act since the date of 
commencement of the Mortgagees' Rights Restriction Act. 
4.1.5 Administration of Creditors and Deceased's Estate 
The next question is whether the Limitation Act is suspended 
during executorship of creditors and deceased's estate. According 
to English authorities, which are considered in view of the 
absence of Tasmanian authorities, it is well settled, that once 
the statute begins to run, subsequent events which preclude the 
bringing of an action do not prevent it from continuing to run 38 . 
In cases of administration, the mere fact that proceedings have 
been commenced will not stop the Limitation Act from running 
against other creditors. However, once an administration decree 
has been granted, time will stop running once and for all against 
all creditors then having a claim against the estate 39 . This is 
so because an administration decree operates as a judgment. 
In Seagram v Knight", a debtor had taken out administration of 
his creditors' estate and it was held that during the period of 
his administratorship the running of the statute was suspended. 
Lord Chelmsford L.C., decided that it was impossible to bring an 
action during the period because the plaintiff and the defendant 
would be the same person. 
However, Seagram v Knight was not followed in re George ° , where 
Mann, J., had to decide whether, a debtor having appointed as 
executor, a creditor to whom probate was granted, the operation 
of the statute was thereby suspended. His Honor held that it did 
not. He said that Seagram v Knight was a very unusual case and 
thought that the true justification for it might be found in the 
fact that it would be inequitable as against third parties to 
allow a debtor, by taking out administration to permit the 
statute to run so as to bar the debt. The creditor had the legal 
right to pay himself and in fact also the opportunity to do so 
without action. 
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He held, therefore, that the debt was statute-barred. In his 
judgment Mann, J.. said, 
"Moreover, it is important to remember that where as here, 
the mortgagee was the executor of the mortgagor, he had not 
only the right, but abundant opportunity of paying himself 
without any action at all; so that, if he was not in a 
position to bring action, he was in a better position in 
that no action was necessary, and it seems to me quite 
impossible to find any reason in law or in equity for 
holding that the statute having begun to run, did not 
continue to run during the executorship of the mortgagt_c!." 
In Bowring-Hanbury's Trustee v Bowring-Hanbur1/42 where tne 
husband, a creditor was the sole executor of the will of his 
wife, who was subsequently adjudicated a bankrupt and the trustee 
commenced an action against the executor to recover the balance 
of the debt from the estate of the testatrix, the executor 
resisted the claim on the ground that it was barred under the 
Limitation Act. On appeal the trustee argued, inter alia, that 
the running of the statute was suspended so long as the plaintiff 
and the defendant in an action to recover the debt would be the 
same person by reason of the creditor being the executor of the 
debtor. Lord Clauson in dismissing the appeal referred to 
Prideaux v Webber43 and said, "these decisions would seem to make 
it difficult to read into the Act an exception of a space of time 
when no action could be brought because there was one hand only 
to pay and to receive." He also distinguished Seagram v Knight 
and said that it was authority only on its own facts pointing out 
that there the debtor was the administrator, not the executor, 
of the creditor. It would appear that Seagram v Knight is limited 
to cases where the personal representative is an administrator 
and an executor is not affected. 
In as far as the administration of a deceased's estate is 
concerned it was held in Re White Bakewell v White" that an 
administration decree made on the application of an executor of 
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a deceased operates as a judgment in favour of such creditors as 
can substantiate their claims to the extent of preventing the 
time limited by the statute from running against the recovery 
of debts. Prior to his death, the testator had settled certain 
property on his wife during her life, and after death as she 
might appoint, but, in default of appointment upon trust for 
himself. The testator's wife died without having exercised her 
power of appointment and thus there was considerable amount of 
money that fell into the testator's estate. At his death, the 
testator was insolvent and a mortgagee, the South Australian Land 
Mortgage and Agency Company Ltd failed to prove their debt, when 
a decree for general administration was made. Subsequently, they 
sold the mortgaged property but failed to realise the full amount 
of the principal loan and interest due under the mortgage. They 
thus took out a summon more than 20 years after the principal 
money became due under the mortgage and the date of 
administration decree to rank as creditors for the difference 
between the principal loan plus interest and the proceeds of the 
sale of the mortgaged property. The defendants objected on two 
grounds. Firstly, that the claim is barred by the Statute of 
Limitations and secondly, that even if it is not so barred the 
company is precluded from claiming now by reason of its conduct. 
Murray C.J. delivering the judgment of the court said, 
"It has long been settled, however, that an action for 
general administration has the effect of stopping the time 
running against all creditors whose claims were not already 
barred at the date of the decree...Jessel, M.R., decided in 
re Greaves (1881), 18 Ch D, 551, that in consequence of the 
Acts of 1833 (3 & 4 Wm IVm C.27 and 3 & 4 Wm IV, C.42), the 
Court of Chancery Procedure Act, 1852, SS.45 & 47 
(represented by our Equity Act, 1866, SS.115 & 117), and 
the Judicature Act (our Supreme Court Act, 1878), the 
reasons for checking the operation of the Statutes of 
Limitations at the filing of the bill in a creditor's suit 
for the administration of that personal estate of a 
deceased person have lost their force, and that as any 
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creditor may now institute proceedings in a summary way, 
and can obtain a decree within a few days, and thereafter 
all other creditors are shut out from obtaining a similar 
decree, the judgment operates for the benefit of all the 
creditors and their rights are to be determined at the date 
of the decree whether they have then proved or not." 
So an administration decree operates like a judgment, in that it 
prevents time from running against the recovery of debts on all 
creditors, whose claims are both barred by statute, at the date 
of the decree. So that there is nothing to stop any creditors 
from coming in and proving their claims at anytime, after the 
decree has been granted, provided there are undistributed assets 
available for distribution, and provided no injustice arises to 
the other creditors. So, in re McMurdo. Penfield v McMurdo" 
where the testator died and a creditor's action was brought after 
the statutory period had run, calculating it even from the date 
of the decree, the Court of Appeal held that the creditor was 
entitled to come in and prove at any time, under either 
bankruptcy or chancery practice, if there were assets 
undistributed and no injustice would be occasioned to other 
creditors. 
Vaughan Williams L.J. sale. 
"Now, according to my experience of bankruptcy practice, 
there never has been any doubt as to the right of a 
creditor, whether he is secured creditor, or whether he is 
an unsecured creditor, to come and prove at any time during 
the administration, provided that he does not by his proof 
interfere with the prior distribution of the estate amongst 
the creditors, and subject always, in cases in which he has 
to come and ask for leave to prove, to any terms which the 
court may 'think it just to impose; and, of course, in every 
case in which there has been a time limited for coming in 
to prove, although the lapse of that time without proof 
does not prevent the creditor from proving afterwards, 
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subject to the conditions which I have mentioned, in every 
such case he can only come in and prove with the leave of 
the court. If that is so, leave must be granted on such 
terms as the court may think just." 
Then, dealing with chancery practice, he said". 
"I really do not think that it makes very much difference 
whether one looks at this proof as if it were carried on in 
bankruptcy or carried in the administration in chancery. In 
either case it seems to me that, by the machinery of what 
is in effect a supplementary certificate upon proper terms 
the court would allow the creditor to come in." 
A creditor, having a claim against an estate normally proves his 
debt. This is because an administration of estate comes within 
the jurisdiction of the Chancery Courts. However, it remains a 
legal claim as Lord Davey observed in the House of Lords in 
Harrison v Kirk49 where he said, 
"When the Court of Chancery had taken into its own hands 
the administration of an estate, it restrained creditors 
from pursuing their legal remedy against the executors. The 
court made a decree for the administration of the estate, 
which operated as a judgment for all the creditors, and as 
it precluded the creditors from asserting their legal 
remedies, it provided other means for them to obtain 
payment of their debts. The court was bound to see that the 
creditors whom it restrained from pursuing their legal 
remedies were not deprived of the means of having the 
assets of the testator applied to the payment of their 
debts. It is an entire fallacy but I think a very common 
one, to suppose that because the debt had to be proved, or 
the debt had to be enforced through the medium of the Court 
of Chancery it became an equitable demand, and ceased to be 
a legal demand. Its character, was not altered one whit: it 
remained a legal demand, and the right of the creditor who 
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came in to prove under an administration decree remained a 
legal right and the debt which was recoverable was a legal 
debt, the only difference made was in the remedy by which 
the debt could be recovered. That being so, the Court of 
Chancery usually fixed a time within which the creditors 
could come in and prove their debts; and obvious 
convenience rendered that necessary, because otherwise the 
administration would have been hung up forever." 
Lord Davey has very clearly stated in his judgment that although 
a debt may be enforced in a Court of Chancery, it does not change 
the legal nature of the debt. In other words, just because the 
claim is heard in a Court of Chancery, it does not become a claim 
in equity but continues to remain a legal claim. This would mean 
the equitable defence would not be available in such cases. 
So, in cases of administration, the position is that a defendant 
would be precluded from pleading the defence of laches, as the 
action is not one at equity. Furthermore, the defence of 
limitation would not be available as time stops running on all 
creditors from the date of the decree. It would appear then that 
the only foreseeable defence available to a defendant, would be 
to prove that the plaintiff had either released, waived or 
abandoned his claim against the personal property or general 
estate of the testator. 
4.1.6 Bankruptcy and Winding-up 
In cases of bankruptcy and winding-up, the commencement of the 
proceedings in itself does not stop time running. However, time 
stops running from the moment a receiving order is made in the 
case of bankruptcy and a winding -up order in the case of 
winding-up proceedings. From the moment the order is made, time 
stops running against all claims which are provable in 
bankruptcy, and the same principle applies in winding-up 
proceedings; that is, the creditors' claims are frozen as at the 
date of the winding-up order. 
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This principle was explained by Mellish L.J. in re General  
Rolling Stock Co50 , where he said, 
"Assets of a debtor are to be divided amongst his 
creditors, whether in bankruptcy or insolvency, or under a 
trust for creditors or under a decree of the Court of 
Chancery in an administration suit. In these cases the rule 
is that everybody who had a subsisting claim at the time of 
the adjudication, the insolvency, the creation of the trust 
for creditors, or the administration decree, as the case 
may be, is entitled to participate in the assets, and that 
the Statute of Limitations does not run against this claim, 
but as long as assets remain unadministered he is at 
liberty to come in and prove his claim, not disturbing any 
former dividend." 
As in the administration of estates, so also in cases of 
bankruptcies, a creditor after the date of the receiving order 
could subsequently prove his debt with the leave of the court, 
as time under the Limitation Act ceases to run from the date of 
the receiving order. So in Ex Parte Lancaster Banking 
Corporation: In re Westbv" where after the court had made an 
order declaring the bankruptcy to be closed the bankrupt managed 
to secure assets from bequests made to him by his wife, the 
question that the court was called upon to decide was whether a 
creditor whose name and debt appeared in the bankrupt's statement 
of affairs, but who had not proved before the close of the 
bankruptcy, could subsequently prove the debt. In allowing the 
creditor to prove the debt with the leave of the court. Bacon, 
C.J., said52 , 
"The argument founded on the Statute of Limitations as an 
answer to this claim is not tenable for the moment. The 
Statute of Limitations has nothing to do with the 
bankruptcy laws. When a bankruptcy ensures, there is an end 
to the operation of that statute, with reference to debtor 
and creditor. The debtor's rights are established in the 
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bankruptcy, and the Statute of Limitations has no 
application at all to such a case, or to the principles by 
which it is governed. I say that because here it appears 
that the present Appellant was a secured creditor. He found 
that there was no estate except that which was pledged to 
him, and he did not trouble about it until he became aware 
of the fact that his debtor, who was a penniless man at the 
time of the bankruptcy, had become a wealthy man, and able 
to pay his debt. Then he sent a proof of his debt, and he 
became, in the plain words of the statute, 'a creditor who 
has proved'. He always had a debt provable." 
So although a very long period of time had elapsed, since the 
time of the receiving order and the time the plaintiff proved his 
debt, the court allowed the proof of debt, as the Statute of 
Limitation ceases to run from the time of the receiving order. 
In fact what the learned judge says in his judgment in Re Westbv 
is that the operation of the Limitation statute is at an end with 
reference to debtor and creditor. It is quite different from 
saying that bankruptcy puts an end altogether, to the operation 
of the statute in relation to all the other matters affecting the 
debtors property. 
In Re Benzon, Bower v Chetwynd 53 , the Court of Appeal had to 
consider whether in a case where a creditor, who had been 
adjudicated bankrupt and remained a bankrupt when he died 
nineteen years later, the fact that he had by his will exercised 
a general testamentary power and thereby had made the subject 
matter of that power assets for payment on his own death, enabled 
his creditors (time having started to run before bankruptcy) to 
say that they were entitled to come in and participate in the 
distribution of that asset and were not statute-barred. 
Chanell, J., who delivered the judgment of the court, said 53 , 
"on the point of the Statute of Limitations, in as much as 
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the debts were incurred by the bankrupt before 1890 and 
1892 respectively, they would prima facie have been barred 
long before his death in 1911. The contentions (of counsel 
for the appellants) on this point on behalf of the 
appellants were, first that the exercise of the power of 
appointment which made the fund available as assets gave 
them a new right of action or proceeding which was not 
barred, and, secondly that, even if that was not so, the 
effect of the bankruptcy was to prevent the statute 
running." 
The court however did not accept the first contention. Then 
Cfianell, J., goes on 
"as to the second point, cases were quoted beginning with 
Ex P. Ross which show that in the bankruptcy a debt does 
not become barred by lapse of time if it was not so barred 
at the commencement of the bankruptcy, and of this there 
can be no doubt, but this is only in the bankruptcy." 
The court accordingly held that, whilst the appointment at death 
gave the creditors a new fund out of which they could get payment 
and a new mode of proceeding in order to get it, this was merely 
a new remedy and not a new cause of action. The cause of action 
was really the old debt, and since the statute, had begun to run 
against the creditors before the commencement of the bankruptcy, 
it continued to run notwithstanding the bankruptcy, and that the 
claims of the creditors, not being claims in bankruptcy, were 
statute-barred. 
It is important to note in relation to this case that only "in 
the bankruptcy" does the statute cease to operate. It does not 
have any effect on any rights or remedies which are unaffected 
by the bankruptcy. In Cotterell v Price and Others 55 the court 
had to decide whether a second mortgagee's rights to recover 
property against the mortgagor was statute barred. The third 
defendant created a first mortgage which became vested in the 
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first and second defendant and a second mortgage over the same 
property which became vested in the plaintiff. The legal date for 
redemption under the second mortgage expired without the 
plaintiff exercising his rights. A receiving order was made 
against the third defendant and he remained an undischarged 
bankrupt. Buckley, J. said, 
"In my judgment a mortgagee who relies on his security 
retains and stands on rights which he had before the 
bankruptcy and which remain • unaffected by the 
bankruptcy... .Section 7 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914, 
provides in Sub-5 (1) that, once a receiving order has been 
made, 'no creditor to whom the debtor is indebted in 
respect of any debt provable in bankruptcy shall have any 
remedy against the property or person of the debtor in 
respect of the debt, or shall commence any action or other 
legal proceedings, unless with the leave of the court and 
on such terms as the court may impose." 
Subsection (2) of S.7 goes on: 'But this section shall not 
affect the power of any secured creditor to realise or 
otherwise deal with his security in the same manner as he 
would have been entitled to realise or deal with it if this 
section had not been passed.' 
Although the bankruptcy takes away the rights of ordinary 
creditors to sue for their dues and regulates their right 
of proof in the bankruptcy, the rights of secured creditors 
are unaffected under that section, and there is no reason 
why time should not continue to run under the Limitation 
Act, 1939, as regards those rights and remedies which the 
secured creditors have outside the bankruptcy." 
The court held that on the second mortgagee's rights of action 
against the mortgagor becoming statute-barred, the second 
mortgagee lost all estate and interest in the mortgaged property 
and with it his status as mortgagee, and the equity of 
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redemption, being incidental to that status, could not survive. 
Buckley, J. went on to say 
"It may be that his right to sue on the covenant (which was 
merely a right to sue on debt) was a right with which the 
supervening bankruptcy interfered so as to prevent this 
becoming statute-barred but that is not a matter in which 
I have any concern because that right alone would not, in 
my judgment, constitute the plaintiff a secured creditor 
within the meaning of the rules. A" secured creditor must, 
for present purposes, be somebody who has some interest in 
property which is security for his debt, and not merely the 
benefit of a covenant." 
Although once a sequestration order is made, for purposes of 
bankruptcy, time ceases to run, there is no provision to say that 
intervening bankruptcy shall act as a stay on the period of 
limitation. In Christensen v Davidson  56  the plaintiff instituted 
proceedings for recovery, of a sum of money obtained from the • 
plaintiff by fraud after the defendant was adjudicated a bankrupt 
and subsequently discharged. The court held that since time 
started to run against the plaintiff before the defendant's 
bankruptcy supervened and since the action was not commenced 
until after the termination of the bankruptcy, the plaintiff's 
right to recover his debt was statute-barred. 
The effect of the Statute of Limitation vis-a-vis the winding-up 
of a company under the Company Act, (1961) NSW was considered in 
Motor Terms Co Ptv v Liberty Insurance Ltd (in liquidation) 57 . 
Section 221 (1) (b) of the Companies Act 1961 (NSW) authorises 
the court to make a winding-up order "on the petition of.... any 
creditor." The majority of the High Court of Australia, Barwick, 
C.J. Taylor and Menzies J.J., held that S.222 (1) (b) authorises 
the making of an order on the petition of a creditor whose debt 
was not statute-barred at the time of presentation, 
notwithstanding that by the time the petition comes to be heard 
the debt is so barred. Barwick, C.J., said, 
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"I would wish merely to say for myself that, in my opinion, 
the relevant date at which to determine whether or not for 
the purpose of a liquidation under the Companies Act 1961 
(NSW) a debt is statute-barred is the date of the 
presentation of the petition on which the winding-up order 
has been made. That date, to my mind, is both logical and 
the practical date, as well as being the date chosen by the 
legislature, as at which to determine who are the creditors 
and as at which to adjust their rights." 
However, in a dissenting judgment, Kitto, J. was of the opinion 
that the material time should be the commencement of the 
bankruptcy or the order for winding-up. In other words, he felt 
that the operative time is the date of the order and not the date 
of presentation of the petition. His Honor stated, 
"In the case of a bankruptcy or the winding-up of a company 
the event upon which the substitution takes place is not 
the event which the relevant legislation deems to be the 
'commencement' of the bankruptcy or of the winding-up: it 
is the commencement of the administration that is to say 
the adjudication in bankruptcy or the making of the order 
for winding-up  Under the Bankruptcy Act 1924-1965 
(Com), a creditor's right to recover his debt by ordinary 
legal proceedings is taken from him at sequestration (S.60, 
C1.63) and the right of proof which he is given in its 
place is expressly limited to liabilities to which the 
bankrupt is subject at the date of the sequestration order 
(S.81). Under the Companies Act 1961 (NSW) in the case of 
a compulsory winding-up, the more important provisions by 
which a right of participation in distributions under the 
authority of the court is substituted for a pre-existing 
right of suit are S.233, placing all the company's property 
in the custody of the liquidator upon the making of the 
winding-up order; s.244, requiring the assets to be applied 
in discharge of the company's liabilities; S.291, giving 
creditors their right of proof in the winding-up; and S.226 
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(3), which operates automatically on the making of a 
winding-up order to prevent any action or proceeding from 
being proceeded with or commenced against the company, in 
contrast with S.226 (1) which recognises that prima facie 
the presentation of a petition is no bar to a creditor's 
pursuit of his remedies in the ordinary courts." 
I submit that the dissenting judgment of Kitto, J. is preferable. 
In bankruptcies as well as in the winding-up of companies, there 
could be a considerable lapse of time between the presentation 
of the petition and the date of the final order. Furthermore, 
there are many cases where a final order is not made by the 
court, as the petition may be withdrawn or dismissed. As such it 
would certainly be more practical to fix the material time for 
limitation purposes as the date of the order. It may however be 
argued that this would be unfair on a party whose claim is not 
statute-barred at the time of presentation of the petition but 
becomes statute-barred by the time the final order is made. This 
problem could be overcome, it is submitted, by the party issuing 
a writ of summons. 
4.2 IN CASES OF LAND 
Where a person is trying to get title to land by way of adverse 
possession he would have to show that he has been in continuous 
possession of the property for 12 years58 or if the property 
belongs to the Crown, he should prove continuous possession for 
30 years59 . 
In the event where an adverse possessor gives up possession 
before the expiry of the 12 year or 30 year period, as the case 
may be, time stops running and he completely loses whatever 
period of time he may have accumulated. Once the statute has 
begun to run, it runs continuously. In the case of a landowner 
whose property is the subject of an adverse possession, his 
rights to action ceases, once the adverse possessor vacates, and 
a fresh right of action accrues only when the land is taken into 
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adverse possession again". In cases of property it is well 
settled that where there is adverse possession, the true owner 
can, by re-entry and possession of the land before the expiration 
of the limitation period, stop the time from running against him, 
rather than commencing proceedings against the adverse possessor. 
On the termination of the time period, the true owner's rights 
are extinguished, including his right of re-entry. However, the 
adverse possessor would lose his right if he is out of possession 
before the full period of time has run, namely 12 years in 
Tasmania. This was decided in Chisholm v Comine where one of 
the defendants went into possession adversely to the plaintiffs 
who had legal title. Some time later the defendant went away and 
his wife had possession. The wife attorned to the plaintiffs as 
their tenant. The court held that the attornment by the wife was 
equivalent to possession being taken of the land by the 
plaintiffs as owners of the legal estate, and operated to stop 
the running of the statute against them. Martin C.J. in his 
judgment said, 
"It is clear law that if a person is out of possession of 
land, of which he is the legal owner, for nineteen years, 
and if some other person is in possession, holding 
adversely to the legal owner, for less than twenty years, 
then if the person in occupation retires from possession of 
the land, and leaves it vacant, the owner may come in and 
resume possession and stop the running of the statute, and 
thus acquire a new point of departure. All the previous 
years will go for nothing, because the owner has got 
possession before being barred by the statute. Adverse 
possession for nineteen years, or for any other number of 
years short to twenty, will go for nothing against the real 
owner." 
Although the general rule is that once time starts running it 
cannot normally be suspended, however, where an adverse possessor 
abandons possession without acquiring title, time stops running 
as against the rightful owner. In this event, the true owner is 
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restored to his full estate and he is in the same position as he 
was before the adverse possession took place. This was clearly 
stated by Lord MacNaughton in Trustees Executors &Aciency Company 
v Short62 , where he said, 
"If a person enters upon the land of another and holds 
possession for a time, and then, without having acquired 
title under the statute, abandons possession, the rightful 
owner, in the abandonment, is in the same position in all 
respects as he was before the intrusion took place. There 
is no one against whom he can bring an action. He cannot 
make an entry upon himself. There is no positive enactment, 
nor is there a principle of law, which requires him to do 
any act, to issue any notice, or to perform any ceremony in 
order to rehabilitate himself. No new departure is 
necessary. The possession of the intruder, ineffectual for 
the purpose of transferring title, ceases upon its 
abandonment to be effectual for any purpose. It does not 
leave behind any cloud on the title of the rightful owner, 
or any secret process at work for the possible benefit in 
time to come of some casual interloper or lucky vagrant. 
4.2.1 Acknowledament 
Generally, under the Limitation Act, 1974, time will stop running 
and will commence to run afresh if the defendant acknowledges the 
title of the plaintiff 63 . 
To establish that the period for making any entry or bringing an 
action to recover land has determined and that the Mortgagee's 
right and title to the land has consequently been extinguished, 
it is not enough for the mortgagor to show that the mortgagee's 
right to make an entry or to bring an action first accrued more 
than 12 years before. This is because a payment of principal or 
interest or an acknowledgment in writing may have caused the time 
to run afresh. 
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The Queensland Full Court in Cameron v Blau & Anor 64 held that in 
certain cases as for instance in. the case of an allegation of 
concealed fraud, the onus of showing that despite the expiry of 
the limitation period, the case is within one of the exceptions 
under which the statute allows the title to continue, lies on the 
person who makes the assertion. However, a person who asserts 
that the title of another has been extinguished by the operation 
of S.5 65 Distress Replevin & Ejectment Act, 1867, must show that 
the other party is barred by the Statute from making an entry or 
brining an action to recover the land. This is established by 
showing that 20 years have elapsed since the last payment of any 
principal or interest, and possibly also that during the 
limitation period there was no acknowledgment given by the person 
in possession. The court also held that an acknowledgment under 
S.21 Distress Replevin and Ejectment Act, 1867, must be signed 
by the person in possession and that the signature by an agent 
is insufficient. Further, the acknowledgment to be effective, 
must be given within the limitation period and an acknowledgment 
given after the period has expired is of no avail under S.21 as 
once title has been extinguished it cannot be restored. 
The acknowledgment must be made to the plaintiff or his agent and 
must show an admission by the maker or a promise to pay. So in 
Macree v Wilson66 where it was held that in pleading an 
acknowledgment, it must be alleged that it was made to the 
plaintiff or to his agent, and that it amounts to a promise to 
pay the debt. Dixon, J. in dealing with the sufficiency of 
acknowledgment and implication of promise to pay in Bucknell v 
Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd 67 said, 
"An express promise in writing by the debtor to pay revives 
his liability. But the liability is revived only according 
to the tenor of the promise. It is so expressed as to be 
conditional or subject to limitations, the condition must 
be fulfilled before the liability becomes enforceable and 
the limitations must be observed. But, although a document 
relied upon as an acknowledgment contains no express 
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promise, it may effect a revival of the debtor's liability 
if there is found in it a distinct admission of the debt. 
The law implies from an acknowledgment of the existence of 
the liability a promise to discharge it. Words clearly 
acknowledging that the writer is liable to pay suffice to 
raise the implication. But although the promise is implied 
as an artificial legal consequence of the written admission 
of liability and is not the result of a search after the 
true meaning disclosed in the writing yet if the document 
in which the admission occurs empresses an intention 
inconsistent with the making of such a promise or an 
intention consistent only with the making of a qualified 
promise, the implication will be rebutted or qualified 
accordingly. Thus, if the context includes a flat refusal 
to pay, the admission of liability cannot be made the 
foundation of an implied promise to discharge the debt." 
So, although an acknowledgment may contain no express promise to 
pay, the law would generally infer from it a promise to pay the 
same. However, where the maker refuses to pay the amount or makes 
only a qualified promise to pay, then the courts will not infer 
a general promise to pay from the acknowledgment. 
4.2.2 Re-entry, Possession or Dealing by Owner 
Where a person is in adverse possession of a property, the 
rightful owner by re-entry and possession of the said property 
will be in a position to defeat the claim of the adverse 
possessor, provided the rightful owner does so before expiry of 
the 12 years limitation period. In Hodgson v Thomson, the 
defendant set up a title by possession from 1884 to a block of 
land of which the land in dispute was a portion. The plaintiff, 
who claimed to have a documentary title to the land, gave 
evidence that in 1893 he went with a surveyor on to the land and 
that they surveyed and marked it out and remained on it for two 
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days, but saw no one else in occupation of it. The court held 
that that act was sufficient to establish a taking possession by 
the plaintiff to the exclusion of the defendant. 
Again in Scanlon v Campbe11 69 , in an action of ejectment the 
defendant set up a title to the land by possession from 1890. 
Evidence for the plaintiff showed that a surveyor went on the 
land in 1908 under instructions from the plaintiff's solicitors, 
surveyed it and marked it out. An assistant and a labourer were 
with him. They worked for two days and saw no one on the land. 
The court held that there was sufficient evidence of 
dispossession of the defendant. Similarly, in A.G. v Swann' 
evidence was adduced that the land within 100 feet of the water 
of a lake and creek had for more than 60 years been used by the 
defendant and his predecessors in title partly for farming and 
partly for grazing and that the land was fenced from the lake to 
the creek. The court held that the acts of dispossession relied 
on by the Crownn were insufficient evidence of re-entry and that 
the Crown had not resumed possession by any of the above acts. 
A re-entry by the owner to defeat a claim by the adverse 
possessor must be such as to show resumption of possession and 
any infrequent acts of re-entry would not be sufficient to defeat 
the claim of an adverse possessor. Thus in Robertson v Butler, 
in an action to assert his right to a certain land of which he 
was the registered proprietor, the plaintiff stated that about 
three or four times a year he entered on the land (which had 
saplings growing upon it) sometimes with his wife and family, 
sometimes with friends, picnicked on it, walked about it, 
occasionally shot a rabbit on it, and sometimes put upon it a 
notice prohibiting the cutting of timber which, however, did not 
appear to have come to the defendant's knowledge until after the 
expiration of the period; that he wrote a letter to the defendant 
stating that he objected to the defendant's unauthorised 
occupation; and that he once sent a man to see as to the 
possibility of obtaining grazing for horses and to report. 
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The Court on Appeal held that the acts of re-entry relied upon 
by the plaintiff were of such a character and so infrequent, that 
they could not be given a cumulative effect and did not amount 
to a resumption of possession, and were insufficient to divest 
the possession out of the defendant and revest it in fact in the 
plaintiff. 
However, in Clement v Jonesm where land belonging to two 
separate person were enclosed within one fence and the whole of 
the enclosed land was used by the first person for grazing cattle 
for a period of fifteen years during which time the second party 
• entered his land only to cut firewood or for the renewal of 
survey marks on boundaries, the court held that the taking of 
firewood was evidence that the second party was using the land 
in such a way as would only be justified by actual possession and 
the renewal of the survey marks would have been sufficient to 
establish a resumption of possession. 
So, to successfully resume possession, a person would have to 
satisfy the Court that the acts he was relying upon were 
consistent with that of a person who had actual possession such 
as cutting and removing firewood and renewal of survey marks. 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
Although the general rule is that once time starts running, it 
will normally continue to run and cannot be suspended, it is now 
well settled that the commencement of an action will stop a 
Limitation Act from running. Commencement of an action is the 
commonest way of stopping the Limitation Act from running. In 
this regard where the last day for commencement of an action 
happens to fall on a holiday, time will be extended to the next 
working day. 
After commencing proceedings, there have been instances where 
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attempts have been made to amend the writs. The courts have 
generally refused to grant amendments, where the effect of so 
granting would be to cause injustice to the defendant or to 
introduce a new party to the proceedings, or add a new cause of 
action, after the time period has expired. 
Besides the commencement of an action, the running of time could 
be suspended by any regulation having the force of statute, and 
by the agreement of the parties, in which event the agreement 
must be expressed in very clear terms and supported by 
consideration. 
The commencement of proceedings for administration of estates and 
bankruptcy however, does not stop time running. In cases of 
administration, it is the making of the administration decree 
that stops time running against creditors, as it operates as a 
judgment, and in bankruptcy proceedings, the making of a 
receiving order will stop time running against all claims, that 
can be proved in the bankruptcy. This same principle is also used 
in winding-up proceedings. 
In cases where the true owners title is extinguished by effluxion 
of time, even an acknowledgment by the defendant will not revive 
the rights of the true owner. In personal actions, as far as the 
Tasmanian Act is concerned, this would be relevant only in an 
action for the conversion or wrongful detention of chattels, as 
this is the only instance when title is extinguished m . 
However, in cases of actions to recover land, including 
redemption actions, the true owners title is extinguished after 
the lapse of the period stipulated in the Ace and an 
acknowledgment by the defendant would be of no effect. In cases 
of land, the running of time is suspended not only by the 
commencement of an action but also in cases where the true owner 
by re-entry takes possession of the land before the expiration 
of the limitation period. 
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CHAPTER 5. EXTENSION OF TIME 
The earliest limitation statutes in England recognised that in 
some instances, a plaintiff should be given respite from the 
operation of the statutes; the principle was recognised that time 
should not run where an action could not be brought, or could not 
be conveniently brought. 
The Limitation Act 1974 (Tas) recognises two methods of granting 
a plaintiff respite from the operation of the Act. Firstly, the 
Act provides for an extension of the limitation period in cases 
of disability l . Secondly, time is extended where there is 
acknowledgment or part payment made by the defendant and in cases 
of fraud and mistake 2 . This chapter Will discuss the disabilities 
that were recognised under the earlier legislation and the 
present list of disabilities under the Tasmanian Act which are 
much narrower. The cases where the courts have granted or refused 
extensions will be examined. The scope of the extensions 
provision under the Tasmanian Act are rather limited. 
Accordingly, the broader provisions in the Victorian and United 
Kingdom, are discussed to allow a comparison between the narrower 
Tasmanian provisions and these broader provisions of the 
Victorian and United Kingdom legislation. 
5.1 	DISABILITIES UNDER EARLIER LEGISLATION 
The earliest Imperial legislation3 in addition to disabilities 
like infancy, unsoundness of mind and a conviction, recognised 
that a person absent beyond the seas and married women were also 
under disability. 
(i) Absence beyond seas 
Various Imperial statutes of limitations 4 recognised that a 
person was under a disability for as long as he was 'beyond the 
seas'. In the Victorian case of Griffith v Bloch5 , the court 
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interpreted the words 'beyond the seas' as 'out of the 
territory', and held that in an action on a bill of exchange, if 
the defendant is absent in Tasmania when •the cause of action 
arose the statutory period of limitation does not begin to run 
till he returns to Victoria. Again Platt, B., in Forbes v Smith 8 , 
said, 
"If the plaintiff is abroad when the cause of action 
accrued, he has six years from his return though they may 
not be for ten or twenty years; but he is not prevented 
from bringing his action before his return. So if the 
defendant is abroad, limitation does not begin to run until 
six years after his return, but the, plaintiff is not 
obliged to wait until his return." 
The Tasmanian Act does not make any provision for the absence of 
either party to an action from beyond the seas, as a disability. 
This is also the position with the other Australian states except 
the Australian Capital Territory and Western Australia. In the 
Australian Capital Territory, the absence of the plaintiff and 
defendant overseas is recognised as a disability, and in Western 
Australia the absence of the defendant overseas is recognised as 
a disability. 
A suggested reason for removing 'absence beyond the seas' as a 
disability both in England and most of the Australian states may 
be due to the provisions that now exist for service of process 
by means of substituted service and for provisions that now exist 
for service of process out of the jurisdiction 7. Furthermore, 
reciprocal enforcement legislation between various countries 
enables a judgment obtained in Australia to be registered and 
executed in another country which has such reciprocal agreement 
with Australia and vice versa8 . 
(ii) Married Women 
The Common Law regarded husband and wife as one person and as ' 
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such the law incorporated the wife's legal existence into that 
of her husband. A married woman had no contractual capacity, and 
her contracts were void. A married woman was incapable of 
acquiring, enjoying or alienating any real or personal property 
apart from her husband9 . The modern law however is that a married 
woman could and is capable of acquiring, holding and disposing 
of any property as if she were a feme sole 10 . In Tasmania, the 
Married Women's Property Act, 1935 s. 3, provides that a married 
woman should: 
a 	be capable of acquiring, holding and disposing of any 
property; and 
be capable of rendering herself and being rendered, liable 
in respect of any tort, contract, debt or obligation; and 
be subject to the law relating to the enforcement of 
judgments and orders, in all respects as if she was a feme 
sole. 
So, the provisions of the Limitation Act are now applicable to 
a married woman in all respects and thus a married woman is no 
more under a disability. 
5.2 	DISABILITIES UNDER PRESENT LEGISLATION 
Part II of the Limitation Act, 1974 prescribes the ordinary 
periods of limitation for various classes of cases there referred 
to, but section 3 provides, "The provisions of this part have 
effect subject to the provisions of Part III". In other words, 
all the limitation period for different classes of action are 
subject to provisions for their extension in case of disability. 
Part III is entitled "Extension of Limitation Periods" and is 
divided into three divisions. The first division deals with 
Disability; the second with Acknowledgment and Part Payment; and 
the third division with Fraud and Mistake. Although the Act deals 
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with (i) disability, (ii) acknowledgment and part payment and 
(iii) fraud and mistake under the same part, the latter two are 
dealt with in the next chapter under the heading of Postponement 
of Time. 
The opening section of Part III reads, 
"Subject to this section if on the date when any right of 
action accrued for which a period of limitation is 
prescribed by this Act the person to whom it accrued was 
under a disability, the action may be brought at any time 
before the expiration of 6 years, or in the case of any 
action for which a less number of years is prescribed by 
this Act as a period of limitation then such less number of 
years, from the date when the person ceased to be under a 
disability or died which ever event first accrued 
notwithstanding that the period of limitation has expired". 
The Limitation Act, 1974 recognises only four disabilities for 
purposes of limitation and they are (i) infancy, (ii) unsoundness 
of mind, (iii) conviction and (iv) disability by reason of war 
circumstances. The Act states that a person is deemed to be under 
disability while (a) he is an infant; (b) he is incapable, by 
reason of mental disorder, of managing his property or affairs; 
or (c) he is a convict within the meaning of section 435 of the 
Criminal Code 12 . 
(i) Infancy 
As far as Australia is concerned, an infant is a person under 18 
years of age. A person of 18 years now enjoys full contractual 
capability 13 . If a person is able to prove that when the cause of 
action arose, such as is referred to in s.5 ie an action in 
respect of personal injuries he was under 18 years old, he would 
be able to obtain an extension if he proves he was not, at the 
time the right of action accrued to him, in the custody of a 
parent. 14 
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(ii) Unsound Mind 
The disability of unsoundness of mind presumably covers all forms 
of mental incapacity. A person is conclusively presumed to be of 
unsound mind in the following cases: 
(a) while he is liable to be detained or subject to 
guardianship under the Mental Health Act, 1963; 
(b) while the Public Trustee has the powers of the 
committee of his estate15 . 
The interpretation section provides that there should be a 
conclusive presumption of disability in the above events, so that 
the running of time is postponed if the disability existed at the 
time when the cause of action accrued. In Harnett v Fisher16 , a 
person who was wrongfully detained as a lunatic on the 
certification of a medical practitioner, was unable to get the 
benefit of the extension for disability because he was able to 
prove that he was compos mentis. As a result his action in 
respect of negligence against the medical practitioner failed as 
being out of time. 
This was obviously an unjust decision as the plaintiff's 
detention though wrongful, prevented him from suing just as 
effectively as if he was properly detained 17 . 
There is no provision in the Act for extension to be granted to 
a person who is detained after a cause of action has accrued. A 
person who is detained after the cause of action has arisen is, 
it is submitted, still under a disability, and the act should 
make provisions for extension in such cases, as well. S.26 (2) 
reads, 
"Subsection (1) does not affect any case where the right of 
action first accrued to some person (not under a 
disability) through whom the person under a disability • 
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claims". 
This is very clearly illustrated in Goodall v Skerrat 18 , where 
one of the issues was whether one of the three sisters was barred 
as to both her original share of the property comprised in a 
settlement and a share accruing from another sister. When the 
disseisor entered, both sisters were alive, and the one in 
question was under coverture (which was a disability at that 
time). Sometime later, the other sister died and her share 
accrued. The court held that the surviving sister was not barred 
as to her original share, because she has been disabled when the 
right of action arose, but that she was barred as to the accruing 
share because her sister, who first had the.right of action in 
respect of it, was not disabled when that right arose. 
(iii) 	Convictionw 
Persons defined as 'convict' under s. 435 of the Criminal Code 
are also under disability under the Tasmanian Act20 , so that if 
a cause of action arises whilst the plaintiff was imprisoned, the 
statutory period does not commence until after his release. 
Of all the other Australian states only Queensland, has a similar 
provision. This means that time would run against a person in 
prison in the same way it would do so in normal circumstances. 
It is submitted that this should also be the case in Tasmania, 
as solicitors can have access to clients or potential clients in 
*prison for briefing and instructions and the prison authorities 
could be ordered to produce a prisoner in court for a trial. So, 
there is no justification to treat a prisoner as being under a 
disability as he is quite capable of setting the machinery moving 
for an action, though detained in prison. The Law Reform 
Commissioe in fact recommended that the Limitation Act be 
amended by omitting the words "other than a convict within the 
meaning of s.435 of the Criminal Code in 5.27(1). 
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(iv) Disability by Reason or War Circumstances  
The Tasmanian Act specifically provides that in the case of any 
war or circumstances arising out of any war in which the 
Commonwealth is engaged, any period during which it is not•
reasonably practicable for a person to commence proceedings would 
be excluded when computing the time perioe. The section also 
provides that the time period will expire only at the end of 12 
months from the date it became reasonably practicable to commence 
proceedings. The only other Australian state with a similar 
provision is Victorian . 
Section 26 and its provisos will be applicable to all actions 
falling within the Limitation Act, 1974. The extension allowed 
by the Act for disability is six years, where the Act provides 
a limitation period of six years or more for a cause of action, 
and where a lesser number of years for that action is provided, 
than the extension is such lesser period as provided for that 
cause of action. This period will be calculated from the date 
when the person under the disability ceases to be under it or 
dies, which ever occurs first. However, the Act stipulates that 
a person under the disability, will not have the benefit of the 
extension provision of the Act 24 . Thus, where a right of action 
which has accrued to a person under a disability accrues, on the 
death of that person while still under a disability, to another 
person under a disability, no further extension of time will be 
allowed by reason of the disability of the second personn . 
Where a person under disability intends to bring an action to 
recover land or money charged on land, he would have 30 years 
from the date on which the right of action accrued to him or to 
some person through whom he claims26 . Where an action is brought 
to recover a penalty or forfeiture, or sum by way thereof, by 
virtue of any enactment, the person bringing the action may rely 
on a disability only if he is an aggrieved party27 . 
In actions in respect of personal injuries for damages for 
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negligence, nuisance, breach of duty including damages under the 
Fatal Accidents Act, 1934, a judge is given a discretion, if he 
thinks it is just and reasonable to do so, to extend the period 
of limitation up to 6 years from the date on which the cause of 
action accrued28 , notwithstanding that the limitation period had 
expired29 . 
Instead of allowing a claimant 30 years to recover land or money 
charged on land and a maximum of 6 years in respect of personal 
injuries for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty, 
it is submitted that a better approach would be to grant shorter 
periods of time for both recovery of land matters as well as 
personal injury claims. Coupled with this shorter period, the 
court should be vested with a residual discretionary power to 
extend time beyond that period. Once a person ceases to be under 
a disability, there should be no reason why he should not 
commence proceedings forthwith, and as such a relatively shorter 
period of time, should be sufficient once the disability ceases 
to exist. 
However, a discretion vested in the courts would not unduly 
prejudice claimants, who for some good reasons were not in a 
position to commence proceedings within the stipulated time 
period. 
5.3 	THE OPERATION OF THE EXTENSION PROVISIONS 
The Tasmanian Act provides that in cases of disabilities, an 
extension of the time period provided in the Limitation Act can 
be sought to accommodate a particular claim. Where such a 
discretion is given without stipulating the grounds on which the 
discretion is to apply, as in the Limitation Act, the court looks 
into the scope and purpose of the legislation before exercising 
its discretion. This is clearly stated by Dixon C.J. in Klein v 
Domus Pty Ltd3° where he said, 
"This court has in many and diverse connections dealt with 
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discretions which are given by legislation to bodies, 
sometimes judicial, sometimes administrative, without 
defining the grounds on which the discretion is to be 
exercised and in a sense this is one such case. We have 
invariably said that wherever the legislature has given a 
discretion of that kind you must look at the scope and 
purpose of the provision and at what is its real object. If 
it appears that the dominating, actuating reason for the 
decision is outside the scope of the purpose of the 
enactment, that vitiates the supposed exercise of the 
discretion. But within that very general statement of the 
purpose of the enactment, the real object of the 
legislature in such cases is investigating the facts and 
considering the general purpose of the enactment to give 
effect to the view of the justice of the case.   
The person seeking an extension, must be able to furnish the 
court with an acceptable explanation for his delay in prosecuting 
his. claim, as noted by Barwick, C.J. in Hall v Nominal 
Defendant32 , where the learned Chief Justice saidm , 
"A very short time is set by the statute within which an 
action against the nominal defendant may be brought, and 
therefore a power to extend that time is given to a court 
of law so that justice may be done according to the 
circumstances. No doubt this extension of time is not as of 
course. Some acceptable explanation for the failure of the 
appellant to sue in time must be given before the court is 
required to consider the substantial question whether it 
would be just to grant the extension. The door, as it were, 
must first be opened. No hard and fast rule can be stated 
defining what may be held an acceptable explanation. But at 
least, in my opinion, it should be that it is the 
litigant's failure to sue in time which must be 
satisfactorily explained." 
So the extension, is not as of right and each individual case has 
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to be examined on its merits. A person who is seeking an 
extension would be required to give a satisfactory explanation 
for his delay in prosecuting his claim earlier. If the claimant 
can furnish some acceptable explanation for the delay in 
prosecuting the claim and under the circumstance the court thinks 
it is just to grant an extension, the claimant's request for an 
extension would be granted. 
5.3.1 Cases Where Extension Granted 
Extensions have been sought and granted by the courts. The 
faCtors relevant to an exercise of the judicial discretion to 
extend time include the following: 
1. Whether the granting of the extension would 
substantially prejudice the respondent; 
2. Whether there is evidence to substantiate the 
applicant's claim; 
3. The applicant's conduct in the prosecution of the 
case. 
In Peter Joseph Scott v Tasmania Broadmills Ltd, an application 
was made under S.5(3) of the Limitation Act, 1974 for an 
extension of time to commence a common law action by the 
plaintiff against his employer. In the course of his judgment 
Everett J. referred to the judgment of the Full Court in Knight 
v Smith35 where it was held that three essential matters should 
be considered in an application for extension of time, namely, 
1. whether or not the granting of the application would 
result in any substantial prejudice to the respondent 
in that application; 
2. whether or not there is evidence of what has been 
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termed a prima facie case of negligence or an arguable 
case of negligence so far as the applicant is 
concerned, and 
3. 	the conduct of the applicant in the prosecution of the 
claim. 
Justice Everett in granting the application, followed the three 
principles enumerated by the Full Court and in addition observed 
that in considering the justice of the case he also took into 
account the conduct of the employer who had improperly avoided 
making any payments under the Workers' Compensation Act. 
In Scott v Ellis, an application was made under S.5(3) of the 
Limitation Act, 1974 for an extension of time. Justice Everett 
after enumerating the three essential matters discussed in the 
above case, allowed the extension and said, 
"Nor do I accept the argument that because the ultimate 
period of six years referred to in section 5(3) of the Act 
has almost expired, there is of necessity prejudice to the 
respondent. The legislature has fixed a finite period of 
six years from the date on which the cause accrued. 
Depending upon all the circumstances, it may be just and 
reasonable in one case to extend time close to the end of 
this finite period but not just and reasonable in another 
case to extend time shortly after the expiry of the three 
year period referred to in section 5(1) of the Act." 
Justice Everett again allowed an extension of time in Mawer v 
Williams37 , where the applicant sought legal advice only on the 
advice of friends after 5 years from the date of the cause of 
action. Justice Everett again applied the same three principles 
which were discussed in the two previous cases. 
In the course of the judgment Justice Everett said, 
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"In all the circumstances I regard the explanation given by 
the applicant for the delay in the decision to institute 
proceedings if time is extended as one which is not 
unreasonable, having regard to his standard of education 
and his lack of knowledge of the relevant legal provisions, 
including the question of a time limit for the commencement 
of legal proceedings. I consider it would be just and 
reasonable •to extend the period for the bringing of the 
action." 
An extension was granted in Guy & Anor v Treffett ls . In this 
case, Chambers J. adopted the three factors outlined above and 
held that it was just and reasonable to grant the applicants an 
extension where the delay was due to their solicitors lack of 
care and negligence. It is submitted that in the above case, 
extension should not have been granted because of the established 
principle "that ignorance of the law is no excuse". The 
applicant's "lack of knowledge of the relevant legal provisions" 
are certainly a matter of law. 
As to the three cases of Peter Joseph Scott v Tasmanian 
Broadmills Ltd, Scott v Ellis and Guy & Anor v Triffett it is 
questionable whether an extension should have been granted where 
the acts clearly showed that the failure to institute proceedings 
within the stipulated time period was due to the sheer negligence 
of the solicitors. In such cases, where the solicitor is at 
fault, the client would not be prejudiced, if an extension is not 
granted, as the client would have recourse against his solicitor 
for professional negligence. Further, as solicitors are required 
to have compulsory professional indemnity insurance, the client 
would be virtually guaranteed of securing the amount of damages 
from his solicitors' insurance company. 
In the first case Justice Everett noted, "In this case it is 
clear that there was continuing and substantial negligence by the 
solicitors who were consulted by the applicant." Again in Scott's 
case the applicant had since his injuries consulted three 
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different solicitors who sat on the matter and allowed time to 
pass by. Chambers J. in Guy's case noted, 
"that the failure of the appellants to commence proceedings 
against the respondent for damages for injuries sustained 
by them was due, or very largely due, to default on the 
part of their solicitors". 
Surely, in such cases where the solicitor is clearly at fault, 
extension should not be granted and the applicants should be 
encouraged to pursue a claim against their solicitors instead. 
Se'ction 5(3) it is submitted contemplates a situation where the 
applicant for some just and reasonable cause has been unable to 
commence proceedings and to extend the benefit of this section 
to the applicants' solicitor is certainly to encourage slowness 
and slackness on the part of solicitors without the prospect of 
any real penalty. 
5.3.2 Cases Where Extension Refused 
In John Maxwell Lucas v Trevor John Eadie 39 Justice Everett was 
asked to decide whether an extension of time should be granted 
to the applicant to pursue a claim based on negligence of the 
defendant when the defendants' motor car collided head-on with 
the applicant's vehicle. The applicant saw a solicitor but did 
not expressly and unequivocally ask his solicitor to institute 
proceedings. In his judgment, Justice Everett said, 
"When Parliament enacted S.5(3) of the Act, and in doing so 
preserved the language of S.2(2) of the Limitation of  
Actions Act 1965, whereby jurisdiction to extend the period 
limited for the commencement of a common law action for 
damages in respect of personal injuries (now three years 
from the date on which the cause of action accrued) was 
conferred on a judge of this court 'if he thinks just and 
reasonable so to do', it no doubt believed that the 
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discretion could hardly have been expressed in wider terms. 
But decisions, binding on me, since the 1965 Act has 
tendered to make the judicial discretion somewhat sterile, 
and that sterility will remain so long as the existing form 
of S.5(3) of the Act is preserved. To what extent (if any) 
the discretion should be made less trammelled is one of 
policy for the Executive and ultimately for the decisions 
of Parliament.". He then went on to say, 
"I am bound by the decision of the High Court of Australia 
in Klein v Domus Pty Ltd (1963) 109 C L R 467 in which the 
statutory provisions under consideration did not, in my 
opinion, differ in substance to any significant degree from 
those of S.5(3) of the Act. In that case, the question was 
whether an extension of time should be granted under the 
NSW Workers' Compensation Act in accordance with a judicial 
discretion to do so expressed as follows:- 
'If he' (that is, the judge) 'is satisfied that sufficient 
cause has been shown, or that having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case it would be reasonable so to do'. 
The following extract from the judgment of Dixon C J in 
Klein's case is relevant at the threshold of a 
determination of the applicant's rights 40 : 
'An analysis of those words, perhaps, indicates that there 
is not a little difficulty in knowing how the words 'if he 
is satisfied that sufficient cause has been shown'. 
'But there is one thing perfectly clear about the sentence 
- at all events it is clear to me - and that is that the 
burden is upon the applicant to satisfy the condition that 
those words express. 
The applicant has got to show that this is a reason, within 
the expression which I have read, for extending the time, 
and it is a positive burden on the applicant, not of any 
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great severity perhaps, but it is positive burden which the 
applicant must discharge as he must discharge any other 
matter in which the burden of proof lies on him. The 
appellant allowed the time to elapse and it is for her to 
show that there is a reason why it should be extended. 
Expressions used in the cases cited before which suggest 
that the usual thing is to extend and the unusual thing is 
to refuse to extend time cannot, in my opinion, be 
supported as indicating the true meaning of this section. 
I think that words which I have read, namely, 'sufficient 
cause has been shown' really mean that -a positive reason 
has been shown and the words immediately following them 
mean 'or if the positive reason cannot be isolated and put 
in a distinct form all the facts which are alleged by the 
appellant amount to - although not dealt with analytically 
- a sound and positive ground on which an indulgence shall 
be allowed.' 
It is also apposite to bear in mind the following view of 
Windeyer J. in Klein's case:- 
'I do not think that there is prima facie right to an 
extension. And I do not understand why it is said that only 
in a rare case should an extension be refused, unless it be 
that in the great majority of cases a sufficient ground for 
an extension is made out. The applicant must make out a 
case for permission to agitate something that prima facie 
time has put to rest. The matter is one for the discretion 
of the Supreme Court. I should add that I do not think that 
the words 'or that having regard to all the circumstances 
of the case it would be reasonable so to do' create an 
alternative to a 'sufficient cause' as a ground on which an 
extension may be sufficient cause for extending the time, 
it could ever be reasonable to extend it. 
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I therefore read those words as explanatory of what is 
meant by a 'sufficient cause' rather than as stating a 
distinct alternative. They obviously confer a wide 
discretion'  tt 
Justice Everett did not allow the extension sought stating that 
the applicant's conduct in this case went against him. In this 
case the applicant (1) did not expressly and unequivocally ask 
his solicitor to institute proceedings.. (2) He left everything 
up in the air for 4 3/4 years without anyattempt to communicate 
with his solicitor after the first two initial consultations. (3) 
The applicant made no enquiry as to what the time limit was 
despite the fact that he was conscious that there was some time 
limit, and (4) the applicant waited for 4 years and 9 months 
before he again consulted his solicitor. In relation to the 
conduct of the applicant, Justice Everett said that consideration 
of the applicant's conduct does not begin when the period limited 
by the statute for commencing an action expires but rather that 
his conduct during the whole period since the accrual of the 
cause of action has to be taken into consideration. 
So a person seeking extension will have to convince the court 
that there is sufficient good reasons for granting the extension, 
as there is no extension as of right. 
In re K J Baker42 , Green, C J was faced with an application for 
extension of time under S.2(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act, 
1965 the language of which was similar to S.5(3) of the 1974 Act. 
In this case the applicant suffered personal injuries in a motor 
vehicle accident in which the driver of the motor vehicle was 
killed. The court found that the failure to commence proceedings 
within the period of limitation was due directly to the failure 
by the applicant's solicitors to make adequate inquiries to 
ascertain whether a competent defendant existed on whom process 
could be served; their failure to take appropriate steps to have 
some person appointed to represent the estate; and their failure 
to advert to the necessity for serving the writ within twelve . 
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months of filing. In dismissing the application, Green C J said, 
"In exercising my discretion my finding that the respondent 
would not suffer any significant prejudice if I granted the 
application weights heavily in the applicant's favour. 
However, notwithstanding that consideration, in all the 
circumstances I do not consider that the applicant has 
discharged the burden of persuasion which rests upon him. 
In reaching that conclusion I am to some extent influenced 
by the largely unexplained delays which occurred initially 
in the prosecution of the claim, but I am influenced to a 
much greater extent by the conclusion that the failure by 
the applicant's solicitors to find or appoint a competent 
defendant and serve him in accordance with the rules has 
not been adequately explained or been shown to have been 
reasonably excusable. In all the circumstances of the case 
I do not think it would be just and reasonable to extend 
the time for the commencement of the action." 
It is submitted, that the above decision is sound, as to hold 
otherwise would only encourage solicitors to be slack in their 
duty. It would however be argued that because of the neglect of 
the solicitor, a client's claim is stature-barred and the 
innocent client is penalised and made to suffer the loss. In such 
cases, the client certainly has a right of action against his 
solicitor for negligence and his quantum of damages would be that 
amount he would have recovered, if his claim was not statute-
barred. So the client is not penalised for the neglect of his 
solicitor. 
Section 26(1) allows a person under a disability to use the date 
upon which he ceases to be under disability, as the date from 
which the period of limitation is to commence. However section 
26(6) makes an important exception namely if the person under the 
disability was in the custody of a parent, the extension referred 
to earlier does not apply for an action instituted under section 
5 of the Act. The question to be determined here is whether the 
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term 'custody' in this context is a legal or factual concept. As 
there are no Tasmanian cases in point, we will examine an English 
case where the Court had to decide on what the term 'custody' 
meant. In Hewer v Bryant43 the plaintiff sought to recover 
damages in respect of personal injuries sustained in an accident 
when he was 15 years of age. His father had not sued during his 
minority, and the plaintiff launched his action upon attaining 
majority. The question was whether the action was barred under 
S.22 of the Limitation Act, 1939 (UK) as amended by S.(2) of the 
Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act 1954. By the latter 
provisions, defendants were protected after a three year period 
'unless the plaintiff proves that the person under the disability 
was not, at the time when the right of action, accrued to him, in 
the custody of a parent." As the plaintiff in this case succeeded 
in proving that the parents either had not got nor exercised 
powers of both care and physical control at the material time, 
the period of limitation did not begin to run. So in practically 
all cases involving injured infants, the limitation period will 
be three years from the date of the accident, unless the 
plaintiff could prove that though he was in the custody of a 
parent, the parent did not exercise powers of care and physical 
control over him at the material time. 
The cases where extensions can be granted under the Tasmanian Act 
are rather restrictive and limited compared to the other 
Australian States like Victoria and New South Wales as well as 
provisions in the United Kingdom. 
Whilst in Tasmania an infant who is in the custody of a parent 
is not able to get extension of time in respect of personal 
injury claims, the Victorian Courts have interpreted the word 
"knowledge" in their extension provision of their limitation Act 
as that of the claimant and not of his parent, agent or any other 
person. 
For comparative purposes, I have included here a discussion of 
the relevant legislation and case law both in Victoria and in the 
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United Kingdom. 
In Victoria, Section 23A44 of the Limitation of Actions Act, 1958 
gives the court a discretion to vary the stipulated limitation 
period of three years, in circumstances which, broadly speaking, 
depend on the knowledge of the injured person as to various 
aspects of his accident and injuries. The injured party is given 
an opportunity to apply for an extension of the period of 
limitation. To succeed, the injured party must show that he did 
not know certain "material facts" relating to his cause of action 
and would not have known them had he taken all reasonable steps 
to ascertain them. 
S.23A (3) spells out what the material facts include in relation 
to a cause of action. They are:- 
a 	the fact of the occurrence of negligence, nuisance or 
breach of duty on which the cause of action is 
founded; 
• the nature of the wrongful act, neglect or default 
that constituted the negligence, nuisance or breach of 
duty; 
the identity of the person whose wrongful act, neglect 
or default constituted the negligence, nuisance or 
breach of duty; 
the identity of the person against whom the cause of 
action lies; 
the fact that the negligence, nuisance or breach of 
duty caused personal injury; 
• the nature of the personal injury so caused; 
• the extent of the personal injury so caused; and 
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the extent to which the personal injury was caused by 
the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty. 
In addition he must show that the material facts were not known 
to him until at least two years after the cause of action arose 
and that he has since known of it no longer than 12 months prior 
to the application. 
A number of cases have arisen concerning the interpretation of 
various words in S.23A. Firstly, Smith v Browne & 0rs 45 involved 
a infant who was 5 years old when he received treatment for an 
eye complaint. Although the event occurred in 1967, the 
application for extension was made only in 1974. The respondents 
argued that "claimant" in S.23A of the Act meant "claimant, his 
servants or agents or parents". The claimant's parents having had 
knowledge of the material fact for over 12 months, it was argued 
that this knowledge ought to be attributed to the claimant. Kaye 
J. rejected this argument and said that the references to 
'knowledge' in Section 23A relate to the claimant and to no other 
person". 
Again in Anasiena v H Crane Haulage Pty Ltd 47 it was held that 
knowledge of the claimant's solicitor would not be attributed to 
the claimant as his own knowledge. 
The Full Court in Guest v Ingram 48 confirmed the principle that 
though an infant is in the custody of his parents and the parents 
have knowledge of all the material facts of the claim to succeed 
in an application under S,23A what is important is the personal 
knowledge of the claimant himself. The court also held that all 
the claimant need show is that he was ignorant of the material 
facts for at least two years after the date upon which the cause 
of action arose and that he could continue to be ignorant even 
up to the time of the application. Counsel opposing the 
application argued that at the time of the application, the 
claimant must have knowledge of the material facts in question. 
The decision of the court, it is submitted, is correct as an 
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infant who suffers from a brain damage may never know the 
material facts indefinitely. 
Guest v Ingram was applied in Kosky v The Trustees of the Sisters  
of Charity° where the Supreme Court in Victoria held that the 
primary fact which the applicant must establish in any claim 
against the hospital was that she received a blood transfusion 
in 1967. This fact was unknown to her until 6 July 1979. The 
facts known to her prior to that time were not sufficient to give 
her a cause of action for negligence or breach of duty. She had 
not failed before 6 July 1979 to take any reasonable steps to 
ascertain that act. The applicant's application was therefore 
made within the time stipulated by S.23A(2).. 
In all the circumstances the discretion should be exercised to 
extend the period within which the applicant could bring her 
action. The court also held that a claimant under S.23A need not 
establish that his claimed cause of action could be established 
at a trial. In the present case, there was evidence upon which 
it could be established at a trial that, as a matter of law, a 
duty of care was owed by the respondent to the infant. The 
question whether a duty of care existed in the circumstances 
alleged should not be determined on an application under S.23A. 
For the purpose of S.23A facts which are 'material' for claiming 
an extension of time include 'the nature of the personal injury 
so caused", and 'the extent of the personal injury so caused'". 
In Kosky v The Trustees of the Sisters of Charity the plaintiff 
was unaware of these facts till 6 July 1979 and thus an extension 
was granted to her. 
In McManamny v Hadley52 the respondent, a doctor had performed an 
operation negligently on one of the claimant's toes. About two 
and a half years after the operation the claimant had to undergo 
further surgery which was performed by another doctor. This 
resulted in partial amputation of the affected toe and other 
related disabilities to the other toes. Medical evidence showed 
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that the second operation was necessary because of the 
inefficient way in which the first operation was carried out. 
It was not until the second operation was done that the claimant 
became aware of the extent to the disability arising out of the 
first operation. The knowledge first came to the claimant's 
attention more than two years after the date the cause of action 
arose, and less than one year before making the application for 
an extension of the limitation period. The Full Court accordingly 
granted the application. 
In Hevey v Leonard53 the claimant was involved in a car accident 
in 1970. He knew that he suffered neck injuries in 1973 for the 
first time when he was informed by his doctor that injuries to 
his neck were caused by the collision in 1970, but did not know 
the full nature and extent of his injuries until 1975 when he 
consulted another doctor who advised him that his work as a 
driver of a motor vehicle, aggravated the condition of his neck. 
The earlier doctor had advised him that he could continue with 
his work. The Full Court dismissed his application. "Injury" in 
paragraphs (f) and (g) of S.23A of the Limitation of Action Act 
1958 means physical injury and not the signs and symptoms 
thereof; pain and suffering do not constitute the injury but are 
merely evidence of it. They also held that 'injury within the 
said paragraphs (f) and (g) does not comprehend effects on the 
working capacity of the injured person; such effects are 
consequences of the injury but are in themselves neither 'the 
nature of the personal injury'; nor 'the extent of the personal 
injury'. The nature and extent of an injury, the court said, do 
not depend upon the possible varying prognoses of medical 
practitioners whom the applicant may consult. Any such prognosis 
is no more than an expression of opinion as to what the effects 
of the injury will be in the future, but such an opinion does not 
reveal to the applicant knowledge of the nature or the extent of 
injury. 
The one feature that distinguishes McManamny's from this case is 
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the fact that in McManamny's case the extent of his injury could 
be measured in physical terms as from one affected toe it spread 
on to the other toes. 
For the purposes of an application under S.23A of the Limitation  
of Actions Act 1958, ignorance of legal rights or legal 
principles or the legal quality of acts or omissions is not 
ignorance of a 'material fact' within the ordinary meaning of 
that expression as used in S.23A(3). Harris v Gas & Fuel  
Corporation of Victoria 54 was a case where the claimant suffered 
injuries in 1968 when a gas stove exploded. However, she did not 
seek legal advice until she read of a similar case reported in 
the papers in 1972, where the claimant succeeded. She applied for 
extension of the limitation period on the basis that she first 
knew the material facts of her cause of action when she consulted 
her solicitor. The court in reaching the above decision over-
ruled an earlier decision of Gowans J. in Evans v Repco  
Transmission Co. Pty Ltd55 where it was held that ignorance on 
the part of the claimant that his employer had a duty to warn him 
of the danger of exposure to high level noise and to supply him 
with ear muffs was a material fact for the purpose of S.23A 
application. The Full Court in disagreeing with Evans case said 
that the ignorance in this case was ignorance of a legal duty and 
not a fact. 
It is submitted that because S.23A(3) (a) 56 is drafted in very 
wide terms, it could be argued that the facts of Harris' case 
could amount to absence of knowledge of material facts and as 
such that the claimant's application for an amendment should be 
granted. The claimant did not know of the fact of the occurrence 
of negligence until she read in the papers that on similar facts, 
a court had held that it amounted to negligence and awarded 
damages. It was only on reading the papers that she first 
realised that the Gas & Fuel Corporation that installed the stove 
which exploded and injured her, were negligent. However, there 
are two limbs to S.23A(2)(a) 57 and both have to be read 
conjunctively. So although Mrs Harris might well be able to 
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- satisfy the first limb, she would not be able to satisfy the 
second limb, as, if she had taken reasonable steps, such as 
consulting a solicitor earlier, she would have found out that she 
had a good cause of action. A claimant has to satisfy the court 
that the material facts of which he was ignorant would not have 
been known to him even if he had taken reasonable steps to 
ascertain the material facts apart from consulting his solicitor. 
Starke J. in his judgment held that putting the matter in the 
hands of his solicitor was both reasonable and proper. 
The effect of S.23A as interpreted by the various cases that have 
come before the courts on this section seem to indicate the trend 
towards expanding the limitation period. All the claimants that 
have come before the courts on this section have succeeded in 
obtaining an extension, with the exception of Harris' case where 
the claimant's knowledge was classified as ignorance of law. From 
an examination of the above cases it is very clear that the 
knowledge of material fact cannot be attributed to the parent, 
agent or solicitor of the applicant. Under S.23A it has to be the 
personal knowledge of the applicant, which alone is material. 
This, it is submitted, should be the proper means of ascertaining 
knowledge for purposes of extension, as any other interpretation 
could leave the unfortunate claimant with no remedy at all, if 
the claimant's parent or agent had failed to institute 
proceedings within the stipulated time period. 
It is submitted, that a similar provision to S.23A should be 
incorporated into the Tasmanian Limitation Act, as the present 
provision limits any extension of the limitation period to a 
maximum of 3 years and furthermore an infant in the custody of 
a parent is denied any extension at all. Alternatively, the time 
provided for extension of up to 3 years should be amended to 
grant the courts some form of discretion to extend time in 
suitable cases where it is equitable to do so and no prejudice 
is suffered by any party. 
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5.3.3 The Position in the United Kingdom 
Having examined the extension provision in Victoria, I will now 
proceed to examine the extension provisions in the Uni=ed 
Kingdom. 
The position as far as the United Kingdom is concerned is 
governed by S.2 of the Limitation Act 1975 (UK) 58 . Although three 
years is the normal limitation period S.2D gives the court a 
discretion to extend the period in any case in which it is 
equitable to do so and if there is no prejudice to any party. 
In Fireman v Ellis 59 the Court of Appeal had to consider a claim 
for extension of time, where the plaintiff's solicitor had failed 
in his duty of not having the writ served in time. In granting 
the application Lord Denning saw the discretion conferred by the 
Limitation Act 1975 (UK) as a 'revolutionary step'. 
He said, 
"section 2D as I read it gives a wide discretion to the 
court which is .not limited to a 'residual class of case' at 
all. It is not limited to 'exceptional cases'. It gives the 
court a discretion to extend the time in all cases where 
the three year limitation has expired before the issue of 
the writ. It retains three years as the normal period of 
limitation (being three years from the date on which the 
cause of action accrued, or the date, if later, of the 
plaintiff's knowledge of the facts) but it confers on the 
court an unfettered discretion to extend the three year 
period in any case in which it considers it equitable to do 
so. The granting of this discretion is a revolutionary 
step. It alters our whole approach to time bars. I do not 
regard it as a retrograde step." 
Ormrod L. J., referring to section 2D said, 
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"The language of the section, in my judgment, is quite 
clear. Having laid down the norm, it then gives the court 
the widest discretion to adapt this norm to the 
circumstances of any case in which it would work 
inequitably. This is, in fact, a statutory analogy of the 
old tradition by which equity was called in to mitigate the 
rigidity of the common law in the interests of individual 
justice   In my judgment, therefore, the act should be 
applied as it stands, and we should be careful not to 
impose judicial fetters on this new and, to my mind, 
valuable discretionary power." 
In Walkley v Precision Forgings Ltd6° the plaintiff had issued 
and served his writ within the primary limitation period. No 
further steps were taken in the action within the primary 
limitation period and it was ripe to be dismissed for want of 
prosecution. In order to avoid this, the plaintiff's new 
solicitors issued a second writ on the same cause of action. An 
application was then made under S.2D to allow the action started 
by the second writ to proceed. The House of Lords were of the 
opinion that the plaintiff having brought his action for damages 
within the primary limitation period, for the very negligence 
which constituted the cause of action in the second writ, was not 
affected or prejudiced by S.2A61 . 
In Thompson v Brown Construction (Ebbw Vale) Ltd and Others 62 , 
the appellant was injured when scaffolding on which he was 
working collapsed, the accident was caused entirely by the 
negligence of the firm of scaf folders which erected the 
scaffolding. The appellant instructed solicitors with a view to 
claiming damages against the scaffolders but the solicitors 
negligently allowed the three year limitation period prescribed 
by S.2A (4) of the Limitation Act, 1939 to expire before issuing 
the writ. When the writ was finally issued, the scaffolders 
pleaded by way of defence that the action was out of time. Lord 
Diplock in allowing the appeal and confirming the unfettered 
discretion of the court under S.2D said, 
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"My Lords, when the court makes a discretion under S.2D 
that the provisions of S.2A should not apply to a cause of 
action, it is making an exception to a general rule that 
has already catered for delay in starting proceedings that 
is due to excusable ignorance of material facts by the 
plaintiff as distinct from his lack of knowledge that the 
facts which he does know may give him a good cause of 
action in law. The onus of showing that in the particular 
circumstances of the case it would be equitable to make an 
exception lies on the plaintiff; but subject to that, the 
court's discretion to make or refuse an order if it 
considers it equitable to do so is, in my view, unfettered. 
The conduct of the parties as well as the prejudice one or 
other will suffer if the court does or does not make an 
order are all to be put into the balance in order to see 
which way it falls." 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
Although the disability provisions under the Tasmanian Act prima  
facie appear reasonable, there could be some instances where 
injustice could be caused to persons under disability who are 
under the custody of a parent, in relation to an action for 
damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty. 
The Act virtually says that a person in this situation will not 
have the benefit of the extension provisionsm provided in the 
Act for persons under disability, so that after 3.years his 
action will be statute-barred unless an extension is granted 
under S.5(3) which discretion of course is limited to a period 
of 6 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. 
This could give rise to claims being barred in cases where the 
plaintiff does not realise he has a good cause of action till 
after the 6 year period has run. 
The United Kingdom has overcome this problem by granting an 
unfettered discretion to the court to extend the time period 
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beyond the normal 3 year period and this could be one of the 
alternatives the Tasmanian Act could incorporate. Although a 
discretionary power is desirable, the discretion should be 
qualified and not an unfettered discretion which could lead to 
cases of extension being granted where the plaintiff could have 
a cause of action against another person such as his solicitor, 
who is at fault. 
Whilst the Tasmanian Act has restricted the application of the 
extension provisions for disability to persons under the custody 
of a parent the courts in Victoria have on the other hand given 
a liberal interpretation to the word "knowledge" as that of the 
claimant and not of his servant, agent or parent. 
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under a statute or independently or any contract or any 
such provision) the damages claimed by the claimant consist 
or include damages in respect of personal injuries to any 
person and it appears to the court that - (a) any of the 
material facts relating to the cause of action - 
(i) was not known to the claimant; and 
(ii) would not have been known to the claimant if he had 
taken all reasonable steps in the circumstances of the 
case to ascertain all the material facts. 
58. This section was inserted by the Limitation Act 1975 S.1 
59. 	(1978) QB 886 
60. (1979) 2 ALL E R 548 
61. The provision of S. 2A are those which require an action 
for personal injuries brought within three years. 
(1) if it appears to the court that it would be equitable 
to allow an action to proceed having regard to the 
degree which - 
(a) the provisions of Section 2A or 2B of this Act 
prejudice the plaintiff or any person whom he 
represents, and 
(b) any decision of the court under this subsection 
would prejudice the defendant or any person whom 
he represents, the court may direct that those 
provisions shall not apply to the action, or 
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shall not apply to any specified cause of action 
to which the action relates. 
(2) in acting under this section the court shall have 
regard to all the circumstances of the case and in 
particular to 
(a) the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on 
the part of the plaintiff. 
(b) the extent to which, having regard to the delay, 
the evidence adduced or likely to be adduced by 
the plaintiff or the defendant is or is likely to 
be less cogent than if the action had been 
brought within the time allowed by section 2A or 
as the case may be under section 213. 
(c) the conduct of the defendant after the cause of 
action arose including the extent if any to which 
he responded to requests reasonably made by the 
* plaintiff for information or inspection for the 
purpose of ascertaining facts which were or might 
be relevant to the plaintiff's cause of action 
against the defendant. 
(d) the duration of any disability of the plaintiff 
arising after the date of the accrual of the 
cause of action. 
(e) the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly 
and reasonably once he knew whether or not the 
act or omission of the defendant, to which the 
injury was attributable, might be capable at that 
time of giving rise to an action for damages. 
(f) the steps, if any, taken by the plaintiff to 
obtain medical, legal or other expert advice and 
the nature of any such advice he may have 
received. 
62. (1981) 2 ALL E R 296 
63. Limitation Act, 1974, s.26. 
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CHAPTER 6. POSTPONEMENT OF TIME 
Generally, when the time stipulated for bringing an action 
expires, the claim is said to be statute-barred, and the 
defendant has a good defence under the Limitation Act. However, 
the Limitation Act recognises certain acts of the defendant as 
postponing the running of time. In cases where a party has made 
an acknowledgment, that is where he admits owing a debt, or made 
a part-payment by making a payment to account of the claim and 
in cases of fraud or mistake the Limitation Act postpones the 
running of time stipulated in the Act. 
In certain cases, at the expiration of the stipulated period, the 
claimant's remedy is barred but in other cases such as landed 
property, effluxion of time could lead to the barring of the 
right. The early English Limitation Act, 1623 did not contain any 
provisions for acknowledgment. The courts, nevertheless, 
recognised that acknowledgment should have some effect on a 
statute-barred debt. 
In the absence of Tasmanian case law, this chapter will discuss 
the early English cases on acknowledgment before looking at the 
acknowledgment provisions under the Tasmanian Act, which deal 
with money claims and the following, 
(i) actions to recover land 
(ii) foreclosures and 
(iii) redemption 
This chapter will also discuss the doctrine of fraud and mistake, 
and examine the effect of both these doctrines on the running of 
time. 
6.1 ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND PART-PAYMENT 
Where a debtor, in writing admits owing a creditor a liquidated 
sum of money, he is said to have acknowledged the debt as in 
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Cohen v Cohen l where the defendant against whom the plaintiff 
obtained a total sum of thousand pounds upon various causes of 
action, some well founded and some not, gave the plaintiff a 
document in these words; "In case of my becoming bankrupt and 
death I owe your one thousand pounds for money lent"; In law none 
of the causes of action were money lent, although a layman might 
have so described them. The court held that there was absolute 
acknowledgment sufficient to take the cause of action out of the 
statute of Limitation. 
Similarly, if he makes any payment to account of the debt, he is 
said to have made a part-payment. 
The effect of an acknowledgment or part-payment in respect of an 
existing liability is to postpone the time for the commencement 
of the Limitation Act and allow time to run afresh. Where a party 
has made an acknowledgment or part-payment, a fresh period of 
limitation commences to run from the time of the acknowledgment 
or part-payment and this new time period will be of the same 
duration as the original period stipulated in the Act for that 
cause of action. 
So where A has 6 years from January 1981 to bring an action 
against B and B either acknowledges A's claim or makes a part-
payment to A in January 1985, time will commence to run afresh 
from January 1985. In other words, A will have 6 years to 
institute proceedings against B from January 1985, and not from 
January 1981 when his cause of action against B first arose. As 
Lawton J., observed in Busch v Stevens 2 this provision 
"provides that in the specific circumstances of an 
acknowledgment or payment the right shall be given a 
notional birthday and on that day, like the phoenix of 
fable, it rises again in renewed youth - and also like the 
phoenix, it is still itself." 
The provision relating to acknowledgment and part-payment would 
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be applicable to the following actions; 
(i) actions to recover land or personal property3 , 
(ii) foreclosure or other action in respect of real or 
personal property4 , 
(iii) actions to redeem land of which the mortgagee is, by 
virtue of the mortgage in possession 5 , 
(iv) actions for debt or other liquidated pecuniary claims 6 , 
and 
(v) claims to the personal estate of a deceased person or 
to any share or interest therein 7 . 
However, it must be noted that an acknowledgment made or part-
payment given after the expiry of the stipulated period would be 
ineffective, where the effluxion of time has barred the right of 
the plaintiff8 . In other words, if by the effluxion of time the 
defendant obtains title to land, then any subsequent 
acknowledgment by him or part-payment made by him will not affect 
his position nor will it give the plaintiff a cause of action 
against the defendant. But an acknowledgment or part-payment made 
or given in cases where the effluxion of time has merely barred 
the plaintiff's remedy will entitle him to institute proceedings 
against the defendant, as the effect of that acknowledgment or 
part-payment by the defendant is to start time running from the 
date of the acknowledgment or part-payment. 
Like an individual, a company can also acknowledge a debt as was 
the decision in In re Coliseum (Barrow) Ltd9 where it was held 
that where money was owing to a shareholder, the issue to him of 
annual accounts showing the outstanding liabilities, including 
the liability to the shareholder, will keep the debt alive so 
long as the accounts continue to be issued and supplied to the 
creditor. However, the accounts will not act as acknowledgments . 
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in favour of any signatory of the accounts and also the person 
signing the document which would otherwise be an acknowledgment 
must be an authorised agent of, the company". Although there is 
no difficulty in accepting that a debt to a shareholder whose 
name and amount of the debt is reflected in the company accounts, 
amounts to an acknowledgment, it is difficult to accept the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Jones v Bellgrove Properties  
Ltd". In this case it was held that a statement in the balance 
sheet "Sundry Creditors - £7,638 8s, 10d" was an acknowledgment 
in writing of a debt of £1,807 claimed by the plaintiff. As the 
term 'sundry creditors' is a general term referring to all 
• creditors and as no specific mention was made to the plaintiff, 
it is submitted that there could be no acknowledgment of the 
plaintiff's debt. 
Although acknowledgment and part-payment have different effects 
depending on whether effluxion of time has barred the right or 
the remedy, it is possible that both effects could occur in 
respect of the same matter. If, for example, a mortgagor stays 
in possession of the mortgaged property for twelve years without 
paying any interest to the mortgagee, the mortgagee is precluded 
from bringing any action to redeem the land. The Act states, 
'When a mortgagee of land has been in possession of any mortgaged 
land for a period of 12 years, no action to redeem the land of 
which the mortgagee has been so in possession shall thereafter 
be brought by the mortgagor or any person claiming through 
him' 12 
At the same time the title of the mortgagee is extinguished in 
this case as 'at the expiration of the period prescribed by this 
Act for any person to bring an action to recover land (including 
a redemption action or an action to compel discharge of a 
mortgage) the title of that person to the land shall be 
extinguished13 . 
In other words, where time has run out, the mortgagee's remedy 
against the land by way of foreclosure can never be revived by 
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an acknowledgment or part-payment made by the mortgagor, although 
it could revive the mortgagee's personal remedy against the 
mortgagor. 
6.1.1 Early English Position 
In tracing the history of acknowledgment, it must be noted that 
the earliest of the English Limitation Act namely the Limitation 
Act, 1623 did not contain any provision regarding acknowledgment. 
Although the 1623 Act, did not contain any provision for 
acknowledgment, the courts were prepared to recognise that 
acknowledgment should have some effect on a statute barred debt. 
As Viscount Cave said in Spenser v Hemmerde 14 after observing 
that the 1623 Act made no reference to any acknowledgment, 
.... but it was held in a series of cases that a promise 
by the debtor to pay the debt, if given within six years 
before action brought, was sufficient to create a new 
contract and so to take the case out of the operation of 
the statute, the existing debt being a sufficient 
consideration to support the promise. It was also held that 
a simple acknowledgment of the debt, without any express 
promise, was sufficient for the purpose, an acknowledgment 
implying a promise to pay." 
However, in Tanner v Smart 15 it was held that an acknowledgment 
did not revive the debt unless it contained within itself, 
expressly or by implication, a fresh promise to pay. There will 
be a fresh promise to pay if the person making the acknowledgment 
renews and affirms without condition or qualification his 
obligation to pay. Even if the acknowledgment shows that the debt 
has never been paid it is immaterial, unless it contains a fresh 
promise to pay. 
Wigran V-C, in Philips v Philips 16 stated, 
"The legal effect of an acknowledgment of a debt barred by 
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the Statute of Limitations is that of a promise to pay the 
old debt, and for this purpose the old debt is a 
consideration in law. In that sense, and for that purpose, 
the old debt may be said to be revived, it is revived as a 
consideration for new promises. But the new promise, and 
not the old debt, is the measure of the creditor's right. 
If a debtor simply acknowledges an old debt, the law 
implies from that simple acknowledgment a promise to pay 
it, for which promise the old debt when he is able, or by 
instalments or in two years, or out of a particular fund, 
the creditor can claim nothing more than the promise gives 
him." 
The kind of acknowledgment needed has been described by Mellish, 
L. J., in The River Steamer Company" thus; 
"There must be one of three things to take the case out of 
the Statute. Either there must be an acknowledgment of the 
debt from which a promise to pay is implied; or, secondly, 
there must be an unconditional promise to pay the debt; or, 
thirdly, there must be a conditional promise to pay the 
debt, and evidence that the condition has been performed." 
So the position under the early English cases was that there 
should be an unconditional acknowledgment of the debt and an 
implied promise to pay the same or an unconditional promise where 
the condition has been performed before the person who makes the 
acknowledgment could be held liable18 . 
In the event that the person making the acknowledgment proposes 
payment of a specified sum, then the liability of that person 
would be limited to the extent of the sum specified. So in 
Hepburn v McDonnell w the plaintiff, by his solicitor, wrote to 
the Defendant a letter stating that the Defendant had made no 
attempt to reduce her indebtedness, that the plaintiff required 
payment of the money and interest, and that any reasonable 
proposal put forward by the defendant would be considered. In 
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reply the defendant wrote to the plaintiff: 
"I was indeed more than surprised to receive a letter 
through your solicitor re my indebtedness to you. Well, in 
the first place I always knew, and had intended to pay you 
a certain sum, which I knew was indebted... I am offering 
you 26s. per year until the war is over, and then when my 
daughter is of age we can sell some land, which I shall 
advise them to give you a portion... At any rate this is 
the best offer I can offer at present - what the future 
brings forth rests in God's hands.. I trust you will see 
your way clear to answer this at once, and trust my word to 
do what I say I will." 
In an action brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, the 
sum, including the sum specified in his letter to the defendant, 
the defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations (UK), and the 
plaintiff relied on the defendants' letter as being an 
acknowledgment in writing of the debt sued upon. The court held 
that the defendants' letter contained an unconditional 
acknowledgment of the debt to the extent of the sum specified in 
the plaintiffs' letter, and that there was nothing in the 
defendants' letter to contradict the implied promise to pay 
arising from that acknowledgment, and therefore that there was 
a sufficient acknowledgment within Lord Tenterden's Act 2° of the 
plaintiffs claim to the extent of the specified sum. 
In stating the general principles as to acknowledgments and 
promises to pay, Dixon, J. in Bucknell v Commercial Banking Co 
of Sydney Lte said, 
"An express promise in writing by the debtor to pay revives 
his liability. But the liability is revived only according 
to the tenor of the promise. It is so expressed as to be 
conditional or subject to limitations, the condition must 
be fulfilled before liability becomes enforceable and the 
limitations must be observed. But, although a document 
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relied upon as an acknowledgment contains no express 
promise, it may effect a revival of the debtor's liability 
if there is found in it a distinct admission of the debt. 
The law implies from an acknowledgment of the existence of 
the liability, a promise to discharge it. Words clearly 
acknowledging that the writer is liable to pay suffice to 
raise the implication. But although the promise is implied 
as an artificial legal consequence of the written admission 
of liability and is not the result of a search after the 
true meaning disclosed in the writing, yet if the document 
in which the admission occurs expresses an intention 
inconsistent with the making of such a promise or an 
intention consistent with the making of such a promise or 
an intention consistent only with the making of a qualified 
promise, the implication will be rebutted or qualified 
accordingly. Thus, if the context includes a flat refusal 
to pay, the admission of liability cannot be made the 
foundation of an implied promise to discharge the debt." 
So, although generally from an acknowledgment, there would be an 
implication to pay, if the document containing the admission 
expresses a contrary intention or if it contains only a qualified 
promise, the courts will give effect to such intention or 
qualified promise as contained in the document. 
6.1.2 The Tasmanian Position 
Acknowledgment and Part Payment are dealt with under Division II 
of Part III of the Tasmanian Act 22 . 
Under the Limitation Act, 1974 both simple debts as well as 
speciality debts are treated in the same way in that where any 
right of action has accrued to recover either a simple debt or 
a speciality debt, and there has been either an acknowledgment 
of part-payment by the debtor, the right is to be treated as 
having accrued on and not before the date of acknowledgment or 
part-payment. This would mean that the period of limitation could 
220 
be indefinitely extended by part-payment or acknowledgment as 
each time there is an acknowledgment or a part-payment time would 
accrue from the date of acknowledgment or the last payment. 
Acknowledgment and part-payment may in all cases be made by the 
agent of the person required to make them, and to the agent of 
the person required to receive them. 
However, where an acknowledgment or payment made by an agent is 
relied on it must be one which he has authority to make. 
The agent may have been expressly appointed or his agency may be 
inferred. The authority of the agent to acknowledge or make 
payment must be continuing. So that although payment or 
acknowledgment by an agent has the same effect as payment or 
acknowledgment by the principal, it is a question of fact whether 
the person making the payment or acknowledgment was an agent for 
that purpose. 
The effect of acknowledgment and part-payment on all debts, 
whether by simple contract or speciality, and claims to shares 
in the personal estate of deceased persons is that it runs from 
the accrual of the right to receive the same 25 . 
However, it runs in respect of simple contract debts time runs 
from the accrual of the cause of action. 
In Section 29(4) the expression "right of action" is used and 
that expression is given a wide definition by s.2(8) to cover 
both classes of cases. 
To be effective, an acknowledgment or part-payment must be made 
by "the person liable or accountable thereof", or his agent. This 
means primarily the principal debtor, or, in the case of a claim 
to share in the personal estate of a deceased person, the 
personal representative. 
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Since there is no case law in Tasmania, English cases will be 
examined and as the wording in the English and the Tasmanian Acts 
are similar, the English decisions would be applicable in 
Tasmania. 
(i) Acknowledgment 
Where any right of action, including a foreclosure action, to 
recover land has accrued, or any right of a mortgagee of personal 
property to bring a foreclosure action in respect of the property 
has accrued, and the person in possession of the land or personal 
property acknowledged title of the Crown to whom the right of 
action has accrued, the right is deemed to have accrued on and 
not before the date of the acknowledgment 26 . 
This provision applies to a right of action to recover land 
accrued to a person who is entitled to an estate or interest 
taking effect on the determination of an entailed interest and 
against whom time is running under the limitation provisions 
relating to defective disentailing assurances, and on the making 
of the acknowledgment that provisions ceases to apply to land 27 . 
An acknowledgment made to a mortgagor after he had been made a 
bankrupt is ineffective as the equity of redemption is then 
vested in his assignee and the bankrupt is not the assignee's 
agent. This was the decision in Markwick v Hardingham 28 . 
In order to amount to an acknowledgment of the claim, a statement 
made by the debtor must admit his indebtedness and his legal 
liability to pay. If he denies the liability in some way, as for 
instance by pleading a set-off or counter-claim, the statement 
is not an acknowledgment and time does not begin to run afresh. 
Also, an acknowledgment can only start time running afresh, if 
it amounts to an admission by the debtor that the debt remains 
due. So in a case where, the debtor denies liability, time does 
not run afresh. This was the decision of Kerr J. in Surrendra 
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Overseas Ltd v Government of Sri Lanka 29 where he held that a 
debtor could only be taken to have 'acknowledged the claim', if 
he had, in effect, admitted his legal liability to pay that which 
the creditor was seeking to recover, and that if the debtor 
denied liability, whether on the ground of an alleged set-off or 
cross-claim, then his statement did not amount to an 
acknowledgment of the creditor's claim. 
Alternatively, if he contended that some existing set-off or 
cross-claim reduced the creditors' claim in part, then the 
statement, taken as a whole, could only amount to an 
acknowledgment of indebtedness.for the balance. In order to be 
a valid acknowledgment, the Act stipulates that every 
acknowledgment must be in writing and signed by the person making 
the acknowledgment30 or his agent31 . 
However as Parke B., observed in Bodger v Arch 32 , writing is, 
however, only necessary to an acknowledgment by words, not where 
it is "coupled with a fact". Normally the "fact" is payment of 
money, but it may be a payment in money's worth. Thus in Bodger's  
case, the parties agreed that the maintenance of the creditors' 
child which the parties agreed shall be treated as equivalent to 
a payment in money. Not only should the acknowledgment be in 
writing and signed, it must also be made to the person, or to an 
agent of the person, whose title or claim is being acknowledged. 
A person is not an agent for the purpose of making an 
acknowledgment or part-payment unless he is duly authorised to 
make it. The court held in Newbould v Smith 33 that payments of 
interest to the mortgagee by the mortgagor's solicitor, after the 
solicitor had ceased to act for the mortgagor was ineffective. 
Although an acknowledgment has to be in writing and signed by the 
maker or his agent, no particular format is required. 
The present position since 1939 is aptly summarised by Harman J., 
in Wright v Pepin34 where he said, 
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"All that is necessary, as it seems to me, for an 
acknowledgment which takes the case out of the statute is 
that the debtor should recognise the existence of the debt, 
or that the person who might rely on the statute should 
recognise the rights against himself." 
Once there is an acknowledgment, it would be an effective 
acknowledgment even though the debtor says he would not pay the 
debt. Lord Denning, M.R. in Good v Parry 35 said, 
"Nowadays, as the result of this new Act, there is no 
necessity to look for a promise express or implied. There 
need only be an acknowledgment of a debt, or other 
liquidated amount. That means, I think, that there must be 
an admission that there is a debt or other liquidated 
amount outstanding and unpaid. Even though the debtor says 
in the same writing that he will never pay it, nevertheless 
it is a good acknowledgment." 
Kerr J. in Surrendra Overseas Ltd v Government of Sri Lanka 36 
made the following observation: 
"Section 23(4) of the 1939 Act omits the words 'or promise' 
and it is now clear and common ground that an implied 
promise to pay is no longer required." 
It would appear that an acknowledgment would be valid though it 
did not specify the amount of the debt, provided extraneous 
evidence could be adduced as to the amount without the parties' 
further agreement. 
Diplock, L.J. in Dungate v Dungate 37 said, 
"There is a clear authority that an acknowledgment under 
the Limitation Act, 1939 need not identify the amount of 
the debt and may acknowledge a general indebtedness, 
provided that the amount of the debt can be ascertained by 
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extraneous evidence." 
There cannot however be an acknowledgment of an unliquidated 
claim. Lord Denning, M.R. in Good v Parry 38 said, 
"A person may acknowledge that a claim has been made 
against him without acknowledging any indebtedness. It is 
clear that what the Limitation Act, 1939, means is 
'acknowledges the debt or other liquidated pecuniary 
amount' .... In order to be an acknowledgment, however, the 
debt must be quantified in figures or, at all events, it 
must be liquidated in this sense that it is capable of 
ascertainment by calculation, or by extrinsic evidence, 
without further agreement of the parties." 
Sections 31(5) and (6) prescribe the effect of an acknowledgment. 
An acknowledgment of a money claim binds only the "acknowledger 
and his successor". The word "successors" is however widely 
defined in s31 (10) and means in this connection "personal 
representatives and any other person on whom.... the liability 
in respect of the debt or other claims devolve(s), whether on 
death or bankruptcy or the disposition of property or the 
determination of a limited estate or interest in settled property 
or otherwise." 
Therefore an acknowledgment by a debtor will not bind a co-debtor 
or a surety for the debt but will bind his personal 
representatives and his trustee in a subsequent bankruptcy. 
However, in the case of a part-payment made in respect of a money 
claim. "all persons liable in respect thereof" are bound39 . 
(ii) Part-Payment 
The effect of a part-payment is similar to an acknowledgment in 
that time runs afresh from the date of part-payment. The effect 
of part-payment are dealt with in s. 31 (7) & (8) of the 
Limitation Act, 1974. 
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In the case of a foreclosure or other action by a mortgagee, if 
the person in possession of the mortgaged property or the person 
liable for the mortgage debt makes any payment in respect of it, 
be it principal or interest, the right of action is deemed to 
have accrued on and not before the date of payment". 
Similarly, in redemption actions, where a mortgagee is in 
possession of the mortgaged land and either receives any sum in 
respect of the principal or interest of the mortgaged debt, an 
action to redeem the land in his possession may be brought at any 
time before the expiration of twelve years from the date of the 
payment° . 
Where an action is brought to recover debts and legacies the same 
principle applies and therefore where the person liable or 
accountable makes any payment in respect of the debt or legacy, 
the right is deemed to have accrued on and not before the date 
of the last payment42 . 
However, payment of part of the rent or interest due at any time 
does not extend the period of claiming the remainder then due, 
but any payment of interest is treated as a payment in respect 
of the principal debt43 . In  re Wilson", there was an agreement 
that the creditor should live rent free at the debtor's farm and 
be provided with farm produce. On this principle, it is quite 
possible to have part-payment without actual passing of money. 
Thus in Maber v Maber 45 a father after calculating the interest 
due to him from his son, stopped the son as he was putting his 
hand into his pocket and wrote a receipt which he gave to the 
son's wife, saying he made her a present out of the interest. It 
was held that any facts which would prove a plea of payment of 
interest in an action brought to recover it would be a payment 
sufficient to stop time running. Similarly, in Amos v Smith" 
there was held to be a sufficient payment where a wife gave a 
receipt for interest to trustees to prevent them making a claim 
on her husband to whom they had lent the fund. 
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As in cases of acknowledgment, for purposes of part-payment, a 
person is not an agent unless he is duly authorised to make part-
payment. 
The remaining provisions dealing with acknowledgments in the 
Limitation Act will be discussed under the following headings 47 : 
(1) Actions to recover land. 
(2) Foreclosures, and 
(3) Redemption 
(iii) Actions to Recover Land 
A person to whom a right of action has actually or notionally 
accrued under ss 10-15, will not be barred after the ordinary 
period, if an acknowledgment of his title has been made to him 
or his agent. Acknowledgment is a statement or statements from 
which an admission of the true owner's title can be implied. Thus 
in Fursdon v Clo sg48,  where the occupier, in answer to a demand 
for rent, asked for an allowance to be made from it for the cost 
of litigation he had been involved, it was held that an admission 
that rent was due was a good acknowledgment of the landlord's 
title. Again in Dublin Corporation v Judge an application for 
a lease made by the occupier to the true owner has been held to 
be an acknowledgment. But in Doe d Curszon v Edmonds 50 where the 
occupier wrote: 
"Although, if matters were contested, I am of the opinion 
that I should establish a legal right to the premises in 
question, yet under all the circumstances, I have at length 
determined to accede to the proposal you made of paying a 
moderate rent on an agreement for a term of twenty-one 
years", it was held that there was no acknowledgment. 
The effect of an acknowledgment of the title to land by any 
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person in possession is to bind all other persons in possession 
during the ensuring period of limitation." 
Time starts to run afresh from the acknowledgment, and no person, 
whether claiming through the acknowledgment or not, can rely on 
the period of adverse possession before the acknowledgment. 
Although not expressly stated, s31 (1) implies that an 
acknowledgment made after the statutory period has expired is 
ineffective, as the title is then extinguished and there is 
nothing left to acknowledge. 
(iv) Foreclosures 
In foreclosure actions, in addition to the postponement of the 
accrual of the right to foreclosure in a case of 
acknowledgment52 , provisions is made in s29 (2) for such 
postponement in the case of payment on account of the mortgage 
debt. So, where the right to foreclose the mortgage has accrued, 
namely, where the date fixed by the mortgage deed for redemption 
has passed and either the person in possession or the person 
liable for the mortgage debt makes payment, whether of principal 
or interest, time will only run from the date of payment. 
Once the statutory period has expired, the right of foreclosure 
is barred and an acknowledgment or payment is ineffective to 
restore it. As Romer J., noted in Kibble v Fairthorne 53 , 
"A mortgagee has two remedies: one being against the land 
comprised in his mortgage, and the other against the 
mortgagor, personally, to recover the moneys secured.. As 
to the land, it is provided that when the statutory 
limitation operates, not only is the remedy against the 
land barred, but the mortgagee's interest in it is 
extinguished. In the second set of provisions - those 
relating to personal remedies - the statutory limitation 
has a different effect. There, only the remedy is barred, 
the debt itself not being extinguished." 
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(v) Redemption 
In redemption actions, where there is only a single mortgagee in 
possession, any acknowledgment by the mortgagee in possession or 
receipt by him of principal or interest extended the time for 
redemption 54 . 
In the event of two or more mortgagees in possession, an 
acknowledgment given by one of the mortgagees binds him and his 
successors but does not bind the other mortgagee 55 . 
It is interesting to note that unlike s.29(3) which clearly 
states that any acknowledgment or receipt of principal or 
interest extends the time for redemption, s.31 (3) omits any 
reference to receipt of any sums of money to account of principal 
or interest. s.31 (3) reads "Where two or more mortgagees are by 
virtue of the Mortgage in possession of the mortgaged land, an 
acknowledgment of the mortgagor's title or of his equity of 
redemption or right to discharge of the mortgage by one of the 
mortgagees shall only bind him and his successors and shall not 
bind any other mortgagee or his successors: and where the 
mortgagee by whom the acknowledgment is given is entitled to a 
part of the mortgaged land and not to any ascertained part of the 
mortgaged debt, the mortgagor shall be entitled to redeem or to 
compel discharge of the mortgage of that part of the land on 
payment, with interest, of the part of the mortgage debt which 
bears the same proportion to the whole of the debt as the value 
of the part of the land bears to the whole of the mortgaged 
land." s.29 (3) reads "Where a mortgagee is by virtue of the 
mortgage in possession of any mortgaged land and either receives 
any sum in respect of the principal or interest of the mortgage 
debt or acknowledges the title of the mortgagor, or his equity 
of redemption, an action to redeem the land in his possession may 
be brought at any time before the expiration of 12 years from the 
date of the payment or acknowledgment." Surely, a receipt of 
payment of interest or principal should have the same effect as 
an acknowledgment but in the absence of express provisions, it 
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would be interesting to see if the courts are prepared to read 
that into the subsection. 
Section 31 (3) may also cause practical difficulties when it 
comes to conveying an undivided share as a result of an 
acknowledgment made by one of the two mortgagees lending as 
trustees on a joint account. 
However, if two mortgagees lending on a joint account take 
possession separately of different parts of mortgaged land, then 
there could be no problem, if one of the mortgagees makes an 
acknowledgment. In such a case the latter part of s.31 (3) 
provides that the mortgagor may redeem the part of the land in 
the possession of the mortgagee who has made an acknowledgment. 
He may do so on payment of a part of the debt proportionate to 
the value of the land. Where there are two or more mortgagors and 
acknowledgment is made to one of the mortgagors, it is deemed to 
have been made to the other mortgagors as wel1 56 . 
Again, it is to be noted that s.29(3) refers to receipt of any 
sum on account or acknowledgment of title by a mortgagee in 
possession, but there is no reference in s.31 (4) to the receipt 
of any sum on account. 
6.2 	Fraud 
Section 32(1) of the Limitation Act, 1974 (Tas), applies in the 
case of any action for which that Act prescribes a limitation 
period, except that a purchaser for valuable consideration who 
is not a party to the fraud and who did not at the time of the 
purchase know or have reason to believe that any fraud has been 
committed is protected57 . It enacts that where: 
(a) any action is based upon the fraud of the defendant or his 
agent or of any person through whom he claims or his agent; 
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(b) the right of action is concealed by the fraud or any person 
referred to in paragraph (a)• the period of limitation 
shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered 
the fraud...or could with reasonable diligence have 
discovered it. 
Paragraph (a) would cover common law actions 58 in which fraud is 
a necessary ingredient as in the tort of deceit. For an action 
based on the tort of deceit, the period is 6 years 59, but 
obviously it must be "based on the fraud of the defendant" within 
S 32 (1)(a) of the Act, in which event the limitation period does 
not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud or 
could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. 
The word 'fraud' in s 32 (1) is not limited to deceit or 
dishonesty used in the common law sense, but to other types of 
fraud as well. Paragraph (b) would include the equitable doctrine 
of concealed fraue. In Archer v Moses82 the covering up of 
foundations which did not accord to specification was held to be 
concealment by fraud of the cause of action. So also was a 
failure to disclose to a purchaser facts showing a risk of the 
subsidence of a house. Further, in Clarke v Woorm , Lawton J., 
said referring to the Limitation Act, 1939, that 'fraud" in the 
context of the Statute of Limitation is not limited in its 
meaning to the tort of deceit and includes the kind of conduct 
known as equitable fraud. He adopted the judgment of Lord 
Evershed M.R. in Kitchen v The Royal Air Force Association85 , 
where he said; 
...it is, I think, clear that the phrase covers conduct 
which, having regard to some special relationship between 
the two parties concerned, is an unconscionable thing for 
the one to do towards the other." 
Thus, where the defendant who sold a plot of land to the 
plaintiff and agreed to build a house on the plot with a certain 
quality of brick and subsequently replaced inferior quality 
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bricks was held liable. Lawson J. held that there was such a 
special relationship because the defendant knew the plaintiff was 
relying on a decent honest performance of the contract and he was 
not employing anyone else to supervise the performance of it. The 
defendants behaviour was unconscionable because, at the time he 
made the contract, he knew he could not perform it to the very 
letter. 
Paragraph (a) and (b) have also been applied to fraud in its 
tortious and criminal meaning67, and to fraudulent breaches of 
trust67 . 
Whenever a person makes a false statement _which he does not 
actually and honestly believe to be true or which he did not know 
to be true, or know or believed to be false, he is deemed to have 
made a fraudulent statement. 
Equity recognised the doctrine of concealed fraud, which occurs 
when a person committing a wrong or a breach of a contract, 
conceals the right of action of the other party by fraud. 
Kindersley V-C defined fraudulent concealment of a proprietary 
right in Petre v Petre69 as, 
"a case of designed fraud, by which a party, knowing to 
whom the right belongs, conceals the circumstances giving 
that right and by means of such concealment enables himself 
to enter and hold." 
Although in most cases involving fraudulent concealment there is 
an active concealment on the part of the person charged, a non-
disclosure by a person who is under a duty to disclose, would 
amount to an active concealment of the fraud, as was the decision 
in Montgomeries Brewery Co Ltd v Blyth7° where the court held 
that a non-disclosure by the directors of a company of the fact 
that they participated in secret profits fraudulently made in 
connection with the promotion of the company amounted to such 
concealment as to prevent the Statute of Limitation from 
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commencing to run in their favour before their fraudulent conduct 
had been discovered by the company. 
The equitable doctrine of concealed fraud received limited 
statutory recognition with the enactment of the Real Property. 
Limitation Ace% Although the equitable doctrine applied to all 
claims in equity and to plaintiffs who had the means of knowledge 
itself, the statutory provision was limited to recovery of land 
or rent and time commenced to run when the plaintiff could have 
known of his rights. Subsequently, a similar provision to s.26 
of the Real Property Limitation Act, 1833 was incorporated into 
the Limitation Act, 1939 72 except that under the latter Act it 
was not limited to recovery of land or rent. The provision in 
Tasmania is similar to that in Englandm . 
Prior to 1939 in• order to invoke the equitable doctrine of 
concealed fraud it must be shown that the defendant has acted in 
an "unconsciousable" manner either by concealing the plaintiffs 
cause of action from him or by failing to make the plaintiff 
aware of the facts from which a cause of action would arise. 
Unless the defendant had been aware of the facts alleged to have 
been concealed, there could be no fraud. 
The present position on concealed fraud has been aptly summarised 
by Lord Denning M.R. in King v Victor Parsons & Co 74 : 
"The word 'fraud' here is not used in the common law sense. 
It is used in the equitable sense to denote conduct by the 
defendant or his agent such that it would be 'against 
conscience' for him to avail himself of the lapse of time. 
The cases show that, if a man knowingly commits a wrong 
(such as putting in a bad foundation to a house), in such 
circumstances that is unlikely to be found out for many a 
long day, he cannot rely on the Statute of Limitations as 
a bar to the claim. In order to show that he 'concealed' 
the right of action 'by fraud', it is not necessary to show 
that he took active steps to conceal his wrong-doing or 
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breach of contract. It is sufficient that he knowingly 
committed it and did not tell the owner about it. He did 
the wrong or committed the breach secretly. By saying 
nothing he keeps it secret. He conceals the right of 
action. He conceals it by 'fraud' as those words have been 
interpreted in the cases. To this word 'knowingly' there 
must be added 'recklessly'. Like the man who turns a blind 
eye, he is aware that what he is doing may well be a wrong, 
or a breach of contract, but he takes the risk if it being 
so. He refrains from further inquiry lest it would prove to 
be correct; and says nothing about it. The court will not 
allow him to get away with conduct of that kind. It may be 
that he has no dishonest motive; but that does not matter. 
He has kept the plaintiff out of the knowledge of his right 
of -action; and that is enough. If the defendant was, 
however, unaware that he was committing a wrong or a breach 
of contract, it would be different. So if by an honest 
blunder he unwittingly commits a wrong (by digging another 
man's coal), or a breach of contract (by putting in an 
insufficient foundation) then he could avail himself of the 
Statute of Limitations." 
From the judgment of Lord Denning M.R., it is clear that section 
26 of the Limitation Act, 1939 is not limited to fraud in the 
common law sense; and is not limited to cases of active 
concealment. Further, cases of recklessness are also covered by 
that section. This, it is submitted should be the position in 
Tasmania, as the wording of s.32 of the Limitation Act, 1974 is 
much the same as the Limitation Act, 1939. In Tasmania the 
Limitation Act deals with actions based upon fraudm as well as 
rights of action concealed by fraudm , similar to the English 
position. 
Although at common law neither actions based on fraud nor 
fraudulent concealment could postpone the running of time, equity 
did allow the running of time in both cases to be postponed until 
the plaintiff was only barred at the expiration of six years 
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after actual or notional discovery 77 . The effect of S 32(1) of 
the Limitation Act, 1974 is to postpone the commencement of the 
limitation period to the time of discovery of the fraud. So, as 
long as the plaintiff is ignorant of the fraud, through no fault 
of his own, time will not run under the Act. However, it should 
be noted that the protection afforded by the Act is limited to 
the original miscreant and a bona fide purchaser for value 
without notice of the defence afforded by the statute, will be 
protected. 
As Lord Denning said in Eddis v Chichester Constable m , 
"But, the property reached the hands of someone who took it 
in good faith and for value without notice of the fraud, 
such a man could avail himself of the Statute of 
Limitation. Equity did not deprive innocent purchasers of 
the benefit of the statute. Nor did the law." 
S 32 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1974 clearly states that where 
a person has given valuable consideration and was not a party to 
the fraud and did not at the time of the purchase know or have 
reason to believe that any fraud had been committed, the 
transaction would be protected, despite the fraud of the original 
miscreant79 . The Act also attributes to the defendant, any fraud 
or fraudulent concealment by the defendant's agent or other 
person for whose acts he is responsible° . So although in cases 
of fraud or fraudulent concealment, the effect of the Limitation 
Act is to postpone the running of time till the plaintiff has 
discovered the fraud, any purchaser who has furnished valuable 
consideration and who is ignorant of the fraud or does not have 
reason to believe that the property has been the subject of fraud 
will be protected in that no action can be successfully brought 
to set aside or recover that property. 
To succeed in an action under s.32 of the Limitation Act, it 
would be necessary for the plaintiff to establish and prove 
fraud; as where the word 'fraud' is used in the context 'action 
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based on fraud', the reference is to such fraud as an essential 
ingredient of the cause of action81 . Lord Greene, in referring to 
s.26 of the Limitation Act, 193982 said in Beaman v A.R.T.S.  
Ltd83 , 
"It must be borne in mind that S 26 is a section of general 
application. It applies to every sort of action which is 
affected by the Act. Of these, many can properly be said to 
be based upon fraud; for example, an action for damages for 
deceit and an action claiming rescission of a transaction 
brought about by fraud." 
In all cases fraud is a necessary allegation in order to 
constitute the cause of action. In other actions covered by the 
Act fraud is not a necessary allegation at all and the action of 
conversion is one of them. 
6 . 3 	MISTAKES84 
Another ground for postponement of time is mistake. Where two 
parties enter into a contract and subsequently one makes a 
mistake concerning the contract, he would not have a remedy at 
law, because the maxim caveat emptor would be applicable in this 
case. Even if one of the parties knew that he was getting a 
better deal than the other, he was under no duty to divulge. 
However, common law did place some limitation. A party for 
instance would not be allowed to remain silent when he knows that 
the other party is mistaken as to what the actual terms of the 
contract are85 , or in cases of mistake as to the identity of the 
contracting party86 . 
Whether a remedy was available at common law for mutual mistake 
is unclear. It has been said that such a mistake may be so 
fundamental as to render the contract void as in Bell v Lever 
Brothers87 , or that the contract can be avoided only by reference 
to the further intention of the parties, or by equity. P.S. 
Atiyah89 argues that the true effect of a contract for sale of 
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perished or non-existent goods is always a question of 
construction and three possible constructions could be placed on 
such contracts. Firstly, the contract may be void or secondly the 
buyer may be making an absolute promise to pay the price or 
thirdly the seller may be promising that the goods exist. Atiyah 
seems to favour the third option. 
Generally, equity has not disturbed the long-established 
principles of common law. In order to obtain rescission in 
equity, both the contracting parties must show that they were 
contracting under a common mistake. As Lord Westbury stated in 
Riverlate Properties Ltd v Paul" that where there is a 
unilateral mistake, there is no principle of law which entitled 
the other party to rescind or annul the agreement. 
At common law, the only remedy available to the plaintiff was an 
action to recover money paid by mistake. The mistake has to be 
one of fact and not one of law. 
However, equity allowed a contract to be rescinded if it can be 
shown that the parties contracted under a mutual mistake of fact, 
and in some cases where the mistake is a unilateral mistake. 
Lord Denning has said that equitable relief may be granted in 
cases where a mistake is not sufficiently fundamental to avoid 
a contract of sale of goods at law. 91 
Equity's jurisdiction was not merely limited to a mistake of 
fact92 and in certain cases relief was also available from a 
mistake of law. A mere lapse of time did not bar the claim for 
any of the equitable relief available at equity until the mistake 
had been discovered or ought to have been discovered ° . 
However, an undue delay could be fatal to the plaintiff. In Leaf 
v International Galleries" a picture, represented to have been 
painted by John Constable was sold and after five years the 
plaintiff purchaser sought to have the sale rescinded on the 
ground of innocent misrepresentation. The question, which the 
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Court of Appeal had to decide, was whether the buyer was entitled 
to rescind on grounds of innocent misrepresentation. In order to 
answer this question, the court had to decide whether there had 
been any laches, that is, whether the buyer had sought to pursue 
the equitable remedy of rescission within a reasonable time. 
Jenkins L.J., sale, 
....in my judgment, contracts such as this cannot be kept 
open and subject to the possibility of recision 
indefinitely. Assuming that acceptance of delivery was not 
fatal to his claim, at all events, I think it behoves the 
buyer either to verify, or, as the case may be, disprove, 
the representation within a reasonable time or else to 
stand or fall by the representation. If he is allowed to 
wait five, ten or twenty years and then reopen the bargain, 
there can be no finality." 
So although mistake may postpone the running of time, and allow 
the affected party to rescind the contract, any person intending 
to rely on this ground has to prosecute his claim within a 
reasonable time, as a delay could mean the loss of his right. 
The English Limitation Act, 1980 S.32(1)(c) refers to actions 
"for relief from the consequences of a mistake", and is broad 
enough to cover relief whether originally obtainable at law or 
equity. 
However, this section applies only where a period of limitation 
is prescribed by the Act96 . 
The proviso to S 32 states very clearly that both for fraud and 
mistake the plaintiff to succeed must show reasonable diligence 
on his part. 
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6.4 	CONCLUSION 
The Limitation Act recognises that in cases of acknowledgment or 
part-payment or cases of fraud or mistake the operation of the 
Act is effectively postponed. In all cases of acknowledgment and 
part-payment whether it be in monetary claims, redemption 
actions, foreclosures or actions to recover land, time starts to 
run afresh from the date of acknowledgment or part-payment. 
Under the Limitation Act, fraud as well as fraudulent concealment 
and mistake will postpone the running of time until such time the 
plaintiff actually discovers the fraud or fraudulent concealment 
or mistake, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered 
it. However, a bona fide purchaser for value, who is unaware of 
the fraud or mistake would have his property protected. For a 
plaintiff to succeed on the grounds of fraud or mistake he would 
have to show reasonable diligence on his part in prosecuting the 
claim. 
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CHAPTER 7. LAW REFORM IN TASMANIA IN RELATION  
TO STATUTES OF LIMITATION 
A study of the Statute of Limitation in the United Kingdom and 
its subsequent developments reveal that in many instances the 
time provisions in the statute of limitation were fixed on the 
basis of ad hoc decisions which were made from time to time and 
often there was not much principle in the actual periods chosen. 
The English Act has been copied by many countries around the 
world. Tasmania indeed was one such British colony to adopt the 
English Statutes of Limitation and as such the Tasmanian 
Limitation Act is similar to the English Act in that there is not 
much principle underlying the actual time periods chosen. 
7.1 	Principles behind Reform 
Before proposing any reforms to the Tasmanian Act, I would 
discuss some principles which should form the basis of any 
reform. 
(i) Fairness A Limitation Act should in limiting the time 
available for a claimant to bring an action and giving a 
defence to a defendant for any action not brought within a 
certain specific limitation period, strike a fair balance 
between the interests of both parties that is the interests 
of the claimants and the interests of the defendants. 
(ii) Unambiguous The provisions of the Act should be clear and 
concise and set out the scope and method of operation in 
clear language. 
(iii)Simple The provisions of the Act should have fundamental 
principles which could be applicable to most cases across 
the board and not contain technical solutions to some rare 
cases. 
(iv) Plain Language The language of the Act should be modern 
and plain and not technical. Further, the language should 
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be easily understood by laymen and lawyers alike. 
7.2 	Problems with the Present Tasmanian Act 
The present Tasmanian Act, it is submitted, is very complex and 
legalistic and is really difficult for ordinary laymen to 
comprehend. Moreover, the act does not operate with sufficient 
fairness for either claimants or defendants. We have seen that 
the present Act has grouped different types of possible claims 
into various categories and different periods of limitation apply 
to different categories of claim. For example, for most claims 
based on contract the prescribed time period is six years from 
the date of accrual of the claim and for most claims in tort the 
limitation period is three years from the date of the accrual of 
the cause of action. Experience in other jurisdiction has shown 
, that in many of the so-called "toxic torts" cases, before a 
claimant could reasonably discover that he has a good claim, the 
limitation period could have expired and this would certainly be 
unfair to claimants, who could be left with no redress. 
On the other hand, claimants with clear-cut claims who have 
obtained all the relevant information to prosecute a claim and 
nevertheless sit on their claims in the knowledge that the Act 
has given them a long period of time, say 3 years or 6 years as 
the case may be, to prosecute a claim and thus delay commencing 
any action until just before the time period is about to run out, 
will cause unfairness to defendants. 
Under the present Act, the time of accrual of a cause of action 
is vital, as time starts to run from the time of accrual of that 
cause of action. However, to ascertain when the cause of action 
arose in many cases is a technical legal issue and could be 
unnecessarily complex and legalistic. Further, to find out which 
fixed limitation period is applicable to a particular claim, one 
would have to see which category the claim falls into and 
furthermore many different methods can be used to describe a type 
of claim and it is not uncommon to use several of these methods 
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to describe a particular claim. Solicitors can often argue that 
a claim arising from a same set of facts fall into one category 
of claim, subject to a three year limitation period or into 
another category of claim which is subject to a six year 
limitation period, or to a third category where no limitation 
period applies. This whole process of characterising the type 
of the claim is very often complex and legalistic and difficult 
to be understood by claimants. Defendants too are not sure when 
they have a valid defence as that will be entirely dependant on 
how the claim is characterised in a Court of law. 
These problems would need to be addressed in any attempt to 
reform the limitation Act. 
7.3 	Proposals for Reform 
The need for reform in the area of limitation in Tasmania cannot 
be overemphasised and is certainly long overdue but the question 
is should any reform be merely cosmetic. In other words should 
the present Act be retained and various changes made to the 
existing Act as for instance by granting judges an absolute or 
limited discretion to extend time in appropriate cases etc, or 
should we repeal the whole existing Act and in its place enact 
a new Act which is fair to both the claimants and the defendants, 
unambiguous, simple and drafted in plain ordinary language. To 
suggest the latter would indeed be a very bold proposal, even 
though the proposal for a completely new Act is justified solely 
on the grounds that the Tasmanian Act is based on a limitation 
strategy formulated in England over three hundred years ago and 
which may not be relevant to the modern day needs of Tasmania and 
further that there is not much principle behind the actual time 
periods in the present Act. 
My proposal for reform in the area of limitation in Tasmania is 
presented in the alternative. The first proposal is that certain 
immediate changes be made to the existing Act in the areas of 
discretion and in the custody of a parent rule. Alternatively, 
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the present act be totally repealed and in its place a new act 
be formulated which is much more fairer and simpler and which I 
submit is the preferred option. 
7.3.1 	First Proposal 
In dealing with extension of time in the previous chapter, it was 
noted that the Tasmanian Act only provides for a limited 
discretion to judges to extend the limitation period. Currently 
under s.5(3) of the Tasmanian Limitation Act a judge can grant 
an extension, if it is just and reasonable to do so up to a 
maximum of six years from the date on which the cause of action 
accrues. 
In tracing the development of the current limitation law in the 
United Kingdom however, we noted that the legislature in their 
wisdom have given unfettered discretion to the courts in the 
United Kingdom to extend the limitation period in a case in which 
it is equitable to do so and if there is no prejudice to any 
party. 
Although limitation legislation were aimed at the prevention of 
avoidable delay and retain justice in the public interest, its 
operation has given rise to particular instances of hardship and 
injustice to plaintiffs. Usually the Limitation statutes provide 
time for commencing action which normally runs from the date on 
which the plaintiffs cause of action is complete or said "to 
accrue". However, in cases of personal injury, although the 
plaintiff will be aware of the wrong at the time of occurrence 
or soon after, there may be a length of time before the full 
extent of the injury or any complications are known. In many 
cases, however, the diagnosis of a disease may not be possible 
until several years after the date of "injury", by which time the 
limitation period may well have expired. 
Similarly, a person suffering from a particular disease may not 
be aware of a casual link between the disease and a particular 
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activity until after the expiration of the limitation period. 
Furthermore, a person may be ignorant as to his right or have 
received misleading advice as a result of which no action was 
commenced before the expiry of the limitation period. 
As a result of injustices which could arise in such cases, 
attempts have been made in several jurisdiction to obtain a new 
balance between the principle that there must be certainty and 
an end to litigation on the one hand and on the other hand that 
innocent litigants go uncompensated as a result of the operation 
of strict technical rules. In the English case of Cartledge v 
Joplingl the plaintiff contracted pneumoconiosis whilst in the 
employ of the defendant. The inhalation of noxious dust caused 
pneumonsconiosis, which resulted in the victim suffering 
substantial injury to the lungs which were not apparent symptoms 
for many years. By the time the plaintiff discovered his plight, 
the limitation period had expired. The House of Lords held that 
the limitation period ran from the date of "accrual", that is, 
from the date when the plaintiff suffered damage or injury which 
could be termed as "real" or not negligible. The fact that the 
plaintiff did not and could not have known that such damage had 
occurred was considered irrelevant. However, their Lordships 
unanimously expressed their concern for victims of latent 
disease. Unlike the Wright committee which in its 1936 Report 
argued that the hardship suffered by such plaintiffs was 
justified in what it considered to be the primary object of 
limitation statute, namely to put a certain end to litigation, 
Lord Reid in Cartledge's case, found it, "unreasonable and 
unjustifiable in principle that a cause of action should be held 
to accrue before it is possible to discover any injury" 2 . 
The current position in the United Kingdom is that the court now 
has a discretion to extend the limitation period in a case in 
which it is equitable to do so and if there is no prejudice to 
any party3 . 
In assessing the current extension provisions in Tasmania, the 
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questions that have to be considered here are firstly, whether 
the present provisions dealing with extension in Tasmania are 
adequate and, secondly, if not, should the legislation be amended 
to grant the Tasmanian Courts with unfettered judicial discretion 
similar to those in the United Kingdom to extend time in 
appropriate cases. 
7.3.1(i) Adequacy of the present extension provisions  
It is submitted that the present limited discretion given to 
judges to extend limitation periods in Tasmania is inadequate as 
grave injustice may be experienced by claimants who suffer latent 
injury where the symptoms of the disease may lie dormant for 
several years and manifest itself well after the limitation 
period has expired, leaving the claimant with no remedy at all. 
It was in order to overcome such injustice that the legislature 
in the United Kingdom gave the judges an unfettered discretion 
to grant extensions in suitable cases. 
Both the states of Victoria and New South Wales have conferred 
on the court a general discretion to extend the limitation period 
if the Court considers it just and reasonable to do so. In 
Victoria, the Limitation of Actions (Personal Iniuries Claims)  
Act 1983 extended the primary limitation period to six years and 
the period is subject to the "discovery" extension, being the 
date on which the plaintiff first knows: 
(a) that he has suffered those personal injuries; and 
(b) that those personal injuries were caused by the act or 
omission of some person. 
This Act further conferred on the Court a general discretion to 
extend the limitation period if it considered it just and 
reasonable so to do and sets out guidelines for the assistance 
of the Court in exercising its discretion. 
In New South Wales, the Limitation Act (1969) was amended in 
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September, 1990 by implementing the recommendations of the New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission 4 . The Amending Act inserted 
provisions allowing for discretionary extension of the limitation 
period for latent injury5 . Besides reducing the primary 
limitation period from six years to three years, the Act now 
allows a discretionary extension of the limitation period if the 
Court decides that it is just and reasonable to do so. The 
"discovery rule" extension was rejected in the Bill and instead 
the courts were granted an unlimited discretion to give extension 
having considered all the circumstances of the case and applying 
certain statutory guidelines. 
The recommendation to grant discretionary powers to the court to 
extend time is absolutely necessary in view of problems created 
by certain latent injuries which do not manifest themselves until 
several years have elapsed by which time the claim could very 
well be statute-barred. 
The granting of judicial discretion to the courts will also bring 
the Tasmanian Limitation Act in line with the limitation 
legislation in the United Kingdom, Victoria and New South Wales, 
where the need for such judicial discretion has been clearly 
argued and analysed, before its adoption. 
Recently, the Law Reform Commission of Tasmania has recommended 
a scheme° "whereby the limitation period can be extended by 
exercise of the Courts' discretion to ensure that justice is not 
denied by the operation of strict legal rules in meritorious 
cases". In his report7 the Law Reform Commissioner highlights 
the problems faced by claimants in the so-called "toxic torts" 
cases. 
... In these cases, the claimant sustains injury or contracts 
a disease as a result of contact with substances which, by their 
nature, are toxic if handled without caution. The 
characteristics of these latent injuries are frequently the same; 
the injury sustained as a result of repeated exposure to the 
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toxic substance, the exposure is over many years and the exposure 
occurred many years before and outside the limitation period. 
Common amongst this class of Plaintiffs are people suffering from 
diseases caused by inhalation of toxic types of dust, asbestos, 
silicosis, pneumoconiosis, and mesothelioma. These insidious 
diseases have a long latency period, sometimes more than thirty 
years from the date of the inhalation. Other toxic substances 
such as radioactive minerals and dangerous chemicals have also 
given rise to instances in which claims have been statute barred. 
The problem of latent injury may be further compounded by the 
standard of medical diagnosis at a given time. In some cases, 
a person may be examined and according to the prevailing standard 
and level of medical knowledge may manifest no adverse symptoms 
but the latent injury may be discovered later with improved 
diagnostic techniques". 
Another disease specifically referred to in the Law Reform 
Commissioners Report is Aids. 
"Aids is yet another notable disease whose symptoms may lie 
dormant until after the expiry of the traditional limitation 
period. The prevalence of AIDS and the HIV virus in the modern 
day needs no emphasis, except to say that there are no doubt 
instances in which the disease is transmitted in tortious 
circumstances". 
In order not to defeat legitimate claims of claimants who suffer 
from such latent injuries which only manifest themselves several 
years later and which might well be after the limitation period 
has expired, the existing Tasmanian laws, it is submitted should 
be amended to accommodate such claims. 
But should the amendments to the Tasmanian Act be in the form of 
granting unfettered discretion to the judges? 
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7.3.1(ii) Should the Courts be given a general discretion 
Having considered the various disabilities in the Act and some 
of the problems associated with the limited discretion given to 
judges for extending the limitation period, one possible solution 
to overcome these problems is to grant to the courts a general 
discretion. However, the question that has often been asked is 
whether judges should be endowed with unfettered discretion to 
extend time. 
As early as 1936, the English Law Revision committee considered 
a proposal to grant unfettered discretion to judges, but rejected 
it8 . Again, the Edmund-Davies Committee considered and rejected 
the proposa19 . Yet again, it was considered by Orr L.J. in 1974 
and his committee and rejected by them as well". The reason for 
rejection was that if an unfettered discretion were given to 
judges, it would lead to too much uncertainty. The proposal was 
condemned by Orr L.J.'s committee in the interim report in these 
words; 
"To make the plaintiff entirely dependent on the court's 
discretion would, in our view, be a retrograde step and we 
do not recommend it". 
However, Orr L.J.'s committee did recommend that the court should 
have a discretion in some "exceptional cases" to extend time. 
They described these cases as a "residual class of case" and the 
discretion as a "residual discretionary power". The committee 
however did not define this residual class but probably had in 
mind cases where a person contracted certain disabilities while 
at work but did not know his legal rights. 
In Finch v Francis", Griffiths J. who was a member of Orr L.J.'s 
committee said, 
"...the object of the discretion to override the time limit 
was to provide for the occasional hard case. I cannot 
252 
believe that it was the intention of Parliament that 
Section 2D should be applied to a case such as this, where 
a person in the hands of a solicitor allows time to run out 
in a straightforward running down action. If the court 
were to exercise its powers in a case such as this the 
value to the defendant of the three year time limit in 
personal injury cases would be completely swept aside. 
Furthermore, the courts would be flooded with applications. 
In my view the court should be circumspect in its approach 
to the application of section 2D and it should be reserved 
for cases of an unusual nature. 
It was a straightforward running down case in which time 
should never have been allowed to expire. I can see no 
reason to extend it". 
Although the various committees did not accept the proposal for 
a general discretion, Parliament in passing the Limitation Act 
of 1975 did give the court a general discretion in terms of 
section 2D. 
Referring to the purpose of Section 2D, Griffiths J., said 12 , 
"Section 2D empowers the court to direct that the primary 
limitation period shall not apply to a particular action or 
cause of action. This is by way of exception, for unless 
the court does make a direction the primary limitation 
period will continue to apply. The effect of such a 
direction, and its only effect, is to deprive the defendant 
of what would otherwise . be a complete defence to the 
action, viz that the writ was issued too late. A direction 
under the section must therefore always be highly 
prejudicial to the defendant, for even if he also has a 
good defence on the merits he is put to the expenditure of 
time and energy and money in establishing it, while if, as 
in the instant case, he has no defence as to liability he 
has everything to lose if a direction is given under the 
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section. On the other hand if, as in the instant case, the 
time elapsed after the expiration of the primary limitation 
is very short, what the defendant lost in consequence of a 
direction might be regarded as being in the nature of 
windfall". 
Lord Denning M.R. in Fireman v Ellis13 said, 
"In former times it was thought that judges should not be 
given discretionary powers. It would lead to too much 
uncertainty. The law should define with precision the 
circumstances in which judges should do this or that. 
Those days are now passed. In statute after statute, 
Parliament has given powers to the judges and entrusted 
them with a discretion as to the manner in which those 
powers should be exercised. In many of these statutes, 
Parliament sets out "guide lines" indicating some of the 
considerations to which the judges should have regard. A 
notable example is the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property  
Act 1970, Section 5, regarding the division of matrimonial 
property. A recent example is the Unfair Contract Terms  
Act 1977, which sets out "guide lines" for application of 
the reasonable test. Sometimes' Parliament has entrusted 
the judge with a discretion without setting out any guide 
lines, as in trial by jury under the Administration of  
Trustee 1Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933: and then the 
judges themselves set out the guide lines: see Ward v 
Jamesa (1966) 1 QB 273. In all such cases the judges can . 
forecast the likely result in any given set of 
circumstances: see Bickel v Duke of Westminister (1977) QB 
517, 524. So a sufficient degree of certainty is achieved 
- as much certainty as is possible consistently with 
justice". 
It is submitted that the move to give the court a general 
discretion is a move in the right direction as Parliament cannot 
foresee every possible situation that may arise and as such ' 
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cannot legislate to cover every such situation. The judges 
having considered all the facts presented in a given case would 
be in a better position to dispense justice if they had a certain 
amount of discretion within the broad framework of the 
legislation. Without any discretion the judges would be required 
to apply the strict provision of the law and this could cause 
injustice in certain instances. However, the discretion should 
not be an absolute discretion but a qualified one. Coupled with 
a discretion, the judges could be given certain guidelines for 
the exercise of this discretion. In fact"as Orr L.J.'s committee 
recommend the discretion should be for 'exceptional' cases and 
not unfettered discretion in terms of S.2D. 
An absolute discretion (as Lord Denning referred to of S.2D), 
'would lead to the consequences shown in the three cases Fireman 
v Ellis, Down v Harvey & 0 Nicklin & Sons Ltd and Ince v Roberts, 
where the benefit of the extension provision was extended to 
clients because of negligent solicitors. The plaintiff's 
solicitors failed to renew the writs in time while negotiations 
for settlement were going on. In each of the three cases the 
judges exercised their discretion in favour of the plaintiffs, 
although the delay was due to the plaintiff's solicitors having 
overlooked the fact that the validity of the writ had to be 
maintained by renewing the writ. Surely in such cases, the 
solicitors should bear the consequences and the plaintiffs should 
be denied an extension and thus made to claim against their 
solicitors. It is submitted that Griffith J. is correct in 
saying that the object of this extension provision was to provide 
for the occasional hard case and not in cases where the 
plaintiff's solicitor is at fault in failing to take action 
within the prescribed time. 
It is submitted that the Tasmanian limitation Act should 
therefore be amended to grant judges discretion to extend time 
and that the current 6 year maximum period be removed. In 
deciding whether to grant the extension, the judges should inter 
alia take into consideration the following factors: 
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1. Whether the defendant would be substantially 
prejudiced by the granting of the extension. 
2. Whether there is evidence to substantiate the 
applicant's claim. 
3. The applicant's conduct in the prosecution of the 
claim and his explanation for the delay. 
7.3.1(iii) "Custody of a Parent" Rule 
Section 26(6) of the Act is normally referred to as the "Custody 
of a Parent" rule. The Act provides specifically 14 that the 
operation of the relevant limitation period is suspended whilst 
a person is under a legal disability 15 which is defined inter 
alia to include an infant. 
The policy behind this is, a person whilst under a legal 
disability as for example infancy, should not be disadvantaged 
by his/her tender age. The "Custody of a Parent" rule however 
operates to negate what the Act bestows on an infant by virtue 
of S.26(1). What the "Custody of a Parent" rule does is that it 
allows the normal limitation period to run, notwithstanding that 
a person is under a legal disability, if that person happened to 
be in the custody of a parent at the time when the right of 
action accrued to him. The reason for this is that a 
conscientious and well meaning parent will or should have the 
interest of his child at heart and do all that is necessary to 
prosecute a claim on behalf of the child expeditiously, so that 
the child is not disadvantaged although under a legal disability 
and thus has no need of special protection under the law. 
Although there may be some truth in that reasoning, there would 
no doubt be several instances where the parent or guardian of the 
infant may have failed to institute proceedings within the 
limitation period because of inadvertence, ignorance or lack of 
intellectual capacity. In such cases the infant unjustifiably 
pays for the omission of his parent or guardian. 
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In this regard, it should be noted that in Victoria the Court has 
held that the word "knowledge" refers the personal knowledge of 
the applicant, which alone is material, and not that of his 
parent, solicitor or agent 16 . 
It is interesting to note that in England, from where Tasmania 
obtained this provision, the Law Reform Committee chaired by Lord 
Justice Orr recommended its abolition, which was subsequently 
given effect to by the Limitation Act 1975 (U.K.). 
The Law Reform Commissioner of Tasmania has recommended the 
abolition of the "Custody of a Parent" rule in his report 17 and 
it is submitted that this should be given effect to as soon as 
possible. 
7.3.2 	Alternate Proposal 
If we are to give effect to all or most of the principles for 
reform discussed in paragraph 7.1, it would be necessary to enact 
a completely new limitation statute. To begin with, the present 
Tasmanian Act is very long, complex and legalistic and is 
contained in 40 sections in 25 pages. 
The starting point for a new statute it is submitted, would be 
to adopt a modern model statute from another jurisdiction which 
is simple, fair, unambiguous and plain, and then perhaps to 
improve on that. 
Having considered various limitation statutes from several 
jurisdictions, it would appear that the British Columbia 
Limitation Act 1975 which is reproduced in Appendix III appears 
to be one suitable model for Tasmania to consider. Unlike the 
Tasmanian Act, the British Columbia Act is relatively short 
consisting 15 sections in 9 pages, is well drafted, organised and 
is relatively easy to understand. 
The British Columbia Act provides in S.3(i) a 2 year limitation' 
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period for 8 causes of action; a 10 year limitation period for 
6 causes of action enumerated in S.3(2); and S.3(4) provides a 
6 year limitation period for any other action not specifically 
mentioned in the limitation Act or any other act. 
S.3(3) enumerates 10 instances where a person is not governed by 
a limitation period and thus a claimant may bring an action at 
any time, as there is no time limitation period. 
The Act also provides in S.8 that notwithstanding a confirmation, 
postponement or suspension of the running of time there is an 
ultimate limitation period of 30 years from the date on which the 
right arose, after which a claimant would not be able to bring 
any action. The ultimate period is reduced to 25 years if the 
claim is under their Hospitals Act. 
However, despite the fact the British Columbia Act in its format 
is relatively much shorter than the Tasmanian Act and is better 
drafted and organised, it still maintains different periods of 
limitation for different causes of action and the problem of 
characterisation and categorisation of a claim still continues 
to exist. This is so because the British Columbia Act just like 
the Tasmanian Act has adopted the two divergent strategies for 
a limitation act which was developed by the English system. 
On the one hand there was the strategy at law and on the other 
the strategy in equity. The primary objective of both these 
strategies was to provide a limitation system which was fair and 
efficient to all parties concerned. 
For an operation of the strategy at law it was necessary firstly 
to categorise a claim as being a tort, contract, property etc. 
Secondly, a fixed period of limitation of different duration 
applied to each category of claim. Thirdly, it was necessary to 
determine when the cause of action accrued and this is often a 
technical legal issue, depending on how the claim is 
characterised. 
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The strategy at equity on the other hand is not statutory and was 
developed by the English equity judges and is known as the 
doctrine of laches. The doctrine of laches involves two main 
elements. The first is that the limitation period is 
discretionary and secondly the limitation period commences at the 
time of discovery. 
For so long as the strategy at law forms the basis of any 
limitation act, the problem of characterisation and 
categorisation will continue to exist. One way to get rid of the 
problem of characterisation and categorisation is to introduce 
one standard limitation period for all causes of action coming 
within the ambit of the limitation act. 
Worthy of serious consideration in this regard is a report by the 
Alberta Law Reform Institute l° in which they recommend a 
completely new limitation Act for Alberta which "should rely to 
a much more significant degree on the equitable strategy" 19 . 
Their recommendation is to "recombine the two basis limitation 
strategies into a distinctly new limitations strategy based on 
the strategy in equity" 20 . 
The principle recommendation of the Institute is that all claims 
be governed by two limitation periods, one known as the 
"discovery period" and the other known as the "ultimate 
period" 21 . The discovery period will only begin when the 
claimant "discovered" or "ought to have discovered" (i) that the 
injury had . occurred; (ii) that it was to some degree 
attributable to the conduct of the defendant, and (iii) that it 
was sufficiently serious to have warranted commencing a 
proceeding. From the time of discovery, the claimant has 2 years 
within which to institute proceedings. This 2 year period is 
referred to as the "discovery limitation period". The principle 
behind the initial discovery period is knowledge and is derived 
from the limitation strategy in equity. Thus the discovery 
limitation period will certainly serve the interest of claimants 
as it is knowledge which sets the limitation clock ticking. 
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language, logically organized and easy to understand. 
The Act uses words in a generic, non-technical sense as for 
instance it talks about a "claim" rather than a "cause of action" 
which is normally used in limitation statutes, and a "claimant" 
rather than the conventional "plaintiff". 
The 2 year discovery period, it is submitted is more reasonable 
and much fairer to a claimant as it will not begin to run until 
the claimant knew or should have known the three basic facts 
which trigger its operation. From that point in time the 
claimant will have 2 years to consult his solicitor and institute 
proceedings should a settlement be not reached. 
Another notable feature is that the discovery period is not 
limited to certain category of cases but to all cases governed 
by the Act. This, it is submitted simplifies the Act, makes it 
comprehensible and does away with the categorisation and 
characterisation problem. 
The discovery rule will also benefit defendants as under this 
scheme many of the claimants would have to institute proceedings 
much sooner than the existing Act, if they have acquired the 
necessary knowledge. 
The ultimate period will benefit defendants as they can rest in 
the certainty that after 15 years no action could be instituted 
against them. 
Although at first 15 years may appear to be a long time for a 
defendant to wait, and thus work unfairly on defendants, in 
actual fact the number of cases that reach the 15 year period 
would be extremely small as the 2 year discovery period would 
have dealt with a great majority of cases, which would have been 
either abandoned, settled, or litigated well before the ultimate 
limitation period of 15 years. 
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Thus the ultimate period will benefit defendants. 
Having suggested two options for reform, my preferred option for 
reform of the law relating to limitation in Tasmania is the 
latter, that is the present Act be repealed and in its place a 
simplified new act be formulated using the British Columbia Act 
and the Alberta Law Reform Institutes model limitation Act. 
Like both these Acts, the Tasmanian Act should be drafted in 
simple language, avoid technical terminology and kept brief. As 
far as possible words in a generic, non-technical sense should 
be adopted, so that a layman would be able to understand and 
coMprehend the Act. 
To avoid problems of characterisation and categorisation, a fixed 
discovery period should be introduced to all actions falling 
within the Act and similarly to protect defendants, an ultimate 
period should be introduced. 
Such an Act, it is submitted will be much fairer to claimant's 
because all claims to which the Act applies will be subject to 
the discovery rule. 
A new Act for Tasmania incorporating the above proposals will, 
it is submitted, achieve the principles behind reform discussed 
in paragraph 7.1 namely, it would be fair to claimants and 
defendants, unambiguous, simple and plain. 
A new Act, moreover will give an opportunity to take into 
consideration various changes in the characteristics of the 
Tasmanian society and with it the consequential enlargement of 
legal rights and remedies considering the fact that the present 
Act was adopted from England, where the limitation law had been 
growing piecemeal for over three and a half centuries and is 
inadequate to meet the modern day needs of Tasmania. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
The overall aims of limitations is to ensure that the claims of 
plaintiffs who have good causes of actions are not defeated and 
that defendants on the other hand should be protected from being 
vexed by stale claims. 
In developing appropriate statutory time periods, a fair balance 
had to be struck between the need to protect the legitimate 
claims of plaintiffs on the one hand and affording protection to 
defendants from having stale claims against them from being 
resurrected on the other hand. 
History has shown that it is difficult to develop appropriate 
statutory time periods to balance the policies of the Statute of 
Limitation, namely that of resurrecting stale claims against the 
undue injustice to a claimant which may result if he is barred 
from prosecuting his claim. Because the early fixed statutory 
periods did not adequately cater for plaintiffs with injuries and 
diseases which manifested several years later, well after the 
statutory period had expired, it was necessary to overcome such 
problems with the introduction of the Discovery rule in England. 
The Discovery rule enabled plaintiffs to institute proceedings 
within 3 years from the date of the plaintiffs discovery. 
Subsequently, in addition to the discovery rule, the courts in 
England were granted a residual discretion to extend the 
limitation period where the strict application of the discovery 
rule would cause injustice. With the granting of a residual 
discretion, a plaintiff with latent injuries and diseases was 
able to derive some comfort in that their claim would not be 
statute barred for failing to institute proceedings within the 
initial time period. 
As the early statutory time periods worked unjustly on plaintiffs 
with latent injuries and diseases, there was a need to introduce 
the discovery rule and to endow the courts with a discretion to 
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extend the initial time periods in appropriate cases in England. 
Unfortunately, Tasmania has still not introduced anything like 
the "discovery rule". As far as extensions are concerned, the 
Tasmanian Act provides for a judge to extend time for the 
commencement of an action if it is just and reasonable to do so 
but the Act places a maximum period of extension to six years 
from the date on which the cause of action accrued. 
In comparison, the state of Victoria has adopted the "discovery 
rule" and also conferred on the courts a general discretion to 
extend the limitation periods if it considered just and 
reasonable to do so. 
New South Wales, on the other had has rejected the "discovery 
rule" extension but given the courts the power to grant unlimited 
extension of the limitation period. 
These progressive developments in the are of discretion in other 
jurisdictions has yet to be adopted in Tasmania. The Tasmanian 
Act as it stands now, would defeat the legitimate claims of 
victims of certain latent injuries and diseases if such victims 
could not have discovered their rights within the maximum 6 year 
currently provided under the present Tasmanian Act. Hence, there 
is an urgent need to address this defect in the Tasmanian Act. 
As the legitimate claims of plaintiffs with latent injuries and 
diseases could be defeated under the present Tasmanian Act, the 
Act does not operate fairly on such claimants. 
Rather than make cosmetic changes to the Tasmanian Act it is 
submitted that the whole Act should be repealed and in its place 
a new Act formulated using as a basis the Model Limitation Act, 
which was translated from the recommendations by the Alberta Law 
Reform Institute. The Model Act is written in plain language, 
uses words in a generic, non-technical sense and does away with 
the problems of characterisation and categorisation. 
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All claims are subjected to two limitation periods, one being the 
"discovery period" and the other known as the "ultimate period". 
The discovery limitation period will not defeat the claims of 
victims of latent injuries and defects as it is knowledge that 
will set the limitation clock ticking. 
The discovery rule will also benefit defendants as most of the 
claimants would have to institute proceedings much sooner than 
under the present existing Act. 
The ultimate limitation period would benefit defendants as that 
period operates as an absolute cutoff date, after which time no 
action could be brought against the defendant. 
A limitation Act for Tasmania based on the Model Act will not 
only simplify the limitation law by doing away with the problems 
of categorisation and characterisation and make it unambiguous 
but as importantly it will operate fairly on claimants and 
defendants alike, and thus fulfil the aims of having a limitation 
law. 
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APPENDIX I 
TIME PERIOD FOR VARIOUS CAUSES OF ACTION UNDER  
THE LIMITATION ACT 1974  
(TASMANIA)  
Relevant Section 
Section 4(1)(a) 
Section 4(1)(b) 
Section 4(1)(d) 
Section 4(2) 
Section 4(3) 
Section 4(4) 
Section 4(5) 
Section 4(6) 
Section 5(1) 
Section 5(2) 
Section 6(1) 
Section 8(2) 
PART II DIVISION II  
Cause of Action 	Time Period 
Simple contract, tort 
including action for damages 
for breach of statutory duty 
Action to enforce a recognisance 
where the submission is not by 
instrument under seal. 
Action to recover any sum 
recoverable by virtue of an 
enactment, other than a penalty 
or forfeiture. 
Action for account. 
Action upon speciality. 
Action upon Judgment. 
Action to recover arrears of 
interest. 
Action to recover penalty or 
forfeiture. 
Action for damages for 
negligence, nuisance or breach 
of duty (personal injuries). 
Actions under the Fatal 
Accidents Act, 1934. 
Action for conversion 
or wrongful detention of 
a chattel. 
Action to enforce claim 
or lien against a vessel. 
6 years 
6 years 
6 years 
6 years 
12 years 
12 years 
6 years 
2 years 
3 years 
1 year 
6 years 
2 years 
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Relevant Section 
Section 10(1) 
Section 10(2) 
Section 12(2) 
Section 17 
Section 17 
Section 18 
Section 22 
Section 23 
Section 24(2) 
Section 25 
Section 8(3) 	Action to enforce claim 	2 years 
or lien in respect of 
salvage services. 
Section 25 
PART II DIVISION III 
Cause of Action 
Adverse possession of land - 
action by crown. 
Adverse possession - in all 
other cases. 
Action to recover land. 
Action to recover land by 
crown. 
Cure of defective disentailing 
assurance. 
Redemption of mortgaged land 
in possession of mortgagee. 
Action to recover rent or damages 
Action to recover money secured 
by a mortgage or Charge or to 
recover proceeds of the sale 
of land. 
Action by beneficiary to recover 
trust property where no other 
provision prescribed by Act. 
Action in respect of any claim 
to the personal estate of 
deceased. 
Action to recover arrears of 
interest in respect of any 
legacy or damages in respect 
of such arrears. 
12 years 
12 years 
6 years 
12 years 
6 years 
12 years 
6 years 
Time Period  
30 years 
12 years 
. 12 years 
30 years 
268 
APPENDIX II  
TAS VIC piLAND 	NSW SA WA 
S.1 S.1 S.1,2 	S.1 S.1 S.1 
S.2(1) S.3(1) S.5(1) 	S.11(1) S.3(1) S.3 
S.2(2) S.3(2) S.5(2) 	S.11(3) S.45(2) 
S.2(3) S.3(3) S.5(3) 
S.2(4) S.3(4) S.5(4) 	S.11(2)(a) 
S.2(5) S.3(4) S.5(4) 
S.2(6) S.3(5) S.5(5) 	S.11(2)(b) 
S.2(7) S.3(6) S.5(6) 	S.11(4) 
S.2(8) S.3(73) S.5(7) 
S.3 S.4 S.9 
S.4(1) S.5(1) S.10(1) 	S.14(1) S.35 S.38(1) 
S.4(2) S.5(2) S.10(2) 	S.15 S.35(b) S.38(1) (c) (iii) 
S.4(3) S.5(3) S.10(3) 	S.16 S.34 
S.4(4) S.5(4) S.10(4) 	S.17 S.34 
S.4(5) S.5(7) S.24(2) S.35(e)(f) 
S.4(6) S.5(5) S.10(5) 	S.18 S.37 
S.5(1) S.5(6) S.11 	S.58 S.36(1) 
S.5(2) S.19 
S.6(1) S.6(1) S.12(1) 	S.21 
S.6(2) S.6(2) S.12(20) 
S.7 S.40(4) 	S.26 
S.8(1) S.10(6)(a)S.22(1) S.35(g) 
S.8(2) S.22(2) 
S.8(3) S.22(3) 
S.8(4) S.22(4) 
S.8(5) 
S.8(6) S.22(5) 
S.8(7) S.22(6) 
S.9 S.5(8) S.10(6)(b)S.23 
S.10(1) S.7 S.27(1) 
S.10(2) S.8 S.27(2) S.4 S.4 
S.10(3) 
S.10(4) S.27(3) 
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S.11(1) S.9(1) S.14(1) S.28 2.6 S.5(a) 
S.11(2) S.9(2) S.14(2) S.29 S.7 S.5(b) 
S.11(3) S.9(3) S.14(3) S.30 S.8 S.5(c) 
S.12(1) S.10(1) S.15(1) S.31 S.9 S.5(d) 
S.12(2) S.10(2) S.15(2) 
S.12(3) 
S.12(4) 
S.12(5) S.10(3) S.15(3) 
S.12 S.10(4) S.15(4) S.22 
S.13(1) S.11(1) S.16(1) S.37 
S.13(2) S.11(2) S.16(3) 
S.13(3) S.11(3) S.13(4) 
S.13(4) S.11(4) S.13(5) 
S.13(5) S.11(5) 
S.14(1) S.12 S.17 S.32(1) S.10 S.6 
S.14(2) S.12 S.17 S.32(2) S.11 
S.15(1) S.13(1) S.18(1) S.34(1) S.15 S.9 
S.15(2) S.12(3) S.18(2) S.34(2) S.16 S.10 
S.15(3) S.13(3) S.18(3) S.17 S.11 
S.16(1) S.14(1) S.19(1) S.38(3) 
S.16(3) S.14(3) S.19(3) S.18(4) 
S.16(4) S.14(4) S.22 S.20 S.14 
S.16A S.25 S.27 
S.17 
S.18 S.15 S.20 S.41 S.29 
S.19 S.16 S.21 S.39 S.18 & 19 S.12 & 
S.20 S.17 S.23 S.29 S.14 S.8 
S.21 S.18 S.24 S.65 S.28 S.30 
S.22 S.19 S.35 S.4 S.34 
S.23(1) S.20 S.26 S.42(1) S.33(1) S.32 
S.23(2) S.20(2) S.26(2) 
S.23(3) S.20(2) S.26(2) 
S.23(4) S.20(3) S.26(3) 
S.23(5) S.20(4) S.26(4) 
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S.23 
S.23(7) 
S.23(8) 
S.24(1) 
S.20(4) 
S.20(5) 
S.21 
S.26(4) 
S.26(5) 
S.42(2) 
S.27 S.27(1) 	S.31 
S.24(2) S.21 S.24(2)(3)S.48 
S.24(3) S.21 S.24(4) S.49 	S.32(1)(b) 
S.24(4) S.32(2) 
S.25 S.22 S.28 S.29 S.33 
S.26(1) S.23(1) S.29 S.52 	S.41(1) S.16 
S.26(2) S.23(1) S.29 
S.26(3) S.23(1) S.29 S.19 
S.26(4) S.23(1) S.29 S.45(3) 
S.26(5) S.23(1) S.29 S.52(3) 
S.26(5) S.23(1) S.29 S.52(3) 
S.26(6) S.23(1) S.29 
S.27 S.53 
S.28 S.23(2) 
S.29(1) S.24(1) S.35(1) S.54 	S.21 S.44 
S.29(2) S.24(1) 
S.29(3) S.24(2) S.35(2) 
S.29(4) S.24(3) S.25(3) 
S.29(5) S.24(3) S.35(3) 
S.30 S.25 S.36 S.54(4) 	& 	S.42(1) S.44(3) 
S.31 S.26(1) S.37(1) S.54(6)(b)&s.45 
S.54(7)(a) 
(i)(ii) 
S.31(2) S.26(2) S.37(2) S.54(7)(a) 
(iii) 
S.31(3) S.26(3) S.37(3) S.54(3) 	S.27(4) 
S.31(4) S.26(4) S.37(4) S.54(7)(a)S.27(3) 
(vi) 
S.31(5) S.26(5) S.37(5) 
S.31(6) S.26(5) S.37(5) 
S.31(7) S.26(6) S.37(6) 
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S.31(8) 
S.31(9) 
S.31(10) 
S.26(6) 
S.26(7) 
S.26(8) 
S.37(6) 
S.36(7) 
S.37(8) 
S.32 S.27 S.38 S.55 & 56 S.25 
S.33 S.28 S.41 S.70-72 
S.34 S.29 S.4(3) 
S.35 S.30 S.42 S.74 S.44 S.46 
S.36 S.31 S.43 S.9 S.49 S.28 
S.37 S.32 S.6 S.10 S.48 
S.38 S.33 S.7 S.7 
S.39 S.35 S.8 
S.40 S.2(1) S.2 
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APPENDIX III 
THE BRITISH COLUMBIA ACT 
LIMITATION ACT 
CHAPTER 236 
DefinitiOns 
1. In this Act 
"action" includes any proceeding in a court and any exercise of a self help remedy; 
"collateral" means land, goods, documents of title, instruments, securities or other 
property that is subject to a security interest; 
"judgment" means a judgment, order or award of 
(a) the Supreme Court of Canada relating to an appeal from a British 
. Columbia court; 
(b) the British Columbia Court of Appeal; 
(c) the Supreme Court of British Columbia; 
(d) a County Court of British Columbia; 
(e) the Provincial Court of British Columbia: and 
(f) an arbitration under a submission' to which the Arbitration Ac: applies; 
"secured party" means a person who has a security interest; 
"security agreement" means an agreement that creates or provides for a security 
interest; 
"security interest" means an interest in collateral that secures payment or performance 
of an obligation; 
"trust" includes express, implied and constructive trusts, whether or not the trustee has 
a beneficial interest in the trust property, and whether or not the trust arises only 
by reason of a transaction impeached, and includes the duties incident to the office 
of personal representative, but does not include the duties incident to the estate or 
interest of a secured party in collateral. 
1975-37-1. 
Application of Act 
2. Nothing in this Act interferes with 
(a) a rule of equity that refuses relief, on the grounds of acquiescence, to a 
person whose right to bring an action is not barred by this Act: 
(b) a rule of equity that refuses relief, on the ground of laches. to a person 
claiming equitable relief in aid of a legal right, whose right to bring the 
action is not barred by this Act; or 
(o) any rule or law that establishes a limitation period, or otherwise refuses 
relief, with respect to proceedings by way of judicial review of the 
exercise of statutory powers. 
1975-37-2. 
Limitation periods 
3. (1) After the expiration of 2 years after the date on which the right to do so 
arose a person shall not bring an action 
(a) for damages in respect of injury to person or property, including 
economic loss arising from the injury, whether based on contract, tort or 
statutory duty; 
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(b) for trespass to property not included in paragraph (a): 
(c) for defamation; 
(d) for false imprisonment: 
(e) for malicious prosecution: 
(f) for tort under the Privacy Act: 
(g) tinder the Family Compensation Act: 
(h) for seduction. 
(2) After the expiration of 10 years after the date on which the right to do so arose 
a person shall not bring an action 
(a) against the personal representatives of a deceased person for a share of 
the estate: 
(b) against a trustee in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to 
which the trustee was party or privy: 
(c) against a trustee for the conversion of trust property to the trustee's own 
use: 
(d) to recover mist property or property into which trust property can be 
traced against a trustee or any other person: 
(e) to recover money on account of a wrongful distribution of trust property 
against the person to whom the property is distributed, or a successor: 
(f) on a judgment for the payment of money or the return of personal 
property. 
(3) A person is not governed by a limitation period and may at any time brine an 
action 
(a) for possession of land where the person entitled to possession has been 
dispossessed in circumstances amounting to trespass: 
(b) for possession of land by a life tenant or remainderrnan: 
(c) on a judgment for the possession of land: 
(d) by a debtor in possession of collateral to redeem that collateral: 
(e) by a secured party in possession of collateral to realize on that collateral: 
(f) by a landlord to recover possession of land from a tenant who is in 
default or over holding: 
(g) relating to the enforcement of an injunction or a restraining order: 
(h) to enforce an • easement. restrictive covenant or profit a prendre: 
(i) for a declaration as to personal status: 
(j) for or declaration as to the title to property by any person in possession of 
that property. 
(4) Any other action not specifically provided for in this Act or any other Act 
shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years after the date on which the right to do 
SO arose. 
(5) Without limiting the generality of subsection (4) and notwithstanding 
subsections (1) and (3). after the expiration of 6 years after the date on which right to do 
so arose an action shall not be brought 
(a) by a secured party not in possession of collateral to realize on that 
collateral: 
(b) by a debtor not in possession of collateral to redeem that collateral: 
(c) for damages for conversion or detention of goods: 
(d) for the recovery of goods wrongfully taken or detained: 
(e) by a tenant against a landlord for the possession of land, whether or not 
the tenant was dispossessed in circumstances amounting to trespass: 
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(f) for the possession of land by a person who has a right to enter for breach 
of a condition subsequent, or a right to possession arising under 
possibility of reverter of a determinable estate. 
(6) No beneficiary. as against whom there would be a good defence by virtue of 
this section. shall derive any greater or other benefit from a judgment or order obtained 
by another beneficiary than he could have obtained if he had brought the action or other 
proceeding and this section had been pleaded. 
(7) In subsections (3) and (5) "debtor" means a person who owes payment or 
other performance of an obligation secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the 
collateral. 
1975-37-3. 
Courterciaim. etc. 
4. ( ) Where an action to which this or any other Act applies has been 
commenced. the lapse of time limited for bringing an action is no bar to 
(a) proceedings by counterclaim, including the adding of a new party as a 
defendant by counterclaim: 
(b) third party proceedings: 
(c) claims by way of set off: or 
(d) adding or substituting of a new party as plaintiff or defendant. 
under any applicable law, with respect to any claims relating to or connected with the 
subject matter of the original action. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not operate so as to enable one person to make a claim 
against another person where a claim by that other person 
(a) against the first mentioned person: and 
(b) relating to or connected with the subject matter of the action. 
is or will be defeated by pleading a provision of this Act as a defence,by the first 
mentioned person. 
(3) Subsection (1) does not operate so as to interfere with any judicial discretion 
to refuse relief on grounds unrelated to the lapse of time limited for bringing an action. 
(4) In any action the court may allow the amendment of a pleading. on terms as to 
costs or otherwise that the court considers just, notwithstanding that between the issue 
of the writ and the application for amendment a fresh cause of action disclosed by the 
amendnient would have become barred by the lapse of time. 
1975-37-4. 
Confirmation of cause of action 
5. ( I ) Where, after time has commenced to run with respect to a limitation 
period fixed by this Act, but before the expiration of the limitation period, a person 
against whom an action lies confirms the cause of action, the time during which the 
limitation period runs before the date of the confirmation does not count in the 
reckoning of the limitation period for the action by a person having the benefit of the 
confirmation against a person bound by the confirmation. 
(2) For the purposes of this section. 
(a) a person confirms a cause of action only if he 
(i) acknowledges a cause of action, right or title of another. or 
'ail makes a payment in respect of a cause of action, right or title of 
another 
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(b) an acknowledgment of a judgment or debt has effect 
(i) whether or not a promise to pay can be implied from it; and 
(ii) whether or not it is accompanied by a refusal to pay: 
(c) a confirmation of a cause of action to recover interest on principal money 
operates also as a confirmation of a cause of action to recover the 
principal money; and 
(d) a confirmation of a cause of action to recover income falling due at any 
time operates also as a confirmation of a cause of action to recover 
income falling due at a later time on the same amount. 
(3) Where a secured party has a cause of action to realize on collateral. 
(a) a payment to him of principal or interest secured by the collateral: or 
(b) any other payment to him in respect of his right to realize on the 
collateral, or any other performance by the other person of the obligation 
secured. 
is a confirmation by the payer or performer of the cause of action. 
(4) Where a secured party is in possession of collateral. 
(a) his acceptance of a payment to him of principal or interest secured by the 
collateral: or 
(b) his acceptance of 
(i) payment to him in respect of his right to realize on the collateral: 
or 
(ii) any other performance by the other person of the obligation 
secured, 
is a confirmation by him to the payer or performer of the payer's or performer's cause 
of action to redeem the collateral. 
(5) For the purposes of this section. an acknowledgment must be in writing and 
signed by the maker. 
(6) For the purposes of this section, a person has the benefit of a confirmation 
only if the confirmation is made to him or to a person through whom he claims, or if 
made in the course of proceedings or a transaction purporting to be under the 
Bankruptcy Act (Canada). 
(7) For the purposes of this section. a person is bound by a confirmation only if 
(a) he is a maker of the confirmation: 
(b) after the making of the confirmation. he becomes. in relation to the cause 
of action, a successor of the maker. 
(c) the maker is, at the time when he makes the confirmation, a trustee, and 
the first mentioned person is at the date of the confirmation or afterwards 
becomes a trustee of the trust of which the maker is a trustee: or 
(d) he is bound under subsection (8). 
(8) Where a person who confirms a cause of action to 
(a) recover property: 
(b) enforce an equitable estate or interest in property: 
(c) realize on collateral: 
(d) redeem collateral: 
(e) recover principal money or interest secured by a security agreement. by 
way of the appointment of a receiver of collateral or of the income or 
profits of collateral or by way of sale. lease or other disposition of 
collateral or by way of other remedy affecting collateral: or 
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(f) recover trust property or property into which trust property can be traced. 
is on the date of the confirmation in possession of the property or collateral, the 
confirmation binds any person in possession during the ensuing period of limitation, 
not being, or claiming through, a person other than the maker who is. on the date of the 
confirmation, in possession of the property or collateral. 
(9) For the purposes of this section. a confirmation made by or to an agent has the 
same effect as if made by or to the principal. 
(10) Except as specifically provided, this section does not operate to make any 
right, title or cause of action capable of being confirmed which was not capable of 
being confirmed before July 1. 1975. 
1975-37-5. 
Running of time postponed 
6. (1) The running of time with respect to the limitation period fixed by this Act 
for an action 
(a) based on fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which a trustee was a party 
. 	or privy: or 
(b) to recover from a trustee trust property. or the proceeds from it. in the 
possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and 
converted to his own use. 
is postponed and does not commence to run against a beneficiary until that beneficiary 
becomes fully aware of the fraud, fraudulent breach of trust, conversion or other act of 
the trustee on which the action is based. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the burden of proving that time has 
commenced to run so as to bar an action rests on the trustee. 
(3) The running of time with respect to the limitation periods fixed by this Act for 
an action 
(a) for personal injury: 
(b) for damage to property: 
(c) for professional negligence: 
(d) based on fraud or deceit; 
(e) in which material facts relating to the cause of action have been wilfully 
concealed: 	• 
(f) for relief from the consequences of a mistake: . 
(g) brought under the Family Compensation Act: or 
(h) for breach of trust not within subsection (1) 
is postponed and time does not commence to run against a plaintiff until the identity of 
the defendant is known to him and those facts within his means of knowledge are such 
that a reasonable man, knowing those facts and having taken the appropriate advice a 
reasonable man would seek on those facts, would regard those facts as showing that 
(i) an action on the cause of action would, apart from the effect of the 
expiration of a limitation period, have a reasonable prospect of success: 
and 
(j) the person whose means of knowledge is in question ought. in his own 
interests and taking his circumstances into account, to be able to bring an 
action. 
(4) For the purpose of subsection (3). 
(a) "appropriate advice — , in relation to facts, means the advice of 
competent persons. qualified in their respective fields, to advise on the 
medical. legal and other aspects of the facts, as the case may require: 
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(6) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (3). where a person under a disability has 
a guardian and anyone against whom that person may have a cause of action causes a 
notice to proceed to be delivered to the guardian and to the Public Trustee in 
accordance with this section. time commences to run against that person as if he had 
ceased to be under a disability on the date the notice is delivered. 
(7) A notice, to proceed delivered under this section must 
(a) be in writing: 
(b) be addressed to the guardian and to the Public Trustee: 
(c) specify the name of the person under a disability: 
(d) specify the circumstances out of which the Cause of action may arise or 
may be claimed to arise with such particularity as is necsary to enable 
the guardian to investigate whether the person under a disability has the 
cause of action: 
(e) give warning that a cause of action arising out of the circumstances stated 
in the notice is liable to be barred by this Act: 
(f) specify the name of the person on whose behalf the notice is delivered: 
and 
(g) be signed by the person delivering the notice. or his solicitor. 
(8) Subsection (6) operates to benefit only those persons on whose behalf the 
notice is delivered and only with respect to cause of action arising out of the 
circumstances specified in the notice. 
(9) The onus of proving that the running of time has been postponed or suspended 
under this section is on the person claiming the benefit of the postponement or 
suspension. • 
(10) A notice to proceed delivered under this section is not a confirmation for the 
purposes of this Act and is not an admission for any purpose. 
(11) The Attorney General may make regulations prescribing the form, content 
and mode of delivery of a notice to proceed. 
1975.37-7. 
Ultimate limitation 
8. (1) Subject to section 3 (3), but notwithstanding a confirmation made under 
section 5 or a postponement or suspension of the running of time under section 6. 7 or 
12. no action to which this Act applies shall be brought after the expiration of 30 years 
from the date on which the right to do so arose, or in the case of an action against a 
hospital, as defined in section 1 or 25 of the Hospital Act. or hospital employee acting 
in the course of employment as a hospital employee, based on negligence, or against a 
medical practitioner based on professional negligence or malpractice. after the 
expiration of 6 years from the date on which the right to do so arose. 
(2) Subject to subsection (1). the effect of sections 6 and 7 is cumulative. 
1975.374: 1977.76.19. 
Cause of action extinguished 
9 - ( 1) On the expiration of a limitation period fixed by this Act for a cause of 
action to recover any debt, damages or other money. or for an accounting in respect of 
any matter. the right and title of the person formerly having the cause of action and of a 
person claiming through him in respect of that matter is. as against the person against 
whom the cause of action formerly lay and as against his successors. extinguished. 
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(2) On the expiration of a limitation period fixed by this Act for a cause of action 
specified in column 1 of the following table, the title of a person formerly having the 
cause of action to the property specified opposite the cause of action in column 2 of the 
table and of a person claiming through him in respect of that property is, as against the 
person against whom the cause of action formerly lay and as against his successors, 
extinguished. 
Column I 	 Column 2. 
Cause of action 	 Property 
• For conversion or detention of goods. 	The goods. 
To enforce an equitable estate or interest in 
land. 
To redeem collateral, in the possession of 
the secured party. 
To realize on collateral in the possession of 
the debtor. 
To recover trust property or property into 
which crust property can be traced. 
For the possession of land by a person 
having a right to enter for a condition 
subsequent broken or a possibility of 
reverter of a determinable estate. 
The equitable estate or interest. 
The collateral. 
The collateral. 
The trust property or the property into which the 
trust property can be traced. as the case may be. 
The land. 
(3) A cause of action, whenever arising, to recover costs on a judgment or to 
recover arrears of interest on principal money is extinguished by the expiration of the 
limitation period fixed by this Act for an action between the same parties on the 
judgment or to recover the principal money. 
1975-37-9. 
Conversion or detention of goods 
10. Where a cause of action for the conversion or detention of goods accrues to a 
person and afterwards, possession of the goods not having been recovered by him or by 
a person claiming through him. 
(a) a further cause of action for the conversion or detention of the goods; 
(b) a new cause of action for damage to the goods: or 
(c) a new cause of action to recover the proceeds of a sale of the goods. 
accrues to him or a person claiming through him. no action shall be brought on the 
further or new cause of action after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the 
first cause of action accrued to the plaintiff or to a person through whom he claims. 
1975-37-10. 
Completion of enforcement process 
11. (I) Notwithstanding section 3 or 9. where. on the expiration of the 
limitation period fixed by this Act with respect to actions on judgment. there is an 
enforcement process outstanding. the judgment creditor or his successors may 
(a) continue proceedings on an unexpired writ of execution, but no renewal 
of the writ shall be permitted: 
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(b) commence or continue proceedings against land on a judement registered 
under the Court Order Enforcement Act. Part 3. but no renewal of the 
registration shall be permitted unless those proceedings have been 
commenced: or 
(c) continue proceedings in which a charging order is claimed. 
(2) Where a court makes an order staying execution on a judgment. the running of 
time with respect to the limitation period fixed by this Act for actions on that judgment 
is postponed or suspended for so long as that order is in force. 
1975-37-11. 
Adverse possession 
12. Except as specifically provided by this or any other Act, no right or title in or 
to land may be acquired by adverse possession. 
1975-37-12. 
Foreign limitation law 
13: Where it is determined in an action that the law of a jurisdiction other than 
British Columbia is applicable and the limitation law of that jurisdiction is. for the 
purposes of private international law, classified as procedural, the court may apply 
British Columbia limitation law or may apply the limitation law of the other jurisdiction 
if a more just result is produced. 
1975-37-13. 
Transitional provisions 
14. (1) Nothing in this Act revives any cause of action that is statute barred on 
July I. 1975. 
(2) Subject to subsections (1) and (3). this Act applies to actions that arose before 
July 1. 1975. 
(3) If. with respect to a cause of action that arose before this Act comes into force. 
the limitation period provided by this Act is shorter than that which formerly governed 
the cause of action, and will expire on or before July 1. 1977. the limitation period 
governing that cause of action shall be the shorter of 
(a) 2 years from July I. 1975: or 
(b) the limitation period that formerly governed the cause of action. 
(4) Subject to subsection (1). a confirmation effective under section 5 is effective. 
whether given before, on or after . July I. 1975. 
(5) Nothing in this Act interferes with any right or title to land acquired by 
adverse possession before July t, 1975. 
1975-37-14: 1977-76-19. 
Repeal of special limitations 
15. (1) Where an Act that incorporates or constitutes a private or public body 
contains a provision that would have the effect of limiting the time in which an action 
(a) within section 3 (1). (2) and (3): or 
(b) to enforce any right or obligation riot specifically created by that Act. 
may be brought against that body, that provision is repealed to the extent- that it is 
inconsistent with this Act. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a limitation provision that specifically 
provides that it operates notwithstanding this Act. 
1975.37. if, 
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[Definitions] 
1 	In this Act, 
(a) 	"claim" means a matter giving rise to a civil proceeding in 
which a claimant seeks a remedial order; 
(b) 	"claimant" means the person who seeks a remedial order; 
(c) 	"defendant" means a person against whom a remedial order is 
sought; 
(d) 	"enforcement order" means an order or writ made by a court 
for the enforcement of a remedial order; 
(e) 	"injury" means 
(1) 	personal injury, 
(ii) property damage, 
(iii) economic loss, 
(iv) non-performance of an obligation, or 
(v) in the absence of any of the above, the breach of a duty; 
(f) 	"law" means the law in force in the Province, and includes 
(1) 	statutes, 
(ii) judicial precedents, and 
(iii) regulations; 
(g) 
	
"limitation provision" includes a limitation period or notice 
provision that that has the effect of a limitation period; 
(h) 	"person under disability" means 
(i) 	a minor, or 
(ii) 	an adult who is unable to make reasonable judgments 
in respect of matters relating to the claim; 
(i) 	'remedial order' means a judgment or an order made by a 
court in a civil proceeding requiring a defendant to comply with 
a duty or to pay damages for the violation of a right, and 
excludes 
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(i) a declaration of rights and duties, legal relations or 
personal status, 
(ii) the enforcement of a remedial order, 
(iii) judicial review of the decision, act or omission of a 
person, board, commission, tribunal or other body in the 
exercise of a power conferred by statute, or 
(iv) habeas corpus; 
(i) 	"right" means any right under the law and "duty" has a 
correlative meaning; 
(k) 	"security interest" means an interest in property that secures 
the payment or other performance of an obligation. 
[Application] 
• 2(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), this Act is applicable to any 
claim, including a claim to which this Act can apply arising under any 
law that is subject to the legislative jurisdiction of the Parliament of 
Canada, if 
(a) the remedial order is sought in a proceeding before a court 
created by the Province, or 
(b) the claim arose within the Province and the remedial order is 
sought in a proceeding before a court created by the Parliament 
of Canada. 
(2) 	This Act does not apply where a claimant seeks: 
(a) a remedial order based on adverse possession of real property 
owned by the Crown, or 
(b) a remedial order the granting of which is subject to a limitation 
provision in any other enactment of the Province. 
(3) 	The Crown is bound by this Act. 
[Limitation Periods] 
3(1) Subject to section 11, if a claimant does not seek a remedial order 
within 
(a) 	2 years after the date on which the claimant first knew, or in 
his circumstances ought to have known, 
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(I) 	that the injury for which he seeks a remedial order had 
occurred, 
(ii) that the injury was to some degree attributable to 
conduct of the defendant, and 
(iii) that the injury, assuming liability on the part of the 
defendant, was sufficiently serious to have warranted 
bringing a proceeding, 
Or 
(b) 	15 years after the claim arose, 
whichever period expires first, the defendant, upon pleading this Act 
as a defence, is entitled to immunity from liability in respect of the 
claim 
(2) 	The limitation period provided by clause (1)(a) begins 
(a) 	against a successor owner of a claim when either a predecessor 
owner or the successor owner of the claim first acquired or 
ought to have acquired the knowledge prescribed in clause 
(1)(a); 
(b) 	against a principal when either 
(i) the principal first acquired or ought to have acquired 
the knowledge prescribed in clause (1)(a), or 
(ii) an agent with a duty to communicate the knowledge 
prescribed in clause (1)(a) to the principal first actually 
acquired that knowledge; 
and 
(c) 	against a personal representative of a deceased person as a 
successor owner of a claim, at the earliest of the following 
times: 
(i) when the deceased owner first acquired or ought to have 
acquired the knowledge prescribed in clause (1)(a), if he 
acquired the knowledge more than 2 years before his 
death, 
(ii) when the representative was appointed, if he had the 
knowledge prescribed in clause (I)(a) at that time, or 
(iii) when the representative first acquired or ought to have 
acquired the knowledge prescribed in clause (1)(a), if he 
acquired the knowledge after his appointment. 
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(3) 	For the purposes of clause (1)(b), 
(a) a claim or any number of claims based on any number of 
breaches of duty, resulting from a continuing course of conduct 
or a series of related acts or omissions arises when the conduct 
terminated or the last act or omission occurred; 
(b) a claim based on a breach of a duty arises when the conduct, 
act or omission occurred; 
(c) a claim based on a demand obligation arises when a default in 
performance occurred after a demand for performance was 
made; 
(d) a claim in respect of a proceeding under the Fatal Accidents 
Act arises when the conduct which caused the death, upon 
which the claim is based, occurred; 
(e) a claim for contribution arises when the claimant for 
contribution was made a defendant in respect of, or incurred 
a liability through the settlement of, a claim seeking to impose 
a liability upon which the claim for contribution could be 
based, whichever first occurs. 
(4) 	The limitation period provided by clause 3(1)(a) does not apply where 
a claimant seeks a remedial order for possession of real property, 
including a remedial order under section 60 of the Law of Property 
Act. 
(5) 	Under this section, 
(a) the claimant has the burden of proving that a remedial order 
was sought within the limitation period provided by clause 
(1)(a), and 
(b) the defendant has the burden of proving that a remedial order 
was not sought within the limitation period provided by clause 
(1)(b). 
[Acquiescence or Laches] 
4 	Nothing in this Act precludes a court from granting a defendant 
immunity from liability under the equitable doctrines of acquiescence 
or laches, notwithstanding that the defendant would not be entitled to 
immunity pursuant to this Act. 
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[Concealment] 
5(1) The operation of the limitation period provided by clause 3(1)(b) is 
suspended during any period of time that the defendant fraudulently 
concealed the fact that the injury for which a remedial order is sought 
had occurred. 
(2) 	Under this section, the claimant has the burden of proving that the 
operation of the limitation period provided by clause 3(1)(b) was 
suspended. 
[Persons under Disability] 
6(1) The operation of the limitation periods provided by this Act is 
suspended during any period of time that the claimant was a person 
under disability. 
(2) 	Under this section, the claimant has the burden of proving that the 
operation of the limitation periods provided by this Act was 
suspended. 
[Claims Added to a Proceeding] 
7(1) Notwithstanding the expiration of the relevant limitation period, when 
a claim is added to a proceeding previously commenced, either 
through a new pleading or an amendment to pleadings, the defendant 
is not entitled to immunity from liability in respect of the added claim 
if the requirements of either subsection (2), (3) or (4) are satisfied. 
(2) When the added claim 
(a) is made by a defendant in the proceeding against a claimant 
in the proceeding, or 
(b) does not add or substitute a claimant or a defendant, or change 
the capacity in which a claimant sues or a defendant is sued, 
the added claim must be related to the conduct, transaction or events 
described in the original pleading in the proceeding. 
(3) 	When the added claim adds or substitutes a claimant, or changes the 
capacity in which a claimant sues, 
(a) the added claim must be related to the conduct, transaction or 
events described in the original pleading in the proceeding, 
(b) the defendant must have received, within the limitation period 
applicable to the added claim plus the time provided by law for 
the service of process, sufficient knowledge of the added claim 
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that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defence to it on 
the merits, and 
(c) the court must be satisfied that the added claim is necessary 
or desirable to ensure the effective enforcement of the claims 
originally asserted or intended to be asserted in the proceeding. 
(4) 	When the added claim adds or substitutes a defendant, or changes the 
capacity in which a defendant is sued, 
(a) the added claim must be related to the conduct, transaction or 
events described in the original pleading in the proceeding, 
(b) the defendant must have received, within the limitation period 
applicable to the added claim plus the time provided by law for 
the service of process, sufficient knowledge of the added claim 
that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defence to it on 
the merits. 
(5) 	Under this section, 
(a) the claimant has the burden of proving 
(1) 	that the added claim is related to the conduct, 
transaction or events described in the original pleading 
in the proceeding, and 
(ii) 	that the requirement of clause (3)(c), if in issue, has 
been satisfied, 
and 
(b) the defendant has the burden of proving that the requirement 
of clause (3)(b) or 4(b), if in issue, was not satisfied. 
[Agreement] 
8 	Subject to section 10, if an agreement provides for the reduction or 
extension of a limitation period provided by this Act, the limitation 
period is altered in accordance with the agreement. 
[Acknowledgment and Part Payment] 
9(1) In this section, "claim" means a claim for the recovery, through the 
realization of a security interest or otherwise, of an accrued liquidated 
pecuniary sum, including, but not.limited to a principal debt, rents, 
income, a share of estate property, and interest on any of the 
foregoing. 
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(2) 	Subject to subsections (3) and (4) and section 10, if a person liable 
in respect of a claim acknowledges the claim, or makes a part 
payment in respect of the claim, before the expiration of the limitation 
period applicable to the claim, the operation of the limitation periods 
begins anew at the time of the acknowledgment or part payment. 
(3) A claim may be acknowledged only by an admission of the person 
liable in respect of it that the sum claimed is due and unpaid, but an 
acknowledgment is effective 
(a) whether or not a promise to pay can be implied from it, and 
(b) whether or not it is accompanied by a refusal to pay. 
(4) When a claim is for the recovery of both a primary sum and interest 
thereon, an acknowledgment of either obligation, or a part payment 
in respect of either obligation, is an acknowledgment of, or a part 
payment in respect of, the other obligation. 
[Persons Affected by Exceptions for Agreement, Acknowledgment and Part 
Payment] 
10(1) An agreement and an acknowledgment must be in writing and signed 
by the person adversely affected. 
(2) 	(a) An agreement made by or with an agent has the same effect as 
if made by or with the principal, and 
(b) an acknowledgment or a part payment made by or to an agent 
has the same effect as if made by or to the principal. 
(3) 	A person has the benefit of an agreement, an acknowledgment or a 
part payment only if it is made 
(a) with or to him, 
(b) with or to a person through whom he derives a claim, or 
(c) in the course of procee- dings or a transaction purporting to be 
pursuant to the Bankruptcy Act (Canada). 
(4) 	A person is bound by an agreement, an acknowledgment or a part 
payment only if 
(a) he is a maker of it, or 
(b) he is liable in respect of a claim 
(i) 	as a successor of a maker, or 
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(ii) 	through the acquisition of an interest in property from 
or through a maker 
who was liable in respect of the claim. 
[Judgment for Payment of Money] 
	
11 	it within 10 years after the claim arose, a claimant does not seek a 
remedial order in respect of a claim based on a judgment or order for 
the payment of money, the defendant, upon pleading this Act as a 
defence, is entitled to immunity from liability in respect of the claim. 
[Conflict of Laws] 
12 	The limitations law of the Province shall be applied whenever a 
remedial order is sought in this Province, notwithstanding that, in 
accordance with conflict of law rules, the claim will be adjudicated 
under the substantive Law of another jurisdiction. . 
[Transitional] 
13(1) Subject to subsection (2), this Act applies where a claimant seeks a 
remedial order in a proceeding commenced after the date the Act comes 
into force. 
(2) A defendant is not entitled to immunity from liability in respect of a claim 
of which the claimant /mew, or in his circumstances ought to have known 
before this Act came into force and in respect of which a remedial order 
is sought 
(a) in time to satisfr the provisions of law governing the 
commencement of actions which would have been applicable but 
for this Act, and 
(b) within 2 years after the date this Act comes into force. 
[Consequential] 
14(1) Section 60 of the Law of Propeny Ad is amended by adding the 
following: 
(3) 	No right to the access and use of light or any other easement, 
right graz or profit a prendre shall be acquired by a person by in 
prescription, and it shall be deemed that no such right has ever been 
so acquired. 
(2) 	The Limitation of AcTions Acr is repealed. 
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